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Date 23/4/76

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FILE No. NB R 1/2 (Part "B")

TITLE: KURDS IN IRAQ.

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G8B	91	11/11	R		26/XI			
R		11/XI	G8B	114	11/11			

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1974

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From: Russell Johnston, M.P.



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

1. Acknowledged ..... 12/9 .....  
2. Minister of State has/has not seen  
3. .... NE ..... Department for  
..... reply from.....



10th September 1974

*Draft*  
*13/9*

Dear David,

Thank you for your letter about the position of the Kurds in Iraq.

You say that the British Government has no locus in the matter and that in consequence no representations can be made to the Iraqi Government.

I am afraid I do not understand the logic of the situation when we can regularly make representations about internal situations in a number of countries, such as South Africa, the USSR, Greece, South Vietnam, the DDR, etc.

Surely if the FCO has evidence that injustice is being done somewhere Britain ought to raise her voice against it?

Yours sincerely,

P.P.

*Russell*

dictated by Mr. Johnston  
and signed in his absence

The Rt. Hon. David Ennals, M.P.,  
Minister of State,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office.



111/DA

SECRET

Ministry of Defence  
DI 4b  
Main Building  
Whitehall  
London SW1



11 September 1974

### THE KURDISH SITUATION

1. Mr Andrew Murray-Threpland of the Sunday Times was introduced to me at a Cocktail Party by the Embassy Information Officer, and as he had just arrived from Iraqi Kurdistan I invited him to talk to the Service Attaches in the Embassy. This he did off the record and unattributably on 11 September. He struck us as being absolutely straightforward and open in the discussions. What is reported here is either what he saw or what he learnt from talking to Kurd Commanders, in particular Mahmud Barzani, Head of Intelligence.

2. Kurd morale. One of the main points he made which is at variance with other information, was that Kurd morale is high. They carry out organised relief in the line (hardly a sign of a last ditch stand); their Commanders are elderly, though extremely experienced in their jobs; the Kurds are not isolated and cut off, indeed Murray-Threpland said it was more the Iraqi army who were beleaguered. The Kurds have freedom of movement by night; they offered to take him to just outside Kirkuk. Although Sulaymaniyah had fallen to the Iraqis, the Kurds were in complete control of the hills around the town. None of the above would suggest that the Kurds are in danger of defeat before being saved by the winter, though, of course, the Kurds are looking forward to the Iraqis retiring to winter quarters.

### 3. Kurd Weapons

- a. They are short of weaponry, particularly anti-tank weapons. They are not short of ammunition for these weapons they have. Much ammunition is 'bought' from Iraq.
- b. The Kurd soldier is issued with a rifle: either Chinese or Russian Kalashnikovs (the latter is in shorter supply but is more expensive and is a better weapon) or BPNO 12s, the most numerous of their rifles. The soldier has to buy everything else, eg water bottle, out of his pay (the equivalent of £12 per month). Supply of small arms ammunition is plentiful.
- c. They have some Soviet 120mm mortars, transported on mules. Murray-Threpland watched, from the CP position, their mortars engaging tanks unsuccessfully, though apparently a near miss blows a tank off.

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SECRET

- d. He saw 5 x 25 pirs (they have some more but not many) captured from the Iraqis. (This ammo must be bought from the Iraqis, I imagine).
- e. They have 7 or 8 RPG-7s. The Kurds think this a good weapon "but only within 200 metres of the tank".
- f. They have some ZU 23-2.

4. Kurd Intelligence on Iraqi Forces

- a. There are 8000 Soviet advisors in Iraq. Of these, 1500 are with the Air Force; 1500 with the army. Murray-Threpland (who speaks Russian) heard, on a captured Iraqi radio, a fluent Russian speaker speaking to a not so fluent Russian speaker. (Russian Advisor to Iraqi Russian speaker? - It appears that the Russians are well forward).
- b. 6 1/2 Iraqi Divisions are deployed against the Kurds (which leaves little elsewhere?).
- c. Iraqis have SAMs 2, 3, 6 and 7, PROGs, KATU HKA Rocket Launchers, 1200 tanks, of which 250 are T62.
- d. Iraqi poison gas is stored at Taji military camp.
- e. Tupolev 22 and IL 28 (Blinder and Badger) are flown against the Kurds at very high altitude. MIG 19s drop "cluster bombs" and Napalm and these weapons the Kurds fear. SUKOY 7s are used for strafing. Straightforward bombing does little damage. Only about 4 or 5 aeroplanes came over daily. Murray-Threpland could not understand why the Iraqis don't employ more air power. Murray-Threpland said no MIG 23s had been flown against the Kurds.
- f. Helicopters. A Squadron each of MI6 (Hock) and MI8 (Hip), and some French Alouettes. Helicopters had tried once to get behind the Kurds, but had been repelled bloodily.
- g. Kirkuk was protected by 2 Army Brigades of Infantry, and one Gendarmerie Brigade.
- h. 300 tanks round Rawandis.

5. Iraqi losses (according to the Kurds) since March

- a. 36 aircraft including MIG 19, Hunter and helicopters.
- b. 160 tanks (but they had received 200 more).
- c. 2600 men. 890 bodies had been captured by the Kurds.
- d. 840 deserters from regular army to Kurds. Murray-Threpland spoke to 8 Kurd Officers who had been trained in the Iraqi Military Academy.

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6. Kurdish losses. 250 men since March. Murray-Threpland saw 50-70 Iraqi bodies as a result of an action in which Kurds claimed they had one KIA.

7. Kurdish Budget. 3 million Iraqi dinars a month, of which 20% comes from Kurdish sources, the remainder from outside.

8. Turkish/Kurd Border

- a. This is heavily guarded by the Turkish Army. Smuggling is difficult. Food prices are high as a result in the Kurdish areas.
- b. The Kurds, with captured bull-dozers are building a road East/West south of the Turkish border, primarily for their own lateral communications but also to ease the refugee problem.


9. Political

- a. Two Kurdish tribes totalling some 6000 men are fighting with the Iraqis as they don't like Barzani. (I imagine some of these are useful contacts for buying information and arms?).
- b. The Iraqis are kicking all the Kurds families out of Kirkuk and forcing Arabs to live there. Similarly Kurds are being thrown out of Baghdad. The Kurds particularly dislike the present Iraqi Government for this reason. Although capable of Palestinian style raids, Mustafa Barzani himself has forbidden them: he does not want the Kurds to be accused of any atrocities nor is it in their tradition.

10. Kurdish HQ is 25 Kms East of Rawandiz at Chalmow (sp?).

11. SUMMARY

- a. Kurdish morale is high. They are in no danger of defeat before the winter.
- b. They need more weapons, particularly anti-tank weapons.
- c. Their intelligence on Iraqi forces is excellent.
- d. Many more refugees can be expected.
- e. The Iraqis are not deploying as many aircraft as one might expect. Shortage of trained pilots in difficult flying conditions?
- f. Russian advisors are well forward.

  
A B S H GOOCH  
Major  
Assistant Military Attache

Copy to: H of C

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(47)

111/DA

SECRET

Ministry of Defense  
DI 40  
Pain Building  
Whitehall  
London W1



11 September 1974

THE KURDISH SITUATION

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- c. They have some Soviet 120mm mortars, transported on mules. Murray-Therpland stated, from the CP position, that mortar engagements were unsuccessful, though apparently a near miss blew a tank off.

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DA  
IO  
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(48)

# THE KURDS

1. Mr Andrew Murray of the Sunday Times asked to see me last night. He had previously called on me at the Embassy, before travelling to Kurdistan. He has just returned.

2. Murray said that he had heard from the Kurdish representative in London before he set out that a major Iraqi offensive was underway and that the late summer would be a crucial period for the Kurds. When he arrived in Kurdistan he was surprised therefore to find morale was very high. From Barzani downwards, the Kurds did not contemplate the prospect of defeat. They accepted of course that the Iraqis had made some territorial gains but that was only to be expected considering the weight of men and arms which was being thrown into the battle.

3. The situation on the ground was not as bad as it might appear from the maps. The Iraqi advances had been confined to a number of tongues protruding into former Kurdistan territory which followed fairly easy ground either along river valleys or widish planes. One of these tongues ended at Soleimanieh. The next ended at Qala Diza, which had fallen recently. The third ended at Rawanduz which had also fallen during the campaign. But the Iraqis had had no success at all in fighting sideways from these tongues to penetrate Kurdistan mountain territory. As soon as they went off the valleys and planes their tanks were no good. The Kurds were sufficiently sure of themselves to take Murray to a point on a hill overlooking Rawanduz where 300 Iraqi tanks could be seen milling around wondering where to go next. Murray had also arrived on the scene shortly after a night battle in which Iraqi troops had attempted to storm a peak overlooking one of the valleys which they held. The attack had been repulsed and Murray had counted 70 Iraqi bodies at a cost of only one Kurdish casualty.

4. I asked Murray why, if the situation was not in fact that serious, so many Kurdish refugees were pouring into Iran. Murray said that Iraq's bombing had driven many Kurdish families out of their villages. This was of no relevance to the military campaign, apart from creating morale problems, but it did mean that these people had no where to go. The 73,000 odd in Iran were well cared for. But there were a further 100,000 refugees just over the border into Iraqi Kurdistan, waiting to cross into Iran. On top of this, there were another 200,000 along the Turkish border to the East of Zukhu, which had fallen to the Iraqis earlier in the campaign. Most of the last group had been driven from the plane and were now in a bad way. It was difficult to get supplies to them because there were no good roads running north from Haji Omran in that direction. Kurdish engineers were rapidly building one with captured Iraqi bulldozers /but

about 40  
miles from the  
Kaman border  
and Amshahr.

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but this took time. The Turks had sealed their border very carefully and were allowing no supplies across; smuggling was so difficult that a tin of powdered milk cost £15. Murray said that he was not worried about the refugees who either were in Iran or would probably arrive there before the snows, but he thought that the remainder had a very bleak future. He intended to give their plight as much publicity as possible.

5. Murray had had three hours with Barzani himself. He was old but certainly not dying and full of good humour. Idris seemed sure to succeed his father and there was no hint of any succession problem. Murray had asked Barzani why his men did not resort to terrorist tactics within Iraqi territory. Barzani had replied that he might be old fashioned but he did not believe in throwing bombs at women and children ~~but~~ to advance a political cause. Murray found this rather charming when the Iraqis had no scruples in bombing Kurdish villages. Barzani had asked Murray whether he thought there was any prospect of the British helping. Murray had replied that he thought absolutely not. Barzani had smiled wistfully and said that if the British had devoted half as much time and effort to him as they had to the Arabs, they would still retain some influence in the Middle East.

6. A last tidbit. Murray had positive evidence of Russian personnel being involved in front line operations. He, a Russian speaker, had heard on a Kurdish radio, a Russian and an Iraqi in two tanks conversing with each other in Russian. S.D.A. and I.O., whom I believe also saw Murray, may be able to add more.

*Mike Browne*

12 September 1974

N W Browne

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"HOME NEWS BULLETIN 16TH YEAR (NO.253) TUESDAY, 10 September"1974"

**TANGIBLE POSITIVE RESULTS**  
**ACHIEVED BY PPNF'S GOOD-WILL**  
**DELEGATION - HADDAD SPEAKS**  
**OF DELEGATION'S WEST EUROPEAN TOUR**

Baghdad, 10th September - INA.

The delegation of the Patriotic and Progressive Nationalist Front (PPNF) which recently returned from a West European tour has successfully expounded Iraq's peaceful and democratic approach to the Kurdish nationalist issue, Mr. Naeem Haddad, the PPNF Secretary General declared today.

Mr. Haddad, also member of the Regional Leadership of the Arab Baath Socialist Party (ABSP), said the delegation's tour achieved tangible positive results "whether on the level of developing and deepening the relations between the PPNF and international patriotic forces or on the level of creating political ties for the first time with West European political forces and initiating direct relationship with Western mass information media".

The PPNF Secretary General also said: "It was an opportunity for the delegation to clarify facts and remove misunderstanding hung on the minds of these forces for a quite long time as a result of information blackening process exercised by the imperialist circles and organs.

"We can safely say that the PPNF has managed to

Cont'd...

change the outlook of Western patriotic forces and Western information media on the bulk of the progressive march of Iraq. The PPNF delegation also managed to explain the political, economic and social developments which the country has witnessed across the post-revolution period".

Mr. Haddad added that the delegation had affirmed the Iraqi revolution's peaceful policy and its sure desire for creating relations of friendship with all peoples of the world in what is serving their mutual benefits.

Mr. Haddad further said: "All patriotic forces and information media have now been ascertained of the criminal inclination of the renegade pocket (of Mulla Mustafa) and its subservience to world imperialism, Zionism and the reactionary Iranian regime".

The PPNF Secretary General revealed that invitations were sent to representatives of political forces and information media from different parts of the world to visit Iraq and apprise themselves of the revolutionary experiment in Iraq.

The PPNF line is striving for establishing militant ties with all patriotic forces in the world, he said, adding that another PPNF delegation would soon make further visits to complement the recent tour.

It is to be noted that delegations representing the Vietnamese National Liberation Front, the Chilean

Cont'd...

- 3 -

Front of the People's Forces and the Rumanian  
Socialist Forces Unity Front are scheduled to visit  
Iraq shortly at the invitation of the Patriotic  
and Progressive Nationalist Front.

4/JAB.

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BRITISH EMBASSY

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
BAGHDAD

1/2

11 September 1974

P K Williams Esq  
Middle East Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
LONDON

*Randpa*



*Dear Sir,*

NATIONAL FRONT DELEGATION

*at'd.* 1. A propos of my letter of 10 September about the Haddad delegation, you may care to see the enclosed press release published on 10 September. Whatever our views on the subjects, the Iraqis seem to have convinced themselves that the tour was worthwhile.

*Yours ever*

*R G*

R G Giddens

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S E C R E T

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1974

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 498 OF 16 SEPT/AND TO IMMEDIATE  
MOD (FOR D14B) RPTD FOR INFO TO ROUTINE BAGHDAD, KUWAIT,  
ANKARA AND WASHINGTON.

MY TELS 489 AND 494 : KURDISTAN.

1. YOU WILL HAVE <sup>Noticed</sup> ~~NOTED~~ THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN <sup>Alam's</sup> ~~FILED BY SKP~~ [GRP UNDEC] DESCRIPTION  
OF THE KURDISH SITUATION AND MURRAY'S ACCOUNT. THE LATEST  
REPORT WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM THE IRANIANS, OF WHICH SUMMARY  
HAS BEEN TELEGRAPHED SEPARATELY, IS LESS PESSIMISTIC THAN ALAM  
HAD BEEN ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF THE KURDS LASTING OUT UNTIL THE  
WINTER AND FITS IN BETTER WITH MURRAY'S IMPRESSION THAT KURDISH  
MORALE REMAINS HIGH. THE HEAD OF THE ISRAELI OFFICE IN TEHRAN  
WHO IS WELL INFORMED, ALSO TOLD ME TODAY THAT HE WAS IN NO DOUBT  
THAT THE KURDS WOULD HOLD OUT.

2. I CANNOT JUDGE FROM HERE WHAT THE REAL POSITION IS. BUT IT IS  
CERTAINLY ON THE CARDS THAT BARZANI EXAGGERATED THE KURDISH  
PLIGHT TO THE IRANIANS IN ORDER TO EXTRACT MORE ASSISTANCE FROM  
THEM. JUDGING FROM THE LATEST REPORT (PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE) IT SEEMS  
POSSIBLE THAT THE IRANIANS MAY NOW BE CONCLUDING WITH SOME RELIEF  
THAT THE WAR IS STILL FAR FROM LOST AND THAT THE KURDS CAN BE  
SUSTAINED WITHOUT RISKING A DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE IRAQIS.

PARSONS

F I L E S

MED

DEFENCE D

PUSD

PS

PS/MR ENNALS

PS/PUS

MR CAMPBELL

MR WEIR

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S E C R E T

GRS 120

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DESKBY 170830Z (FCO AND MOD)

EN CLAIR

FM TEHRAN 170600Z

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TOP COPY *Pa*

DESKBY 170830Z (FCO AND MOD)

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 499 OF 17 SEPTEMBER. 1974  
AND TO IMMEDIATE MOD (FOR DI4B).

*188 18/9  
pa*

INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, ANKARA AND WASHINGTON.

MY TELNO 498: KURDISTAN

1. KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL THIS MORNING FEATURES PROMINENTLY A REPORT ON KURDISH PROGRESS IN THE WAR BASED ON MONITORING OF RADIO KURDISTAN. ACCORDING TO THE RADIO, THE KURDS HAVE RECAPTURED SHEIKHAN AND RAWANDUZ FROM IRAQI GOVERNMENT TROOPS AND HAVE BLOCKED THE KIRKUK-SULEIMANIEH HIGHWAY THREATENING KIRKUK ITSELF. THE RADIO ALSO ALLEGES THAT KURDISH TROOPS HAVE LAUNCHED COUNTER ATTACKS ON IRAQI FORCES IN BALAK, ZAKHO, KHABAT AND SULEIMANIEH. IT IS CLAIMED THAT AN OIL PIPELINE HAS BEEN CUT BY KURDISH FORCES. RADIO KURDISTAN FURTHER REPORTS THAT " THOUSANDS OF IRAQI TURKOMANS" HAVE JOINED BARZANI'S TROOPS.

PARSONS

F I L E S

MED

DEFENCE DEPT

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PS/MR ENNALS

PS/PUS

MR CAMPBELL

MR WEIR

COPIES TO:

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*Copied to W. Cmdr. J. Davies  
Cabinet Office  
DVB 17/9*



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
Concurs 13/9  
Mr Cornish, SEED  
Mr Everett, SEED  
Mr Ford, CSAD  
Mr Astley, SEAD  
Mr Meyer, EESD  
Mr Le Breton, WED  
Mr Richardson, NENAD

also given Colvin LAD.

REPRESENTATIONS TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS ON THE TREATMENT OF  
THEIR OWN CITIZENS

1 Mr Russell Johnston MP has been pressing us to make representations to the Iraq Government about the situation of the Kurds. In reply to the usual arguments about locus standi he has now written to the Minister of State (copy attached) raising the general principle of representations and extending the argument beyond the particular instance of the Kurds.

2 I am sending copies of this minute to the desk officers concerned with the countries mentioned by Mr Johnston and to one or two other desk officers who I assume will have also been involved in this general question. I attach a proposed draft reply from the Minister of State and would be grateful if the recipients of this minute could, in view of the usual deadline for submission, let me have their comments by noon, on Monday, 16 September.



P K Williams  
Middle East Department

13 September 1974

CONFIDENTIAL

1/2



P K Williams Esq  
Middle East Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
LONDON

BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

10 September 1974

Mr Clark 16/9 para 3.  
Mr Wright 18/9  
Mr Burton 18/9  
P K Williams 16/9

See file.

## THE IRAQI FRONT DELEGATION

/40

1. Thank you for your letter of 3 September about the visit of Naim Haddad and his delegation.
2. It is indeed disappointing that the Iraqis did not make much more of this visit. As you say, their failure to do so does give us a weapon with which to retaliate should they be critical of our attitude to the Kurdish problem in future, but it is nevertheless a pity that, having gone to the trouble of sending a delegation to Europe, they failed to make the fullest use of it.
3. I see, incidentally, from the Iraqi News Agency bulletin of 20 August that the Haddad delegation met Mr Ron Hayward, Secretary-General of the Labour Party; Mr Keith Hill, International Relations Department of the Labour Party, and Mr Ian Mikardo whilst in London. The report continues "During the meeting the delegation could expound the social and political transformations taking place in Iraq".
3. A propos of the report in the "Morning Star", you will have noted that the paragraphs relating to the National Assembly in Iraq are factually incorrect. The 60 nominations mentioned were to the Legislative Council for the District of Kurdistan. The National Front Assembly, to which the newspaper refers, was still-born as the KDP would not take their seats. This was of course the national institution.
4. None of my European colleagues is able to say very much about the visit of the delegation to their countries. Most of them have heard nothing from their capitals, and those who have (the French and Finns) say that, there too, the delegation appeared not to take the opportunities offered.

Yours truly  
R G Giddens

(54)

Mr Burton MED

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35  
19 SEP 1974

NBR 1/2

## KURDISH REFUGEES

1. For what it is worth, a representative of a charitable organisation at a meeting this morning of the Standing Conference of British Organisations for Aid to Refugees said that he had heard on good authority that there were 100,000 or so Kurdish refugees in Iran and another 80,000 on the Iranian border waiting to cross. A further 100,000 had tried to cross the Turkish border, which was closed to them: the Kurds had "borrowed" some earth moving equipment from the Iraqi Army and were making a road across to the Iranian border. They were about a third of the way there.



D E S Blatherwick  
Near East & North  
Africa Department

19 September 1974

CONFIDENTIAL

(55)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

R Giddens Esq  
British Embassy  
BAGHDAD

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 2 4 SEP 1974 NBR 1/2
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Your reference

Our reference

Date 20 September 1974

KURDS

*attd.*  
1 You will be interested to see from the footnote to the enclosed copy of a letter from the Kurdish Red Crescent Society that an ATV documentary about the Kurdish war is due to be shown here on 29 October. I expect this will arouse more interest in the war and result in more letters from the public and MPs like the latest letter (copy attached) which we have received from Mr Russell Johnston MP. I enclose for your information a copy of the reply Mr Ennals has sent to Mr Johnston.

(46)

↓  
entered on NBR 3/548/5  
and attd

G S Burton  
Middle East Department

CONFIDENTIAL

# HELP THE VICTIMS OF KURDISTAN WAR

w(55)



TO HELP THE VICTIMS OF  
KURDISTAN WAR

# **WE APPEAL TO:**

**UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL,  
DR. K. WALDHEIM**

**THE LEAGUE OF RED CROSS SOCIETIES**

**INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS**

**NATIONAL RED CROSS (RED CRESCENTS, RED LION  
AND SUN) ORGANISATIONS**

**NATIONAL CHARITY ORGANISATIONS**

**ALL PEOPLE CONCERNED WITH HUMAN SUFFERING**

**ALL OVER THE WORLD**

**TO HELP THE VICTIMS OF  
KURDISTAN WAR**



# **INTRODUCTION**

**The Kurdistan Red Crescent Society is a humanitarian, non-political organisation born as a response to the needs of Kurdish people to bring medical care and assistance without discrimination to both the civilians and military victims of the fighting between the Baghdad government and Kurdish forces (Pesh Marga) in the northern part of Iraq.**

**Its purpose is to protect life and health by carrying out daily medical services in the area and to ensure respect for human beings.**

**It has a firm belief in the principles of the Red Cross and Geneva Convention.**

# **OUR CASE**

The Kurdistan Red Crescent (K.R.C.S.) would like to present its case to world opinion through the international (like the Red Cross and U.N.) and national humanitarian organisations, medical societies, governments, prominent bodies, personalities and the national press and broadcasting media of various countries.

It is the story of long-standing suffering of the Kurdish people as a result of protracted war which is, for political reasons, little heard of outside Iraq.

Our aim is to present the human side of the conflict and draw the attention of the world to an impending human disaster which may well end in the destruction of the Kurdish people.

## **GEOGRAPHICAL AND SOCIAL FACTS**

(See map, page 15)

Kurdistan is the adjacent areas of Iraq, Iran (Persia), Turkey and Syria. (There is a Kurdish minority in the U.S.S.R.). The part which concerns us in this appeal is Iraqi Kurdistan, an area of 80,000 square kilometres, the population of which is about 2 to 2½ million.

The standard of living is low as compared with other developing countries; the majority of people live in small scattered villages, farming grains and tobacco. The other part of the population lives in towns; it consists mainly of small traders, shopkeepers, manual workers, government officials, teachers and a small number of middle class and professional people. There are increasing numbers of refugees from the villages. The number of factories in the area can be counted on the fingers of one hand.

The nature of the land is that of high mountains and deep valleys. The roads are bad which makes communication difficult and relief operations very slow, especially in the long and snowy winters.


The economy without oil\* (which is in the hands of the Baghdad government) is precarious; bad harvesting either due to lack of rain or burning as a result of war brings people to the brink of starvation.

\* 75% of Iraqi oil comes from Kurdistan.

## **HISTORY OF THE RECENT CONFLICTS**

The history of the Kurdish National Movement is long and complicated. It started at the turn of the century. As it grew stronger it came to many confrontations with central governments, the longest being from 1961-1970 in the Iraqi part of Kurdistan. This was ended in a truce lasting four years with a promise from the Baghdad government to grant autonomous ruling to the Kurds.

The interpretation of the content and the boundaries of the autonomy was different by each side and peaceful means of negotiation were not successful in bridging the gaps. This, unfortunately, led to resumption of war in the most violent and ruthless way ever seen in the area. Since the beginning of April, thousands of people, mainly women, children and the elderly have been killed and many more have been injured or burnt. Hundreds of villages have been completely wiped out and towns bombed. Thousands have fled from their homes to hide in mountains because of continuous bombardment and the fear of poison gases. There is a complete economic and medical siege of the area by the military.



"Is there nothing we can do, doctor?"

The administration of garrison towns is in the hands of the Baghdad government, while the rural areas and smaller towns are in the hands of Pesh Marga.

The nature of the fighting is that of guerrilla warfare with sudden and unexpected outbreaks of violence in any part of Kurdistan. It lasted about nine years when it started in 1961. On this occasion it is certainly more violent and might be longer too with a greater loss of human life and more destruction.

## **HEALTH AND MEDICAL SERVICES IN PEACE AND WAR**

You do not need statistics to show that the medical services even in peace are minimum. The number of medical personnel in the area is far from sufficient. The few hospital beds and out-patient services come to a standstill every now and then, not because of shortage of high standards and expensive treatments known to the west, but because of lack of simple drugs like Aspirin, Antibiotics, antiseptics, cotton wool, bandages etc.

The out-patient departments are packed with hundreds of patients every day to receive, after hours of waiting, mostly, nothing more than a symptomatic treatment or a placebo. Emergency services except in the big towns are near nil. The bad roads and long winters put a great number of villages in complete isolation.

Due to lack of preventive public health services and to poverty there is an increasing number of infectious and nutritional diseases, like tuberculosis, typhoid, malaria, meningitis, liver cirrhosis and anaemia.

The care of expectant mothers (ante natal care) does not exist, certainly not in the form known in the western world.



Child mortality rate is high because of the inadequacy of vaccinations against endemic diseases like typhoid, whooping cough, tetanus and tuberculosis and of protection against malaria and treatment of worms. Because of malnutrition, an epidemic of even a relatively benign disease like measles leads to a great number of deaths.

Throughout Kurdistan there is no hospital or institution for psychiatric illness, the physically or mentally handicapped or for geriatric cases.

With only a little imagination, one can visualise the picture when war is adding hundreds of casualties every week, mostly women and children, when even the meagre medical services are withdrawn and a complete ban on all medical supplies and drugs as well as food is imposed by the authorities.

In the first two months of fighting 1,534 civilians have been killed and 3,500 injured by bombing and about 15 towns and 204 villages have been shelled or bombed. One of the worst hit by air raids is Qala Diza, a small town not far from the Iranian border, where a whole quarter—shops, houses, a school and part of the hospital—was demolished. 130 people died including 80 children.

## **THE ROLE OF THE IRAQI RED CRESCENT**

There has been no move from the Iraqi Red Crescent to temper the suffering of our citizens. They have sent no aid to the area either on their initiative or in response to repeated pleas from our people asking for medical equipment, drugs, children's food, tents and medical personnel. It had a similar attitude throughout the long years of war from 1961 to 1970.



... all that he could find of his daughter was a handful of hair.

On the contrary it has blocked out help to reach the victims. This has happened on many occasions when relief supplies like drugs and food sent to Kurdistan via Iraqi Red Crescent have either never reached the area or been delayed deliberately until after the contents have expired and become of no use at all.

The carelessness of the Iraqi Red Crescent is not surprising when you know that well-known and influential politicians in the Iraqi government are on the board of its executive committee.

The behaviour and the nature of the Iraqi Red Crescent is far from being consistent with the basic principles of the Red Cross.

## **WHAT IS KURDISTAN RED CRESCENT?**

Against the background of the most destructive war in a very limited area, our society came to light. Our principles are humanity, impartiality and neutrality. It is a non-political, voluntary organisation. Its aim is to protect life and health, to prevent and alleviate human suffering regardless of nationality, race, religion, class or political opinion, solely guided by human needs.

Our independence from the two sides of the conflict will be maintained and the principles of Red Cross will be strictly observed.

Geographically we operate in the areas in the control of Pesh Marga. As soon as the Iraqi Government allows us, we will extend our services to the whole of Kurdistan. An official request will be made to the Iraqi Authorities.

Our ambition is to be officially represented in the League of Red Cross Societies.

# **OUR PLANS**

**Our lines of action are:**

## **(1) Inside Iraqi Kurdistan**

The bulk of the members of our society will be operating inside the besieged war zone in Kurdistan. It consists of Physicians, surgeons, chemists, nurses and other medical and non medical personnel. In spite of our very limited facilities, we will try our best to deal with all medical problems.

We will help to maintain the medical services of a population of more than one million by running medical out-patients clinics, treating an increasing number of patients, giving advice regarding protection against endemic diseases, carrying out vaccinations and distributing what we get of children's food and milk. Urgent cases will be admitted to our hospitals.

We will deal with war casualties, civilian and military, from both sides.

We will provide medical services for the prisoners of war and refugees.

## **(2) Outside Kurdistan**

Our members, especially in European countries, will contact various organisations all over the world regardless of their nationality, east and west alike, drawing their attention to the grave situation in our country and asking for help and assistance. We only hope that we get a good response from our friends all over the world. Our proverb "It is only at times of stress that you know who your friends are" is true.



*A homeless family... do they really deserve this?*

**We stress the point that the degree of human suffering in Kurdistan due to the war and lack of medical services is beyond being a local problem. As the present medical services are not able to carry on for long without outside help, it is becoming a direct responsibility of international and national medical and charity organisations all over the world. It is for them now to carry out their duties and apply their humanitarian principles to our people.**

**We will start charity funds in various European and North American capitals to raise money to buy drugs and medical equipment which are urgently needed.**

## **HOW CAN YOU HELP US?**

**Every single one of you can help us depending on your capability, whether you are in the executive chair of an established organisation or a member of the public. Our needs are great and urgent. Any medical supplies you send will be of great help. If you cannot get hold of any, please send us money which would also be much appreciated.**

**Our plea for everyone is to send medical supplies to the battered area, under the guidance of our society as this is the only way we can guarantee its arrival where it is needed.**




**Send postal orders and cheques made payable to the  
Kurdistan Red Crescent Society:**

**Or send your contributions direct to:  
Kurdistan Red Crescent Society  
Account No. 19085834,  
The National Westminster Bank Ltd. (U.K.).  
Earl's Court Branch,  
195 Earl's Court Road,  
London, S.W.5.**

## **OUR THANKS**

**We express our gratitude to the organisations and individuals  
who have already helped our people.**





What hope have they?

Written;

**KURDISTAN RED CRESCENT SOCIETY,  
EUROPEAN LIAISON COMMITTEE,  
P.O. BOX 668  
LONDON, SW5 0HD**

**PUBLISHED BY KURDISTAN RED CRESCENT SOCIETY  
AUG 1974**

# KURDISTAN RED CRESCENT SOCIETY

EUROPEAN LIAISON COMMITTEE,

P.O. BOX 668

LONDON, SW5 0HD



August 1974

Dear Sir/Madam,

The enclosed booklet is a brief account of present medical conditions in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The contents make a grim and depressing reading, but they correspond to the facts and are presented with sincerity. You may not have heard before about the war in Kurdistan, but I am sure you will agree on reading this booklet that the Kurdish people have become innocent victims of a vicious political situation.

Many lives are lost every day as a direct result of the fighting and many more are threatened by the total economic blockade and stopping of medical supplies. Crops have been burned, endemic diseases are rife and with the cold winter approaching, thousands of families are already homeless.

May I quote a very important paragraph from this booklet which says, "We stress the point that the degree of human suffering in Kurdistan due to the war and lack of medical services is beyond being a local problem. As the present medical services are not able to carry on for long without outside help, it is becoming a direct responsibility of international and national medical and charity organisations all over the world. It is for them now to carry out their duties and apply their humanitarian principles to our people". Indeed, it is now the responsibility of the outside world — organisations and individuals. Please do not let us down.

Your assistance, which is needed for more than one million civilians as well as for the casualties of war, will lighten the burden on our shoulders and help us carry out our duties in a proper and humane way.

Your contribution is very much appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

*K. I. Majid*

Professor K. I. Majid  
University of Aston — Birmingham

- Enclosures: 1) "Help the Victims of Kurdistan War" by K.R.C.S.  
2) ~~List of Equipment and Drugs.~~

To T.V. viewers in U.K: An A.T.V. documentary about Kurdistan War (made by Mr. C. Goddard and his team) will be shown at 10.30 p.m. on Tuesday 24th September. & etc

**MISSION PROGRAMME**  
**23-25 February, 1974.**

**23 February:**

1. Briefing at British Interests Section.
2. DG of Foreign Trade Relations, Ministry of Economy.
3. Head of Projects Dept., State Organisation for Industrial Design and Constructions.
4. President, State Organisation for Trade.
5. Secretary-General, Federation of Iraqi Chambers of Commerce.
6. President (see 3 above), State Organisation for Industrial Design and Constructions.
7. Cocktail party given by Commercial Secretary.

**24 February:**

1. President, State Organisation for Industrial Development.
2. Director of Planning, State Organisation for Soil and Land Reclamation.
3. President, State Organisation for Textile Industries.
4. GM, Commercial Bank of Iraq.
5. Dinner, Basra Petroleum Co. Ltd.

**25 February:**

1. Secretary-General, Federation of Iraqi Industries.
2. Counsellor, Central Bank.
3. President, State Organisation for Drugs.
4. Head of Industrial Division, Ministry of Planning.
5. Minister of Economy.
6. Cocktail Party, Head of British Interests Section.

Meetings were also arranged for some members of the Mission with the Under Secretary for Technical Affairs at the Ministry for Oil and Minerals, the Vice-President (Technical Affairs) of INOC, and the Head of the Agricultural Division of the Ministry of Planning.



RR JISNE ✓

(56)

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FM BAGHDAD 241020Z

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35  
25 SEP 1974

NBR 1/2

MOD DISTRIBUTION

*MET*

SECRET.

*Mr. Burton*

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TEL NO DIG FCH OF 24 SEPTEMBER INFO *Mr. H. Jones*  
ROUTINE TO TEHRAN KUWAIT AND JISNE. *25/9*

*Ester*  
*25/9*  
*pa*

WEEKLY SUMMARY.

ONE. KURDISTAN.

APART FROM 19 AND 15 BDES IN BASRA AREA AND 10 ARMD BDE BASED AT SALMAN PAK WITH SUB UNITS STATIONED BETWEEN MANDALI AND BADA A ALL OTHER ARMY UNITS ARE INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING IN KURDISTAN. INTENSIVE FIGHTING IS REPORTED IN RAWANDUZ AND RANIA QALABIZAH SECTORS. RUMOURS OF RAWANDUZ FALLING TO KURDS PERSISTANT IN BAGHDAD OVER PAST 10 DAYS ARE DISCOUNTED HERE. IT IS BELIEVED GOVT WILL ENDEAVOUR TO HOLD RAWANDUZ AT ANY COST. REPORTS OF QALADIZAH BEING RETAKEN BY KURDS ARE BELIEVED. KURDISH MORALE IS BELIEVED TO BE HIGH AND THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO HOLD THEIR PRESENT AREAS AND INCREASE PRESSURE ON RANIA AND RAWANDUZ UNTIL ONSET OF WINTER IN MID OCTOBER AS WELL AS MAINTAINING GUERRILLA ACTIONS IN ALL AREAS FROM DOHUK TO KHANEQIN. REPORTS OF RUSSIAN ADVISER INVOLVEMENT IN GROUND REPEAT GROUND FIGHTING ARE DISCOUNTED IN BAGHDAD BECAUSE OF RISKS INVOLVED. GOVT PRESS CONTINUE TO IGNORE FIGHTING AND REPORT CCONTINUED DEFECTIONS OF KURDS TO GOVT SIDE ONLY. GOVE TROOPS RETURNING TO BAGHDAD ON 5 DAYS R AND R TALK OF INTENSE FIGHTING, VERY HIGH GOVT FORCE CASUALTIES AND CONSTANT KURDISH HARRASMENT OF L. OF C, REAR AREAS AND FWD POSNS.

TWO. ORGANISATION.

17 JULY PROMOTIONS NOT PUBLISHED. NEW IAF COMMANDER BRIG NA'YAT EL DULAYNI COMMANDERS OF TWO, FOUR AND EIGHT DIVS ALL CHANGED. FULLER DETAILS FOLLOW IN BAG.

REPUBLICAN GUARD BELIEVED NOW TO BE INCREASED TO TWO BDE  
STRENGTH ONE BDE COMPLETELY ARMoured, OTHER BDE ONE  
ARMED TWO MECH BNS. THIS ALLOWS GOVT TO RELEASE 10 ARMED DIV  
FOR KURDISH AND BORDER OPERATIONS.

THREE. VISIT OF INDIAN POC, 19 TO 23 SEPT GP CAPT HALL  
DEBRIEFED. VISITED KIRKUK OIL INSTALLATION ONLY, MILITARY COLLEGE,  
STAFF COLLEGE, BABYLON. NEGATIVE ANSWERS BY IRAQ ON ALL  
QUESTIONS RELATING TO WAR, BORDER ETC. NO ATTEMPT TO BRIEF  
ON KURDISTAN. CGS DID SAY "WE ARE NEGOTIATING WITH KUWAIT  
FOR A LEASE ON THIS LAND (AL WARBA AND BUEIYAN ISLANDS)  
AND AS THEY (KUWAIT) ARE SMALLER THAN US WE DONT EXPECT  
ANY TROUBLE". ALSO SAID MAIN PRIORITIES WERE FIRSTLY TO  
IMPROVE ARMY EFFICIENCY THEN IAF THEN TURN TO NAVY  
FULLER REPORT IN BAG.

FOUR. BAGHDAD EXCEPTIONALLY QUIET.  
OCTOBER 73 HAD AXEMEN AND ASSOCIATES ARRESTED AMIDST GREAT  
PUBLICITY SUSPECTED THAT THOSE ARRESTED ARE MERELY SCAPEGOATS.

GIDDENS

BT

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(57)

Mr Burton (MBA) 18/9

Mr Williams 18/9

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35

26 SEP 1974

NBR 1/2

PLEDGE BY HMG TO THE KURDS

1. Mr Williams asked me to look for a pledge allegedly given to the Kurds by HMG at the time of the mandate. We thought this might just refer to the Treaty of Sèvres, but on looking through Kurds, Turks, and Arabs by C J Edmonds I think it more likely that it refers to the following announcement made in December 1922:

"His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of Iraq recognize the right of the Kurds living within the boundaries of Iraq to set up a Kurdish Government within those boundaries and hope that the different Kurdish elements will, as soon as ~~my~~ possible, arrive at an agreement between themselves as to the form which they wish that the Government should take and the boundaries within which they wish it to extend and will send responsible delegates to Baghdad to discuss their economic and political relations with His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of Iraq."

2. I am going on leave tomorrow and will examine the background more thoroughly on my return, but it seems that tribal rivalries and Turkish trouble-making made self-administration for Kurdistan an impossibility at that time. You will find some general background in the 1946 memorandum on the Kurds which I sent to Mr Williams.

att'd.

C J S Rundle

C J S Rundle

Research Department

17 September 1974

Mr Clark Fascinating, but times have changed. 18/9  
Mr Wright

Thank you.

R  
17/9

Mr Rundle 18/9

then

R and J

Q 1/9

This must be what Sir A. Drew was talking of to Mr Wright. We need to know much more of the circumstances etc in which the "announcement" was made and I will pursue with Mr Rundle. Meanwhile this is, if substantiated, a much more direct

and uniquely British commitment  
than anything in the Treaty of  
Severs. Although its history now  
it could be raised effectively in  
public debate.

*Phillips*

18/9

I am going on leave tomorrow and will examine the  
background more thoroughly on my return, but it seems  
that tribal rivalries and Turkish province-making make  
self-administration for Kurdistan an impossibility at  
that time. You will find some general background in  
the 1946 memorandum on the Kurds which I sent to you  
last time.

*See 20/9*

C. J. S. Rundle

Research Department

17 September 1974

*Mr. Clark*  
*Mr. Wright*

This must be what Sir G. Brown was  
talking of to his right. We need to  
know more of the circumstances  
etc. in which the "annexation"  
was made and I will pursue with it  
meanwhile this is if

*Mr. R. P. [unclear]*  
*Mr. [unclear]*  
*Mr. [unclear]*

IRAQ.

August 3, 1946.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

(17081)

[E 7580/19/98]

Copy No. 168

## THE KURDISH PROBLEM.

(With Maps.)

## SUMMARY.

*Part I.**'Iraq.*

The idea of an independent Kurdish State was contained in the Treaty of Sèvres (signed in 1920, but never ratified), but was abandoned three years later with the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne. Kurds of the Mosul and Arbil liwas accepted 'Iraqi citizenship, although those of Sulaimani rejected it. Genuine Kurdish nationalism and the selfish aims of the tribal leaders exist side by side. The problem before the Government has all along been that of reconciling the needs of a liberal policy towards the Kurds with the necessity of quelling the revolts of their lawless chieftains. 'Iraqi politicians failed to cope with this difficulty. (Para. 1.)

The League of Nations Frontier Commission, in 1925, recommended the appointment of Kurds to the administration of their country, the dispensation of justice, and for teaching in the schools; also the use of Kurdish as the official language for these services. The British Government, as the Mandatory Power, was invited by the Council of the League to submit the measures they proposed to take to put these recommendations into effect. In 1923 the 'Iraqi Government had issued instructions that in Kurdish areas officials were to be Kurdish, and that Kurdish should be the official language and be taught in the schools. (Paras. 2-4.)

To allay Kurdish fears that the privileges recommended by the League would be withdrawn on the termination of the mandate, a declaration regarding minorities was made by the 'Iraqi Government to the Council of the League in 1932. (Para. 5 and Appx. "A.")

Numerous petitions were addressed to the League of Nations and the Mandates Commission in 1930 and 1931 demanding the formation of a Kurdish Government, but the Commission went no further than a recommendation that the 'Iraqi Government should exercise a spirit of broad toleration towards its Kurdish subjects. (Para. 6.)

In commenting on the Kurdish petition of July, 1930, His Majesty's Government defended the 'Iraqi Government, although admitting that in districts other than Sulaimaniya the proportion of Kurdish officials was low, and there had been a delay in establishing Kurdish as the official language. It is unquestionable, however, that measures designed to meet Kurdish desires have been successfully sabotaged, with the result that little progress towards solution of the Kurdish problem had been made when war broke out in 1939. Kurdish nationalism seemed to be waning except when the Government showed especial loyalty to the Arab cause. (Paras. 7-11.)

Economic difficulties, rather than thwarted nationalism, have been the underlying cause of complaint of the Kurds during the war. In the settlement made with Mulla Mustafa in January, 1944, it was stipulated that grain should be sent to Barzan and relief would be organised; Mulla Mustafa's truculence and the 'Iraqi Government's inefficiency precipitated a revolt which broke out in August, 1945. With the help of heavily-subsidised Kurdish chiefs the revolt was quelled and the Mulla fled to Persia, where he still remains a potential threat. (Paras. 12-13.)

The 'Iraqi Government cannot be absolved from blame. When peace was undisturbed they were neglectful: when trouble arose they were vindictive. They paid lip-service to a policy the execution of which they did their best to obstruct. British and League of Nations influence has probably prevented their resort to massacres. But it is difficult for them to sympathise with a community which loses no opportunity of expressing its contempt for them. (Para. 14.)



### *Persia.*

Kurds of Persia are "hopelessly divided among themselves." The return of the tribal chiefs after the abdication of Riza Shah soon made conditions as bad as before their removal. Nationalistic aspirations, as distinct from tribal, have not been in evidence outside Azerbaijan. (Para. 15.)

In the months immediately following the entry of British and Russian troops into Persia the policy of both Governments was conditioned by the presence of Kurds on either side of the Turkish frontier. His Majesty's Government avoided any action which might have excited the suspicions of the Turks: the Russians, on the other hand, alarmed them by the encouragement they gave to the Persian Kurds owing to their anxiety to have friendly tribes on the Azerbaijan-Turkey frontier. A change later took place in the Russian attitude, and, in 1942, they were endeavouring to hold the balance between the Kurds and the Persian authorities. In 1944 signs again appeared of Kurdish nationalism being encouraged. (Paras. 16-17.)

The Tudeh Party endeavoured to influence the Kurds against the Tehran Government generally, rather than in favour of national separatism, but was unpopular with the Kurds who had little sympathy with its aims. (Para. 17.)

During 1944 Mahabad became the centre of Kurdish nationalism in Persia, where Qazi Muhammed, a local notable, emerged as the leader. There was, at the same time, an unaided move to unite three Kurdish nationalist societies. (Para. 18.)

In February, 1945, the Russians prevented the passage of Persian troops to put down a disturbance at Mahabad, and were hailed by the Kurds as deliverers, a view which was not unreasonably connected with the opening of a branch of the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society in Mahabad in April. Komala Kurd (a nationalist society) began to be considered as successor to the Jian-i-Kurd. Deterioration of the situation among the 'Iraqi Kurds was vaguely attributed to Russian and Komala activities, but had no effect on Persian Kurds. Meanwhile Qazi Muhammed and other Kurdish chiefs had been taken to Baku and advised to join the new Democrat Party of Azerbaijan in return for Soviet support for their independence movement. The recent agreement reported between Mahabad and Tabriz is evidence that Russian policy is unchanged, as it is unlikely to have been made without Soviet approval. The boundaries of the Kurdish zone have not been authoritatively reported, but a rough definition has been given of the southern limit. (Paras. 19-21.)

### *The Russians and the Pan-Kurd Movement.*

There is no evidence of Russian support for any wide movement for Kurdish independence, but only reports of attempts to persuade Persian Kurds to help Mulla Mustafa. This may indicate only a pause in a policy designed to create first a united effort in Azerbaijan. The successes of Qazi Muhammed, and the fact that Mulla Mustafa remained at large in Persia in spite of 'Iraqi requests for his capture, crystallised vague ideas of emancipation into the expectation that, under Soviet guidance, the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish State could be extended to include the Kurdish districts of 'Iraq and Turkey. Except in Persia the Russians do not seem to be making any serious effort to direct the Kurdish movement; they must appreciate that, where the appeal of nationalism has failed to unite rival chieftains, Communist ideology, which is repugnant to most of them, will not succeed, except under direct Soviet control. Meanwhile propaganda prepares the way for a possible future change of policy, which is a bogey which can be produced at need; and the present limited support for Kurdish nationalism assists in undermining British influence in the Middle East. (Paras. 22-24.)

### *Levant States.*

The Kurdish community is believed to number about 50-60,000, mostly living in tribal groups along the Syro-Turkish frontier. In Damascus there is a community of over 20,000. The tribal groups are mostly illiterate and are engaged in agriculture. They are apt to grumble about discrimination by the Syrian authorities, but show no separatist tendencies, and there is no evidence of any close connection with Kurds in 'Iraq or Persia.

Amongst the Kurdish community in Damascus (who carry little weight with those in the north) there are two factions—the "Kurdish League," and the "Society of Salah ed Din." The former favour the formation of an autonomous Kurdish State and have produced pamphlets which have been sent



to the United Nations Organisation, etc.; the latter are concerned with raising the status of Kurds and reviving their language. Their leaders are not at present attracted towards Russia, though the "Kurdish League" might turn to her for support if they become convinced that none was forthcoming from His Majesty's Government. Although the leader of the Lebanese Communist Party is of Kurdish origin, there is no evidence of his having any special interest in his own community. (Paras. 26-27.)

### *Part II.—The Kurds of Turkey.*

Of the (approximately) 3,000,000 Kurds in the world, 1,500,000 live in Turkey, where they remain the chief thorn in the Turkish flesh, never having been completely subdued by any Power. (Para. 28.)

#### *Recent history.*

Turkish Kurdistan is mountain country, and the life of its inhabitants tribal and feudal. Ever since the Turks conquered the country in 1534 the Kurdish desire to remain independent has led to intermittent rebellion, the latest attempt being in 1937. By employing modern methods of warfare on a large enough scale, the Turks have had little difficulty in suppressing these later risings, but the severity of their methods has sown the seeds of further revolts. (Paras. 29-30.)

It is difficult to assess the present position, but the Turkish Government refuses to recognise the Kurds as a minority, and their drastic efforts at assimilation have failed, although this Government has a tighter hold than any of its predecessors. Attempts to open up communications in this part of the country and to spread Turkish culture have been half-hearted and ineffectual. Security prevails, on the whole, only because of the presence of Turkish troops. There is, too, a growth of Kurdish nationalism (as distinct from mere discontent) stimulated by more intellectual Kurdish elements in Syria and 'Iraq. (Para. 31.)

#### *Population.*

The latest detailed figures available—those for 1935—giving the numbers of Turkish and Kurdish-speakers in what may be considered the Kurdish vilayets are shown in a table. Details of the 1944 census have never yet been published, but it is certain that the proportion of Kurdish-speakers was not lower than the 37 per cent. of 1935. As a race the Kurds are more prolific than the Turks. Distribution is not even throughout the whole area, and in some vilayets the proportion of Kurdish-speakers was as high as from 64-79 per cent. (Para. 32.)

The Kurdish vilayets have been much depopulated through drastic punitive action and recruitment for the 1914-18 war, from which there were few survivors, and there is reason to doubt Turkish population statistics. According to these, by 1944 the population of Turkey had almost doubled itself since 1914, in spite of the terrible toll taken during the war and the notorious infertility of the Turks. Should a claim on eastern Turkey be made in the name of the Kurds, these statistics might be challenged. (Para. 33.)

#### *Autonomy and Russia.*

Under the Treaty of Sévres, 1920, Great Britain, France and Italy were to produce a scheme of local autonomy for specified Kurdish areas, and an independent Kurdish State was to be created at the discretion of the League of Nations if it were demanded. A scheme for a Kurdo-Armenian State was also mooted. That none of these schemes matured was due to Turkish resistance under Mustafa Kemal. The Kurds hold Turkey first, and Great Britain secondly, responsible and incline towards Russia for support. (Paras. 34-36.)

Turkish policy towards the Kurds has always been Turkification, whereas the Soviet has adopted its usual policy of encouraging the culture of a minority—albeit with an ulterior motive. (Para. 37.)

There is no evidence that the Turks recognise the possibilities of an economic solution of the problem; they have broken up the old economy, but have done little to introduce modern prosperity in its place. Fairly good medical and veterinary services are among the things for which Turkey can claim most credit. (Paras. 38-39.)

There is no evidence yet of active Soviet interference, although a Soviet-sponsored nationalist movement might be limited only by Turkish ability to suppress agitation. Even an autonomy movement among 'Iraqi and Persian

Kurds might cause Turkey no anxiety as long as she could hold her frontiers. However, the case which Russia could present to the world on behalf of an autonomous Kurdistan is a strong one. There are two reasons why Russia might be specially interested in Turkish Kurdistan: first, it is in the Kurdish vilayets that there is most hope of finding oil; secondly, the existence of Kurds in Cilicia and on the Turco-Syrian frontier 35 miles inland from Alexandretta, might give a pretext for extending Kurdistan to embrace that port, and/or for claiming Cilicia for the Armenians. (Paras. 40-43.)

Even were the Turks likely to adopt a liberal attitude towards Kurdish freedom, the present Russian menace makes such a policy impossible. The fear of minority status developing into autonomy and ultimately into independence is likely to make Turkey stick even more obstinately to a policy of Turkification. (Para. 44.)

## THE KURDISH PROBLEM.

### PART I.

#### 'Iraq.

1. The idea of an independent Kurdish State comprising the predominantly Kurdish areas of Turkey and 'Iraq (but excluding that of Persia) was contained in the Treaty of Sèvres signed on 29th August, 1920, but never ratified. This project was finally abandoned three years later with the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne (24th July, 1923). But the result of it was that during this period the policy of His Majesty's Government and of the 'Iraqi Government had to be framed with a view to the possible implementation of the relevant articles of the Treaty of Sèvres. In spite of this situation the Kurds of the Mosul and Arbil liwas of 'Iraq accepted 'Iraqi citizenship before 1921, although those of Sulaimani rejected it, refused to be incorporated under the 'Iraq Government under any conditions and abstained from voting for King Faisal in the referendum of that year. The sequel and the activities of Shaikh Mahmud in Sulaimani and of Shaikh Ahmad and his brother, Mulla Mustafa, in the Barzan district are briefly recorded in the earlier paper on the "Kurdish Problem" (Research Department Handbook, Paper No. RR X/9/ii), where it is implied that the persistent unrest of these three leaders has been due to the failure of the 'Iraq Government to fulfil its obligations. This is only partially true. Their hostility to the "Arab" government of Baghdad is fundamental and, in that sense, they may be regarded as champions of Kurdish nationalism; but it is a nationalism limited to achieving their personal ambitions rather than one inspired by a wider patriotism. Their primary aim is to be left alone to exercise their feudal tyranny over as many of their countrymen as they can contrive to control.<sup>(1)</sup> That is not to say that national sentiment and the desire for Kurdish institutions are non-existent amongst the rank and file. The numerous petitions which have been presented asking for recognition of inherent and acquired rights are evidence to the contrary, and since 1924 nationalism has spread from its original hearth in Sulaimani to Arbil and the Kurdish district of Mosul. A large proportion of the students and young lawyers is imbued with a brand of it much more fiery than the parochial and rather selfish patriotism of Sulaimani in its early days. But though the language of both demands is the same the meaning is not. Thus the British and 'Iraq Governments have been faced with the dilemma of reconciling the needs of a liberal policy towards the people of the Kurdish districts with the necessity of quelling the revolts of their lawless chieftains. 'Iraqi politicians, many of them ex-soldiers of the old Turkish school, lacked the subtlety to cope with such a situation.

2. Formal obligations were placed upon the 'Iraq Government and the Mandatory Power by the recommendation of the League of Nations Frontier Commission which visited the Kurdish areas of 'Iraq in February, 1925. In their final conclusions they said:—

"Regard must be paid to the desires expressed by the Kurds that officials of Kurdish race should be appointed for the administration of their country, the dispensation of justice, and teaching in the schools, and that Kurdish should be the official language of all these services."

<sup>(1)</sup> The support which they receive from the more moderate and law-abiding Kurds may be gauged from the fact that, during Shaikh Mahmud's rule in Sulaimani between 1922-24, the population of the town fell to 700; it rose to 12,000 in two months and to 20,000 in four months after the reoccupation by British and 'Iraqi forces.

3. The Council of the League, in their decision regarding the northern frontier of Iraq, made the following reference to the Kurdish question :—

“ The British Government, as Mandatory Power, is invited to lay before the Council the administrative measures which will be taken with a view to securing for the Kurdish populations mentioned in the report of the Commission of Enquiry, the guarantees regarding local administration recommended by the Commission in its final conclusions.”

4. A resolution of the Council of Ministers passed in 1923 was accordingly confirmed and amplified in a speech by the Prime Minister in the Chamber of Deputies, and instructions were issued to the members of the Cabinet to the effect that, in the Kurdish areas, officials were to be Kurdish and the official language Kurdish, which was also to be taught in the schools.

5. The intention of the British Government to work for the liquidation of the mandatory régime by the year 1932 gave rise to Kurdish anxiety that after the withdrawal of British influence the Kurds would no longer enjoy the privileges recommended for them by the League. They wanted guarantees for the future. The terms of the Treaty of the 30th June, 1930, accentuated their fears since there was no reference in it to safeguards which might have allayed their apprehension, since the imposition of such conditions was regarded as inappropriate in an alliance between independent states. A formal declaration regarding minorities was, however, made by the Iraq Government to the Council of the League of Nations in May, 1932, the relevant paragraphs of which are reproduced as Appendix “ A.”

6. Ten notables of Sulaimaniya addressed a petition to the League of Nations in July, 1930, demanding the formation of a Kurdish Government under supervision of the League of Nations, and eight further petitions between August, 1930, and April, 1931, came under the consideration of the Mandates Commission in June of that year, but the Commission in its recommendations to the League Council went no further than to suggest that the Mandatory Power should be requested to impress upon the Government of Iraq that it should be guided in its dealings with its Kurdish subjects by a spirit of broad toleration.

7. His Majesty's Government in observations on the Kurdish petition of July, 1930, defended the Iraqi Government and contested a statement that the majority of the administrative and executive officials of the Kurdish district were Arabs, by quoting figures for the Sulaimaniya district, in which, of 157 officials, 109 were Kurds and only 12 Arabs; it was, however, admitted that in other Kurdish districts the proportion of Kurdish officials was lower. The difficulty of finding suitable and qualified Kurds to fill executive and technical positions was referred to. It was admitted that there had been delay in enacting a law to establish Kurdish as the official language for governmental correspondence and for the law courts and schools in the Kurdish areas, but this was excused because Kurdish as a written language was unknown “ until recent years.” Reference was made in the same communication to a letter from the Acting Prime Minister of Iraq of the 19th August, 1930, outlining the Government's policy which they maintained was in the best interests of the Kurds themselves and not in conflict with the stipulations of the League. Briefly they contended that to appoint only Kurds in the Kurdish liwas would bar them from employment in other parts of Iraq which was detrimental to the general interests of the administration. At the same time Kurdish would be preserved as their language in their primary education, in the dispensation of justice and in all their relations with the administration.

8. This letter referred to a law which was eventually passed on the 23rd May, 1931. Under this law a circular was sent to all Ministries (excepting the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs) instructing them to replace such of their officials in the Kurdish areas as did not know Kurdish or, where this was not possible, to arrange for them to learn Kurdish. At the same time committees were set up which decided the form of Kurdish to be used.

9. Provision had already been made for a Translation Bureau in Baghdad to undertake the translation into Kurdish of legislation, regulations and departmental circulars; a Kurdish inspector for the Kurdish schools and a Kurdish Assistant Director-General of Administration in the Ministry of the Interior were to be appointed. Of these measures only the appointment of the Kurdish Assistant Director-General was immediately carried out and maintained. A Kurdish Inspector of Schools was not appointed until 1945, and although there has been some sporadic translating of books into Kurdish under pressure, no permanent translation bureau has ever taken shape.



10. Reference has been made above to the defence of the 'Iraq Government put forward by His Majesty's Government before the League of Nations Council and to the admission of their failure to carry out their obligations in all respects. It is unquestionable that, up to the present day, measures designed to meet Kurdish desires have been fairly successfully sabotaged. This may have been due in part to lack of energy in tackling natural difficulties but, on the whole, it must be regarded as the result of deliberate reluctance to take steps believed to tend towards the separation rather than the unity of the community of 'Iraq (such, for example, as the creation of a special Kurdish administrative unit).

11. As a result of this negative attitude to the Kurdish question which was taken up by successive Cabinets little progress was made towards its solution in the period between the admission of 'Iraq as a member of the League of Nations and the outbreak of war in 1939. On the whole Kurdish nationalism seemed to be on the wane, although at any time of national sensitiveness or agitation it was revived, and it received a natural stimulus from time to time from manifestations by the Government of especial loyalty to the Arab cause.

12. Economic difficulties, rather than thwarted nationalism, have been underlying complaints of the Kurdish population during the war years. The high cost of living and the shortage of textiles have caused grumbling throughout 'Iraq, but the situation has not been serious. Compensation has been found in the plains from the presence of British troops, which has been denied to the people of Kurdistan. In the settlement made with Mulla Mustafa in January, 1944, it was stipulated that grain should be sent to Barzan and relief work be organised on the roads. In spite of this settlement Mulla Mustafa became truculent, and the 'Iraq Government dilatory and inefficient.<sup>(\*)</sup>

13. Movements of 'Iraqi troops and of Mulla Mustafa momentarily increased the tension, but in June, 1945, the news from Barzan was "extremely encouraging." By the 2nd August things had taken a turn for the worse, and by the middle of the month Mulla Mustafa was in open revolt. This was put down by the 'Iraq army with the help of heavily-subsidised Kurdish chiefs hostile to Mulla Mustafa.<sup>(\*)</sup> The Mulla himself fled to Persia, where he remains a potential threat to the peace of his own country.

14. It is impossible to absolve the 'Iraq Government from blame for the past and present situation.<sup>(\*)</sup> When the peace was undisturbed they were neglectful; when trouble appeared they became vindictive. They give lip-service to a policy with which they disagree and obstruct its execution whenever they are able to do so. On the other hand it is difficult for them to have any great sympathy for a community whose leaders, with few exceptions, lose no opportunity of expressing their contempt for the "Baghdad Government" and all its works. Left to themselves they would no doubt attempt to resolve the difficulty as Riza Shah resolved his problem, by removal of the powerful chiefs, and, as in an earlier day, Muhammed Ali of Egypt did, by the massacre of the Mamelukes. The moderating counsels of British advisers and the interest of the League of Nations in minority affairs have kept them off this course. The frustration of their natural instincts and the knowledge that Kurdish leaders have traded on this situation are irritants which give a reaction unfavourable to a genuine change of heart.

#### *Persia.*

15. Events in Western Persia during the past four years fully confirm the opinion expressed in the former paper that the Kurds of Persia are "hopelessly divided among themselves." The return of the tribal leaders after the abdication of Riza Shah led within a very few months to a revival of the conditions of lawlessness which had preceded their removal, and, in so far as Persian forces

(\*) In January, 1945, Majid Mustafa, the Kurdish Deputy for Sulaimaniya and former Minister without Portfolio who negotiated the settlement with Mulla Mustafa the previous year, attacked the Ministry of the Interior saying in effect, that what the Kurds wanted was not independence, but their issues of sugar and tea.

(\*) An interesting sidelight on the relations between Kurdish leaders is given by the fact that, at the end of August, 1945, when the Barzan revolt was in full swing, Shaikh Mahmud of Sulaimaniya and Babekr Selim Agha of the Pizhder (themselves long-standing rivals) headed a petition to the Government against a decree regarding the purchase-price of tobacco and the method of classification of the leaf.

(\*) In May, 1944, the following figures relating to education in Sulaimaniya were reported: "Although the number of pupils receiving primary education is more than double their number at the termination of the Mandate, out of a total population of 180,000 souls there are only some 3,500 children receiving education. There are 48 primary schools (of which 12 are in Sulaimani town) with 165 teachers between them, and two intermediate schools (respectively for boys and for girls) with a total of 23 teachers. Of the 165 primary teachers 43 speak no Kurdish, and in one or two cases a single non-Kurdish speaker is the only teacher in the school. The teaching in the intermediate schools is in Arabic."

were free to operate (that is mainly outside the Russian zone of occupation), measures for their subjugation and control were undertaken with varying successes.<sup>(\*)</sup> The history of events, therefore, in the Kurdish area outside the province of Azerbaijan follows the traditional pattern. Except that it is necessary to record that nationalistic, as distinct from tribal, aspirations have not been in evidence, the period calls for no special comment.

16. In the months immediately following the entry of British and Russian troops the policy of both Governments towards the Kurds was conditioned by the presence of Kurds on both sides of the Turkish frontier. We have always been fully conscious of Turkish susceptibilities on the Kurdish question, and deliberately refrained from any interference in the affairs of Persia which might have been interpreted as an encouragement to pan-Kurdism or as an incitement to the Kurds of Turkey. The Russians, on the other hand, for some time were obsessed with the anxiety to have friendly tribes on the frontier between Azerbaijan and Turkey in the event of the military situation in the Caucasus deteriorating, although their motives seem to have been somewhat confused and their policy gave the impression of being an improvisation. The encouragement which they gave to the Persian Kurds alarmed the Turkish Government but had no effect upon their Kurdish subjects. The improvement in the military situation and a clearer perception of the facts (which led the Russians to realise the danger from turbulent tribes to the supply line across Persia) resulted in a change of attitude, and by the end of 1942 they were trying to keep the Kurdish tribes quiet and holding the balance between them and the Persian authorities. The Kurds were correspondingly disappointed; they had felt that the Russians had acquiesced up to a point in sponsoring the movement towards Kurdish unity (implying freedom from Persian Government interference), and had then drawn back.

17. This policy was consistently maintained until some time in 1943. Early in the following year there were signs that Kurdish nationalism was again being encouraged, although the position may have been somewhat complicated by the rise of the Tudeh Party who were independently in touch with the Kurds, influencing them, presumably, against the Tehran Government in general terms rather than in favour of national separatism. But the Tudeh was unpopular with the Kurds in general, who had no interest in Tudeh agitations for industrial reform, and with the Aghas in particular, who viewed with the greatest concern Tudeh plans for agrarian reform. The Russians seem to have had some difficulty in reconciling the competition for membership between the Tudeh Party and the Jian-i-Kurd (Kurdish Life) Society (q.v.).

18. During 1944 Mahabad became the centre of Kurdish nationalism in Persia, where Qazi Muhammed, a local notable, emerged as the leader of the movement. His original aims appear to have been to obtain local autonomy on lines similar to those demanded by the Iraqi Kurdish spokesmen. By the end of the summer he had established his authority in Mahabad and the presence of the local farmandar was hardly noticed. In November he visited Tehran with several tribal leaders and attempted, with incomplete success, to convince the Persian authorities of his loyalty, although independent reports credited him with the admission that many Kurds did not want independence, but would be content with a fair administration, schools in which Kurdish was allowed, health services and improved communications. Russian policy had not yet swung over completely, and a move reported at this time for the fusion of the Khoybun, the Hewa<sup>(\*)</sup> and the Jian-i-Kurd Societies owed nothing to Russian inspiration. It may be remarked in parenthesis that there is no evidence of direct Russian support for any larger schemes for Kurdish independence.

19. Before the visit of Qazi Muhammed to Tehran it was generally believed that the Russians were actively supporting the Kurdish movement in various ways, including the printing of the organ of the Jian-i-Kurd, *Nishtman*. In February, 1945, a disturbance occurred at Mahabad and the Persian Government ordered the despatch of a column of troops there. The Russians intervened and stopped the column. This incident was followed by an intensification of Kurdish

(\*) During the period 1941-44 Southern Kurdistan had reverted almost to its uncontrolled state before Riza Shah. During those years the frontier areas around Sardasht, Baneh, Merivan and Avroman were virtually independent of Government control and were under tribal rule. Persian army garrisons, withdrawn or driven out by Kurds at the time of the Anglo-Soviet invasion of 1941, were not re-established in any of these areas until the autumn of 1944. They are still there preserving a precarious existence, but their position is far from secure and Government influence is slight.

(\*) The Khoybun has been comparatively inactive of late. The Hewa is a secret society of Sulaimani.

nationalist propaganda in which the Russians were represented as deliverers, a view which was not unreasonably connected with the opening of a branch of the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society in Mahabad in April. At the same time the Komala Kurd began to be spoken of as the successor to the Jian-i-Kurd, and as a party independent of the unpopular Tudeh Party which, however, rather than the Komala, seemed at this time to enjoy Russian support.

20. The gradual deterioration of the situation in the Barzan area of 'Iraq, culminating in the revolt of September, 1945, was vaguely attributed, without any solid foundation of evidence, to encouragement from the Komala and the Russians. There was an unconfirmed report that the Russians tried to get Qazi Muhammed to send help to Mulla Mustafa in September, but that he bargained for a cessation of Tudeh activities. Mulla Mustafa himself was also reported to have gone to Persia to seek reinforcements, but without success. Whatever may be the truth on these matters, it is indisputable that the revolt had no effect upon the course of events in Persia. In spite of some information tending to glorify Mulla Mustafa's position as a nationalist leader, even since his flight over the frontier, the bulk of evidence shows that neither he nor his indigent followers were welcome there.

21. Before the defeat of Mulla Mustafa by the 'Iraq army Qazi Muhammed had been taken with other Kurdish chiefs to Baku where they were advised to join the new Democratic Party of Azerbaijan. In return they were promised Soviet support for their independence movement. After the "Democratic" revolt of Azerbaijan in December a delegation of five Kurds, representing "the Democratic Party of Kurdistan and its leader Qazi Muhammed," offered their congratulations and all cultural and economic co-operation. But they announced at the same time that their own National Assembly of Kurdistan would shortly be opening, and referred to the People of Autonomous Iranian Kurdistan (Khud Mukhtari Kurdistan Iran). Qazi Muhammed was summoned to Tabriz and exhorted by Pishavari, the head of the Azerbaijan Government, to co-operate fully with them, and although the evidence is somewhat conflicting, the Russians appeared to be supporting the Azerbaijan Democrats; that is to say that their policy had not changed since the visit of the Kurdish leaders to Baku. The agreement recently reported to have been concluded between Mahabad and Tabriz is evidence of the continuance of this policy. Recognition of the right to use of their language by Kurds and Turki-speaking people in each other's territory is mutually guaranteed, provision is made for military assistance to one another, and this rather vague document published at Mahabad (a Tabriz version has not been seen) includes an expression of the sincerity of this declaration; all that can be said is that it is unlikely to have been made without Soviet approval. The boundaries of the Kurdish zone have not been authoritatively reported, but the southern limit has been roughly defined as a line from Tabbaghach to "a few miles south of Bukan," and thence to the "Iraqi frontier near Sardasht.

#### *The Russians and the Pan-Kurd Movement.*

22. Russian policy towards the Kurds has necessarily been dealt with fairly fully in the paragraphs dealing with Persian Kurdistan, and it has already been noted that there is no evidence of Russian support for any wide movement for Kurdish independence. Such evidence as exists of interest in Kurdish affairs outside Persia is confined to reports of an attempt to persuade Persian Kurds to help Mulla Mustafa in September, 1945, and to stories (of doubtful reliability) that they supplied arms at the same time to the Barzanis. (There is little doubt that they have done so since Mulla Mustafa took refuge in Persia.) The fact that they had made, and even now seem to be making, little or no attempt to influence the Kurds outside their zone of occupation in Persia to join in the movement for Kurdish autonomy, may indicate no more than a pause in the evolution of a policy designed in the first place to create a united effort in Azerbaijan.

23. But without any deliberate effort on their part it was natural that their military exploits and their political relations with neighbouring Kurds should excite the interest of the Kurds of 'Iraq. This interest was noted many months before the revolt of Mulla Mustafa in the autumn of 1945, and even the fact that the revolt was suppressed largely by the assistance of other Kurdish tribesmen does not appear to have damped the hope of achieving unity. The successes of Qazi Muhammed and the fact that Mulla Mustafa remained at large in Persia, in spite of the request of the 'Iraqi Government for him to be arrested and handed over, and the presence with him of 'Iraqi ex-officers who maintained contact with their own countrymen over the border, had the effect of crystallising vague ideas



of emancipation into an expectation that the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish State in Persia, under Soviet guidance, could be extended to include the Kurdish districts of Iraq and Turkey without great difficulty. Thus an earlier tendency to see in Russian help a hope for the fulfilment of aspirations which we had been unable or unwilling to assist them to achieve, assumed a more definite shape in the minds of the minor shaikhs and officials and of the students, and their interest was stimulated by propagandist literature of both nationalist and Communist character.

24. The impression given by all reports is that, except in Persia, the Soviet authorities are not at present making any serious effort to direct the Kurdish movement, and even there they are still pursuing a limited objective. They must appreciate that where the appeal of Kurdish nationalism has failed to overcome rivalries between Kurdish chiefs, the propagation of Communist ideology, which is repugnant to most of the chiefs and, except in its cruder manifestations, meaningless to their followers, could hardly be expected spontaneously to create a united Kurdistan. Such a result can be achieved only under full Soviet control, and the most recently-expressed desires of the Persian Kurds to retain, however loosely, their Iranian nationality, justify the belief that the Soviet authorities have no immediate intention of attempting to assume such control. Meanwhile, in the absence of any effective counter action, propaganda, whether directed by them or inspired by their actions, prepares the way for a possible change to a policy of unification of the Kurds and their absorption in the U.S.S.R. Even if the Soviet Government has no intention of adopting this policy, it is a bogey which can be produced at need, and the present limited support for Kurdish autonomy helps the process of undermining British influence and prestige in the Middle East.

#### *Levant States.*

25. The Kurdish community in the Levant States is believed to number about 50-60,000 (no accurate figures are available), many of whom are now more or less assimilated into the local population. There are very few in the Lebanon and the majority live in tribal groups in the area along the Syro-Turkish frontier. In Damascus there is a community of rather more than 20,000. The tribal groups who are engaged in agriculture and kindred pursuits are backward and mostly illiterate, and largely dominated by their tribal chiefs and the Mureddin (the religious and learned class). While their leaders are apt to complain on occasion (as do most other minorities) that the Syrian authorities discriminate against them, they have not so far shown any tendency to develop a separatist movement; and although they have of late been taking increased interest in the affairs of the Kurdish communities on the other side of the frontier, there is no evidence that they have any close connection with the Kurds in Iraq or Iran.

26. Amongst the more politically-minded Kurdish community in Damascus, who at present carry very little weight with the Kurdish communities in the north, there are two factions entitled respectively the "Kurdish League" and the "Society of Salah ed Din." The former, led by Dr. Nafiz and the brothers Jeladat and Kamaran Badr Khan, are professed partisans of the formation of an autonomous Kurdish state and have produced various pamphlets during the year which have been sent to the San Francisco Conference, the United Nations' Organisation, etc. The latter faction are concerned with reviving the Kurdish language and with raising the status of Kurds in the countries of their domicile, but do not appear inclined to exchange their present situation for a problematical Kurdistan. It is clear that the Kurdish leaders in Syria are not at present attracted towards the Soviet Union, though it is possible that some of the younger and more progressive Kurds tend to be susceptible to Russian propaganda, and the supporters of the "Kurdish League" may turn to Russia for support if they become convinced that they have nothing to hope for from His Majesty's Government.

27. The leader of the Lebanese Communist Party, Khalid Bagdash, is of Kurdish origin, but there is no evidence that he has any special interest in his own community or influence amongst them.

#### *Kurdish Publications.*

A brief summary of Kurdish publications is given in Appendix "B."

#### *Kurdish Societies.*

A Note on Kurdish political societies is given in Appendix "C."

## PART II.—THE KURDS OF TURKEY.

28. On a conservative estimate there are 3,000,000 Kurds in the world and 1,500,000 of them live in Turkey. The Turkish territory where they live is roughly the same eastern provinces which were largely inhabited also by Armenians until the Turks massacred or deported the latter in 1915 and 1916. The Kurds can still boast that in the course of its long history their race has never been completely subdued by Turkey or any other Power, and they remain to-day the chief thorn in the Turkish flesh.

*Recent History.*

29. Turkish Kurdistan—a geographical expression which is taboo to the Turks—is mountain country, and the Kurdish way of life is tribal and feudal. Ever since the Turks conquered the country in 1534 the Kurdish chieftains' desire to maintain their independence has led to intermittent rebellion and warfare. The Porte's attempt to extend administrative reform to the eastern provinces of Turkey entailed a general Kurdish rebellion and a punitive campaign in 1830. There were further risings in 1843, during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8, and again in 1880. Abdul Hamid II's reign (1876-1909) was an interlude during which the Kurds were kept quiet by a policy of conciliation—often at the expense of their Armenian neighbours. But the new Turkish Republic's policy of laicisation and westernisation produced two revolts in 1925-6, another in the Mt. Ararat region in 1930, and yet another in the mountains of Dersim (now re-named Tunceli) in 1937-8.

30. The motive for the 1925-6 revolt was mainly religious: the Kurds, who are mostly Sunnis, were shocked by the new anti-religious policy of Angora. The Turks had not much difficulty in suppressing that revolt and each of the subsequent risings, once they made up their minds to take action on a big enough scale, employing several divisions with guns and aircraft, over a period of six months or more. But the fighting was apt to be savage and Turkish losses heavy, and the utter ruthlessness with which the army treated the Kurdish population when putting down a rising left bitter feelings which tended to produce a subsequent rebellion. The general policy was to maintain order by keeping an ample force—sometimes as much as half the whole army—in the region; to repress any rising with the utmost severity; to break up the tribal and feudal system by deporting or otherwise liquidating the more influential chieftains (Beys and Agas) and splitting up their estates; and at the same time to try to assimilate the Kurds by extending the railways eastwards and making roads into the many inaccessible districts, opening schools to teach Turkish, and improving the primitive methods of agriculture in order to attract the nomads among the Kurds to sedentary life.

31. The Turkish authorities refuse to recognise the Kurds as a minority or as raising anything more than a mere frontier problem. For obvious reasons the Turkish Government has kept the eastern provinces closed to foreigners, so that it is difficult to assess the present position. But it can safely be said that the policy outlined in the preceding paragraph has not yet enabled the Turkish Government to assimilate its Kurds, though it has a tighter hold over them than any of its predecessors ever had. The families of troublesome Kurds (who may themselves have been executed) have been planted out in western Anatolia on only a small scale. The settlement of Turkish immigrants from the Balkans in districts from which Kurds have been evicted—a task which would tax a much more competent administration—has been tackled in only a half-hearted way. As the result of the Government's forcible disruption of the old serf economy and its obstruction of seasonal migration between plain and mountain (a practice applied by the Soviet authorities to the Kirghiz and other Asiatic nomads) there has, it is true, been a noticeable infiltration of Kurds seeking employment in the growing industries of Sivas, Kayseri, Malatya and Cilicia. But this westward drift does not seem to have been on a scale to affect the root of the matter. The railways have hardly reached the middle of the Kurdish area as yet and construction proceeds very slowly. Road-building is still so neglected that in the winter wheeled traffic in the southern districts can hardly go east of Diyarbakir. Lack of funds and teachers has prevented the opening of enough schools, and the teaching of Turkish has made little progress. Conscripted Kurds, if they manage to reach home again after military service, do not seem generally to return as good Turks. The Turkish officials are on the whole ill-paid and disgruntled and take few pains to spread Turkish culture. In general, security no doubt prevails, but that is because Turkish forces are on the spot or known to be available. Angora does not govern the Kurds by

consent, and if the army were withdrawn the Kurds would soon shake off Turkish authority. The brutality employed in repression and disruption has caused a resentment which militates against conciliation. Moreover Kurdish nationalism is growing. Hitherto the leaders' motive for rebellion has never been pure nationalism, but sometimes religion, sometimes mere economic need and more often concern for their individual feudal rights, while the lack of cohesion among the chieftains has been notorious. Now, however, although the poppy heads have been cut off by death and deportation, the feeling of kinship which has always existed is developing into nationalism, stimulated by more intellectual Kurdish elements in Syria and Iraq and by the recent exploits of rebel leaders who, whether dead or alive, are regarded as national heroes. Plainly a race is on between Kurdish nationalism and Turkish assimilation.

#### Population.

32. According to the Turkish census of 1935, the last detailed figures available, the numbers of Turkish-speakers and Kurdish-speakers in the total population of what may be considered the Kurdish vilayets, were as follows:—

Vilayet.	Turks.	Kurds.	Total Population.	Percentage of Kurds.
Siirt ... ..	7,904	101,311	127,518	79
Diyarbakir ... ..	55,993	155,846	214,142	72
Van ... ..	38,960	103,786	143,434	72
Agri (Ararat) ... ..	29,650	77,271	107,206	72
Muş ... ..	38,032	99,433	143,899	69
Mardin ... ..	15,836	146,704	229,921	64
Urfa ... ..	83,808	111,579	229,614	48
Elâzığ ... ..	144,251	105,101	256,189	41
Erzincan ... ..	92,972	64,048	157,344	40
Malatya ... ..	247,001	161,259	410,162	39
Kars ... ..	232,384	70,876	305,536	23
Erzurum ... ..	326,777	57,627	385,387	15
Gaziantep ... ..	244,740	34,439	283,506	12
Maraş ... ..	160,857	21,159	188,877	12
Sivas ... ..	372,044	50,730	432,996	11
	2,091,209	1,361,169	3,615,731	37

The subsequent census of 1944 records an increase of the total population in these vilayets to almost 4,000,000, but details have not yet been published to show whether the proportion of Kurdish-speakers still works out at 37 per cent. Whatever reliance may be placed on Turkish statistics, it may be taken as certain that those returned at Turkish-speakers include Turkomans and others who are not strictly Turks, and that the proportion of Kurdish-speakers was at the very least as high as the 37 per cent. revealed by the 1935 census. Further, it is interesting that even according to Turkish statistics the Kurds in the southern vilayets (Bitlis, Van, Muş, Diyarbakir, Siirt, Mardin and Urfa) increased between 1927 and 1935 by 250,000 and the Turks by only 20,000. There seems to be no reason to suppose that in the northern vilayets there has not been a corresponding increase in the numbers and proportion of the Kurds, who as a race are more prolific than the Turks. Roughly speaking, the Kurdish population is, as the percentages in the tables above suggest, thickest in the vilayets near the Persian and Iraqi frontiers and Lake Van, but beyond the Araxes (Aras Su) and Murat Su it thins out gradually towards the north and west. The vilayets of Kars, Erzurum, Sivas, Maraş and Gaziantep form a fringe where the proportion of Kurds is lower. Whether the proportion for the whole area is really more than 37 per cent. or not, the fact that on the basis of Turkish statistics the proportion in the six vilayets of Siirt, Diyarbakir, Van, Agri (Ararat), Muş and Mardin is as high as 64–79 per cent., may prove an awkward point for the Turks.

33. In common with the rest of Turkey the accessible parts of the Kurdish vilayets were combed for recruits in 1914–18, and few survivors returned. The rebellions of the 1920's and 1930's entailed massacre, emigration, deportation and devastation, and the consequent depopulation has struck the few foreigners permitted to see it. The interest of the Turks in discouraging the idea that the area is a desirable vacant *Lebensraum* is so obvious as to create a *prima facie* suspicion of Turkish population statistics. Meticulous though these statistics are, they may arouse scepticism owing to the remarkable leaps and bounds by



which they show the total population of Turkey to have increased of late. In 1914 it was generally put at under 10,000,000 for all present-day Turkey, but in spite of the terrible toll taken by war in 1914-18 and of the notorious infertility of the Turks, it was returned in 1927 as nearly 14,000,000, in 1935 as more than 16,000,000, and in 1944 as nearly 19,000,000. Although since 1922 the Turks have avoided the ravages of war and have improved public hygiene to an extent which must have favoured the growth of the population, it is nevertheless a matter for astonishment if they have doubled their population in less than a quarter of a century. In the event therefore of a claim being made on eastern Turkey in the name of the Kurds it is possible that Turkish population statistics will be challenged. But as no alternative figures exist, the accuracy of the Turkish census is unlikely to be either proved or disproved.

#### *Autonomy and Russia.*

34. An Anglo-French declaration of the 7th November, 1918, defined the Eastern war aim of the British and French Governments as "the complete and final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations." Although neither the Kurds nor any other people was specifically mentioned, this declaration plainly covered the Kurds. Accordingly, under Arts. 62-64 of the Treaty of Sèvres of 1920, Great Britain, France and Italy were to produce a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of Wilson's Armenia and north of Syria and Iraq. There were to be full safeguards for the Assyro-Chaldeans and other racial or religious minorities. Further, if demanded by a majority of the population within a year, an independent Kurdish State was to be created at the discretion of the League, and the Kurds of the Mosul vilayet were to be allowed to adhere to it.

35. Another scheme mooted after 1918 was for a Kurdo-Armenian State. There is no inveterate antipathy between the two races, although it was Ottoman policy to turn the Kurds on to the Armenians. Kurdish and Armenian leaders agreed in Paris on a joint policy in 1919 but nothing came of it.

36. That none of these schemes was carried out was due to the resistance of the Turks under Mustafa Kemal who prevented ratification of the Treaty of Sèvres and refused to have any mention of Kurds or Armenians in the treaty of Lausanne which replaced it in 1923. The Kurds therefore rightly hold Turkey primarily responsible for thwarting their aspirations, though, forgetting that this was largely due to the diplomatic and material support of the U.S.S.R., they tend to throw a secondary responsibility on to Great Britain. Indeed there is some evidence that in Turkey as elsewhere the Kurds now tend to look to Russia rather than to us whom they consider unable, however willing, to do anything for them. Such an impression can only have been deepened by the deplorable fate of the Assyrians in whom the British Government took a traditional interest and whom they were unable to induce the Turks at the Lausanne conference in 1923 to readmit to their home in the Hakkâri mountains of Turkey.

37. Whereas Turkish policy towards the Kurds has simply been Turkification, the Soviet Government has applied to them its usual policy of encouraging the culture of a minority. As against the opening of Kurdish schools in the Armenian Soviet Republic, the admission of Kurds to the Erivan university, the devising of a Kurdish alphabet there and the general encouragement given—albeit with obvious ulterior motives—by the Soviet authorities to the development of the language and the study of "Kurdology," the Turkish Government can set little except the fact that it is doing what it can to give its Kurds—divided as they are by differences of dialect which make some almost incomprehensible to others—a Turkish education.

38. Although, as the Soviet Government seems to have done, the Turkish Government may realise the possibilities of an economic solution of the Kurdish problem, it has in fact little to show in the economic sphere. The disruption of the Kurdish feudal system has meant the break-up of the primitive Kurdish economy. The successive punitive campaigns have involved widespread depopulation and devastation. Those tribes which have always been nomad are unlikely as yet to have been made sedentary on any large scale. Modern methods of farming must take a long time to oust the old primitive way. There is in short no evidence that after destroying the old economic system the Turkish Government has had more than sporadic success in introducing a modern form of prosperity in its place. While some towns are recovering, most of the countryside seems still to be in a state of economic decline.

39. Among the best things for which the Turks can claim credit are fairly good and fairly extensive medical and veterinary services, and a considerable number of village institutes where Western ideas are inculcated.

40. There is little doubt that the Soviet Government keeps in touch with the situation of the Kurds in Turkey, but there is no evidence so far of active Soviet steps to stir them up. Yet in view of the nature of the frontiers it would be comparatively easy for the Russians to play on the Turkish Kurds through the Kurds of north-west Persia and in particular through the thousands of Kurdish refugees at Kamishli and other places in north Syria. Even if the Kurds were more sophisticated than they yet are, an appeal on Communist anti-feudal lines would be more likely to serve Angora than Moscow. But if the Soviet Government started a movement on nationalist lines, in all probability the response of the Kurds, who have many old scores against the Turks, would be limited only by the ability of the Turks to suppress agitation. At present Turkish counter-espionage and police control seem to be efficient. Even therefore if Persian and Iraqi Kurds were to join in an autonomy movement, the Turkish Government would probably feel no real anxiety so long as it could hold its frontiers.

41. However, the case which the Soviet Government could present to the world on behalf of an autonomous or independent Kurdistan is strong. It might embrace the following:—

- (i) The immemorial title of the Kurds. In the south at least it is believed to date from about 2,000 B.C.
- (ii) The Anglo-French declaration of the 7th November, 1918 (para. 34 above).
- (iii) The Allies' recognition in 1920 of the Kurds' right to autonomy and even independence (para. 34) and the Allies' failure to ensure either.
- (iv) The Turks' record of ruthlessness and their refusal to do anything for the Kurdish race as such (paras. 30 and 31).
- (v) The feasibility of creating a Kurdo-Armenian State (para. 35) if the number of Kurds alone should be considered too small to justify detaching the Kurdish vilayets from Turkey. This would fit in admirably with the Armenian claim to Turkish territory, a great weakness of which is the absence of Armenians. Moreover, the northern part of the Kurdish area coincides with the south of Wilson's Armenia, and the southern part of the Kurdish area was until 1915 the home of a substantial number of Armenians.
- (vi) The possibility of providing in the new State for the re-establishment of the Assyrians in their home (para. 34).
- (vii) The sparseness of the Turkish population. This might lead to inconclusive argument and the question "What is a Turk?" (paras. 32 and 33).

42. There are two points which may give the question of Turkish Kurdistan a special interest for the Soviet Government. Firstly, it is roughly in the Kurdish vilayets that there is most hope of finding oil. The Standard Oil Co. is understood to possess, and be exercising, the right of prospecting there.

43. Secondly, the existence of Kurds in Cilicia and in the Kürt Dağ (Kurdish Mountain) on the Turco-Syrian frontier 35 miles inland from Iskenderon (Alexandretta) might be used by the Russians as a pretext for extending Kurdistan to embrace that port. Such a claim might be put forward together with an Armenian claim to Cilicia for which there would be some justification, and even with a Georgian claim to the Taurus Mountains for which there would seem to be none.

44. It is difficult to imagine any effective compromise by which Turkey might meet a demand for Kurdish freedom. Even if the Turks had been by nature or tradition the sort of people who might make a success of a liberal attitude to the Kurds, such a policy is impossible in the face of the present Russian menace. It is inconceivable that even if the Turkish Government went so far as to agree on paper to giving the Kurds minority rights, it would grant them in practice. The fear of minority status developing into autonomy and of autonomy becoming independence is likely to make the Turks stick doggedly to their policy of Turkification and fight, rather than risk the loss of so great a part of their territory and population.

*Research Department, Foreign Office,  
3rd August, 1946.*

## Appendix "A."

EXTRACT FROM THE OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

*Annex to the Report of the Council Committee, dated 9th May, 1932.*

DRAFT DECLARATION BY THE 'IRAQI GOVERNMENT.

## CHAPTER I.

*Article 1.*

Protection of Minorities. The stipulations contained in the present chapter are recognised as fundamental laws of 'Iraq, and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action now or in the future prevail over them.

*Article 4.*

1. All 'Iraqi nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion.

2. The electoral system shall guarantee equitable representation to racial, religious and linguistic minorities in 'Iraq.

3. Differences of race, language or religion shall not prejudice any 'Iraqi national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights—as, for instance, admission to public employment, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions or industries.

4. No restriction will be imposed on the free use by any 'Iraqi national of any language, in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

5. Notwithstanding the establishment by the 'Iraqi Government of Arabic as the official language, and notwithstanding the special arrangements to be made by the 'Iraqi Government, under Article 9 of the present Declaration, regarding the use of the Kurdish and Turkish languages, adequate facilities will be given to all 'Iraqi nationals whose mother tongue is not the official language for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts.

*Article 5.*

'Iraqi nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities will enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other 'Iraqi nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to maintain, manage and control at their own expense, or to establish in the future, charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

*Article 8.*

1. In the public educational system in towns and districts in which are resident a considerable proportion of 'Iraqi nationals whose mother tongue is not the official language, the 'Iraqi Government will make provision for adequate facilities for ensuring that, in the primary schools, instruction shall be given to the children of such nationals through the medium of their own language; it being understood that this provision does not prevent the 'Iraqi Government from making the teaching of Arabic obligatory in the said schools.

2. In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of 'Iraqi nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities will be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, Municipal or other budgets for educational, religious or charitable purposes.

*Article 9.*

1. 'Iraq undertakes that, in the liwas of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya, the official language, side by side with Arabic, shall be Kurdish in the qadhas in which the population is predominantly of Kurdish race.

In the qadhas of Kifri and Kirkuk, however, in the liwa of Kirkuk, where a considerable part of the population is of Turcoman race, the official language, side by side with Arabic, shall be either Kurdish or Turkish.



2. 'Iraq undertakes that, in the said qadhas, the officials shall, subject to justifiable exceptions, have a competent knowledge of Kurdish or Turkish, as the case may be.

3. Although in these qadhas the criterion for the choice of officials will be, as in the rest of 'Iraq, efficiency and knowledge of the language, rather than race, 'Iraq undertakes that the officials shall, as hitherto, be selected, so far as possible, from among 'Iraqis from one or other of these qadhas.

#### Article 10.

The stipulations of the foregoing articles of this Declaration, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, are declared to constitute obligations of international concern and will be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. No modification will be made in them without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

This was duly signed and ratified on 13th July, 1932.

#### Appendix "B."

##### KURDISH PUBLICATIONS.

The following printed Kurdish publications are at present appearing at regular or irregular intervals:—

- (i) *Zhiyn* (Life).—Published in Sulaimani by Haji Tewfiq Pirmard. Kurdish newspaper, appearing at, roughly, weekly intervals.
- (ii) *Gelaweyzh* (Sirius).—Published monthly in Baghdad by Ibrahim Ahmad. Has been described as "the best literary review in the Middle East."
- (iii) *Azadi* (Freedom).—Published at irregular intervals as the organ of the Kurdish Branch of the 'Iraqi Communist Party and is the Kurdish counterpart of the illegal Arabic *Al Qaida*. Has now absorbed an early Communist Kurdish production, *Yekiyati Tekushin*. Well informed on local events and news in Kurdish districts of 'Iraq. Preaches the unity of Kurds and Arabs against the "Imperialist" and "Colonising" Powers.
- (iv) *Dang-i-Geyt-i-Taza* (Voice of the new World).—First published in Baghdad by Public Relations Section of British Embassy. Now run independently by Tewfiq Wahbi and Sayid Hussain Huzni Mukriyani.
- (v) *Hawar* (The Call).—Edited by Jeladat Badr Khan and published in Damascus. Uses Latin characters.
- (vi) *Ronahi* (The Light).—Edited by Jeladat Badr Khan and published in Damascus. An illustrated supplement to *Hawar* printed in Latin characters.
- (vii) *Roja Nu* (The New Day).—Daily newspaper edited by Dr. Kameran Badr Khan in Beirut. Printed in Latin characters.
- (viii) *Ster* (The Star).—A monthly, edited by Dr. Kameran Badr Khan in Beirut. Printed in Latin characters.
- (ix) *Riya Taza* (The New Day).—Published in Erivan in Soviet Armenia. Latin or Russian(?) characters.
- (x) *Nishtman* (The Homeland).—The organ of the Kurdish J.K. (Jian-i-Kurd) Society. Believed to come from Mahabad or Tabriz. Strongly Nationalist and takes the lines that the tribal chiefs and aghas are mainly responsible for Kurdish backwardness. Appears at irregular intervals.
- (xi) *Kurdistan*.—A new daily printed in Mahabad and the voice of the newly established Independent Democratic Kurdish Republic.
- (xii) *Hawar-i-Kurd* (The Kurdish Call).—Another new publication from Mahabad.
- (xiii) *Ala Kuk*.—A new publication which describes itself as a product of the "Home of Soviet Civilisation, Tabriz."

N.B.—Except where otherwise stated, the above publications use Arabic script.

## Appendix "C."

## KURDISH SOCIETIES.

*Khoybun* (Independence).

The original Kurdish Independence Party. Strongly anti-Turk in origin. Headquarters in Syria with links in Cairo and 'Iraq. Was formed soon after first World War and later joined forces with the Armenian Dashnaks. The partnership was dissolved, it is alleged, because, the Dashnaks being anti-Soviet, association with them precluded Soviet interest in Khoybun Kurdish activities. The party remained deliberately inactive during the last war in order, it is believed, to avoid embarrassing Turkey. It has recently shewn some signs of revival and its periodicals, after an interval of a year or two, are being republished.

*Komal-e-Kurd* (Komala) (Kurdish Group).

Appeared in Persian Azerbaijan in the early part of 1945. Headquarters at Mahabad. Led by Qazi Muhammed Ilkhani Zadeh of Mahabad. Believed to be the successor of Jian-i-Kurd and may now have dissolved into Kurdish Democratic Party. Has had some contact with the Pizhder and other 'Iraqi Kurds, but wields no great influence outside Persia.

*Jian-i-Kurd* (Kurdish Life).

Believed to have been founded in 1943. According to its organ, the *Nishtman* (second issue, early 1944), its programme included an appeal for Kurdish unity and opposition to the Aghas, but it was not Communist. Some secrecy, however, was allowed to surround its activities, and especially the printing of the *Nishtman*. Had some influence, through the *Nishtman*, in Sulaimani, and a report of August 1944 spoke of "an attempt" to join up with the Hewa of Sulaimani and the Khoybun. Zero Beg Herki named as its most prominent member. Anti-Tudeh but pro-Russian. Supplanted by Komal-e-Kurd towards end of 1945.

*Hizb-i-Demokrati-e-Kurdistan*.

Founded after visit of Qazi Muhammed and other Kurds to Baku in September 1945. A manifesto in Kurdish and Persian issued in October 1945 made the following demands:—

- (a) An autonomous Kurdistan within the frontiers of the Persian State.
- (b) The use of the Kurdish language in schools and the administration of Kurdistan.
- (c) The immediate election of a provincial council for Kurdistan to supervise all social and Government affairs.
- (d) Selection of Government officials exclusively from the people of Kurdistan.
- (e) Promulgation of a law to regulate relations between peasants and landlords.
- (f) Co-operation with the other races of Azerbaijan (Armenians, Assyrians, &c.) to establish unity and brotherhood in the country.
- (g) Exploitation of the natural resources of Kurdistan for the benefit of its people.

Seems to have taken the place of the Komal-e-Kurd and to be the ruling party in the Azerbaijan Kurdish district.

*Hewa Kurd* (Hope).

A secret society of Sulaimani; little is known of it or its activities.

*Razgar-e-Kurd* (Kurdish Rescue).

Recently appeared in Bagdad as the sponsor of memoranda supporting the Persian Kurds and demanding the rights of those of 'Iraq. These memoranda, which were sent to the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow in December 1945 and to the United Nations Conference in London, closely resemble the *Azadi* articles. The identity and membership of the party are not yet known.

*K.K.K.*

In a February number of the Beirut *Roja Nu*, there was mention of the K.K.K.—the Komal-i-Kommunist-i-Kurdistan—whose political aims were listed. It was claimed that this news item was taken from a Persian newspaper, *Elburz*, published in Resht(?).


# Map to accompany memorandum ARMENIAN & GEORGIAN CLAIMS TO TURKISH TERRITORY




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 - - - - - Wilson Line, 1920

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Kurdish frontier, 1878-1918  
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TO PRIORITY TEHRAN TELNO 399 OF 26 SEPTEMBER, 1974  
FOLLOWING FROM WRIGHT, MED  
MEDICAL SUPPLIES FOR KURDS

1. GENERAL SIR ARTHUR DRUMMOND, A FORMER DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF ARMY MEDICAL SERVICES, CALLED ON ME ON 26 SEPTEMBER TO SAY THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY MR RICHARD HAUSER TO UNDERTAKE A SURVEY OF KURDISH MEDICAL REQUIREMENTS, FOLLOWING AN APPROACH TO HAUSER BY KURDISH ORGANISATIONS IN LONDON. DRUMMOND PROPOSES TO FLY TO TEHRAN ON 29 SEPTEMBER.

2. BEARING IN MIND PARA 3 OF YOUR TEL NO 476, I TOLD DRUMMOND THAT OUR LATEST INFORMATION INDICATED THAT THE IRANIANS DID NOT REQUIRE OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE TO COPE WITH THE REFUGEE PROBLEM, AND ADVISED HIM TO BEAR IRANIAN SENSITIVITIES IN MIND DURING HIS VISIT. HE HAS AGREED TO MY SUGGESTION THAT HE SHOULD CALL ON AFSHAR BEFORE DEPARTURE.

3. DRUMMOND CLAIMS TO HAVE MEDICAL CONTACTS IN TEHRAN AND HOPES THROUGH THEM TO ARRANGE A CALL ON THE MINISTER OF HEALTH. HE MAY ALSO CALL AT THE EMBASSY ON ARRIVAL.

4. I HAVE EMPHASISED TO AFSHAR THAT DRUMMOND'S VISIT IS ENTIRELY PRIVATE, AND ARISES FROM THE HUMANITARIAN CONCERN OF A GROUP OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AT THE SITUATION IN KURDISTAN. SINCE DRUMMOND INDICATED TO ME THAT HE ALSO PLANNED TO VISIT IRAQI KURDISTAN, I HAVE POINTED OUT THE RISKS AND HAVE EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR HIM (AND US) TO DISSOCIATE ANY SUCH VISIT FROM HMG.

CALLAGHAN

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MR CAMPBELL

MR WEIR

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 346 OF 27 SEPTEMBER 1974.  
INFO ROUTINE TEHRAN.

MY TEL NO'S FCO 345 AND VISFO 313. VISIT OF MINISTER  
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

1. JAMALI ASKED ME LATE LAST EVENING WHETHER ARRANGMENTS COULD BE MADE FOR A FEW CORRESPONDENTS INTERESTED IN THE KURDISH PROBLEM TO INTERVIEW TAQA DURING HIS STOPOVER IN LONDON. I SAID I WOULD PASS THIS ON.
2. AS YOU KNOW TIMES, FINANCIAL TIMES AND GUARDIAN HAVE SHOWN MOST INTEREST. IF INTERVIEW COULD BE ARRANGED IT MIGHT AT LEAST SERVE TO UNDERLINE TO TAQA THAT WE WISH TO HELP WHEREVER POSSIBLE.
3. YOU MAY WISH TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE VISIT FOR SOME STRAIGHT TALKING WITH THE MINISTER ON MATTERS OF RELATIONS GENERALLY AND KURDS/VISAS IN PARTICULAR. THIS WOULD PROVE VALUABLE IN HELPING TO CORRECT SOME OF HIS WILDER NOTIONS. I FEAR THAT TO AVOID SEEING HIM ALTOGETHER WOULD SIMPLY CONFIRM HIM IN HIS VIEW THAT WE ARE NOT REALLY INTERESTED IN IMPROVING RELATIONS.

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
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<i>Mr. MVD</i>
<i>Mr. News</i>

*Mr. MVD*

*R.C.*

*(copy)*

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& ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 345 OF 26 SEPTEMBER 1974.

INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

1. I WAS SUMMONED THIS MORNING BY THE UNDER SECRETARY WHO, SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS MINISTER, SAID HE WISHED TO EXPRESS AGAIN THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES "DEEP CONCERN" AT WHAT APPEARED TO BE THE DECLINE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

2. JAMALI SAID THAT AS I KNEW, A NUMBER OF IRAQI PASSPORTS WERE NO LONGER VALID FOR THE UK. HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO SAY THAT THIS ACTION WAS BEING TAKEN FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS :-

(A) THE ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT OF IRAQI CITIZENS IN LONDON ON CHARGES OF SHOPLIFTING WHICH HAD BEEN "ARRANGED" BY ZIONIST AGENTS. THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES HAD TAKEN NO ACTION TO PREVENT THIS HAPPENING.

85- (B) OUR CONTINUING POLICY OF MAKING DIFFICULTIES OVER VISAS FOR THE UK. DESPITE THE MINISTER'S PERSONAL REQUEST TO ME (MY TEL NO 325) WE HAD DELAYED ISSUING VISAS TO THREE MEMBERS OF THE STAFF WHO WERE URGENTLY NEEDED IN LONDON.

(C) BRITAIN WAS ADOPTING A POSITION MORE FAVOURABLE TO THE KURDISH DISSIDENTS THAN TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. BRITISH OFFICIALS HAD RECEIVED KURDISH DISSIDENT REPRESENTATIVES IN LONDON, AND THE BRITISH PRESS WAS "FULL OF" REPORTS CRITICAL OF IRAQ "S POLICY TOWARDS THE KURDS.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS NOT INTERESTED IN THE MATTER OF THE BORDER

(C) BRITAIN HAS RECEIVED MORE KURDISH DISSIDENTS THAN TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. BRITISH OFFICIALS HAD RECEIVED KURDISH DISSIDENT REPRESENTATIVES IN LONDON, AND THE BRITISH PRESS WAS "FULL OF" REPORTS CRITICAL OF IRAQI'S POLICY TOWARDS THE KURDS.

(D) WE WERE SUPPORTING IRAN IN THE MATTER OF THE BORDER AND KURDISH ISSUES. ON MOST MATTERS OUR POLICY WAS DISTINCTLY MORE FAVOURABLE TO IRAN THAN IRAQ.

3. HE WENT ON TO REPEAT MANY OF HIS EARLIER STATEMENTS ABOUT IRAQ "DISAPPOINTMENT AT OUR FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THEIR DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS (MY TEL NO 262). THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES FOUND IT HARD TO UNDERSTAND WHY THIS SHOULD BE THE CASE AND HE THOUGHT THAT HM AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE WOULD HAVE A VERY DIFFICULT TIME UNLESS ACTIVE STEPS WERE TAKEN BY HM TO IMPROVE MATTERS. THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEM, HE BELIEVED, WAS THAT OF VISAS. IF WE WOULD ONLY LIFT OUR RESTRICTIONS, THE IRAQIS WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO FOLLOW SUIT, BUT UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THIS HAPPENED THEY WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO RETALIATE.

4. DEALING WITH HIS POINTS AS THEY HAD BEEN RAISED, I SAID THAT I WAS AWARE THAT TWO IRAQI SUBJECTS HAD BEEN CONVICTED BY LONDON COURTS FOR SHOPLIFTING. I HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE EVIDENCE PUT FORWARD IN THEIR DEFENCE, BUT WAS CERTAIN THAT PROPER WEIGHT WOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO IT BY THE JUDGES CONCERNED. HIS ALLEGATION THAT THE WHOLE THING HAD BEEN CONTRIVED BY ZIONIST AGENTS WAS ONE ON WHICH I COULD NOT COMMENT.

5. AS TO THE KURDS, I DENIED EMPHATICALLY THAT ANY KURDISH DISSIDENT HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY ANY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FCO (YOUR TEL NO 179). I REMINDED HIM THAT THERE WAS NO CONTROL OF THE PRESS IN BRITAIN. NEWSPAPERS WERE FREE TO SUPPORT ONE COURSE AGAINST ANOTHER. I REGRETTED THAT THE HADDAD DELEGATION HAD NOT MADE THE FULLEST USE OF ITS VISIT TO LONDON,

(WILLIAMS LETTER OF 3 SEPTEMBER TO ME), I.E. AS FAR AS I WAS AWARE, NO REQUEST HAD BEEN MADE FOR THEM TO BE SEEN AT THE FCO, AND THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR INTERVIEWS WITH THE PRESS SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN INEFFICIENTLY HANDLED. I SAID

THAT IF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT OBJECTED TO BRITISH PRESS HANDLING OF THE KURDISH ISSUE, THEN THE FIRST STEP TO TAKE WAS TO ENSURE THAT ITS OWN POLICY WAS PROPERLY EXPLAINED. THIS DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN DONE. JAMALI TOOK NOTE OF

HANDLING OF THE KURDISH ISSUE, THEN THE FIRST STEP TO TAKE WAS TO ENSURE THAT ITS OWN POLICY WAS PROPERLY EXPLAINED. THIS DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN DONE. JAMALI TOOK NOTE OF THIS AND SAID HE WOULD REPORT TO THE MINISTER.

6. AS TO IRAN, I SAID THAT CERTAINLY OUR RELATIONS WERE EXCELLENT AND OF LONG STANDING BUT I WAS NOT AWARE THAT WE SUPPORTED IRAN TO THE DETRIMENT OF IRAQ. I SAW NO REASON WHY OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAQ SHOULD NOT BECOME CLOSE, BUT THESE THINGS TOOK TIME. AS TO HIS MAJOR CONCERN THAT WE WERE AIDING AND ABETTING THE IRANIANS IN THEIR SUPPORT OF THE KURDS, THIS WAS QUITE UNTRUE. AS I HAD ALREADY SAID, WE REGARDED THE KURDISH PROBLEM AS AN INTERNAL MATTER.

7. ON VISAS, I REPEATED WHAT I SAID EARLIER ( MY TEL NO 260 ) THAT WE REGRETTED THAT CIRCUMSTANCES WERE SUCH THAT VISAS WERE NECESSARY, BUT UNFORTUNATELY I WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO SAY IF AND WHEN THIS POLICY WAS LIKELY TO BE CHANGED. FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST, VISAS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE NECESSARY. FOR OUR PART, WE WOULD DO OUR UTMOST TO SEE THAT THIS CAUSED THE MINIMUM OF DIFFICULTY TO TRAVELLERS. WE WERE ALREADY ISSUING VISAS FAR QUICKER THAN WERE THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES.

8. I SAID THAT I HOPED ALL THAT I HAD HAD TO SAY WOULD PERSUADE HIM THAT THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR RESTRICTING TRAVEL TO THE U.K. SUCH RESTRICTIONS WERE OUTMODDED AND SERVED NO PURPOSE. HE SAID ONLY THAT HE WOULD REPORT TO THE MINISTER.

9. JAMALI WAS SERIOUS WHEN HE COMPLAINED OF OUR ATTITUDE OVER VISAS AND THE DIFFICULTIES THIS WAS CAUSING IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR RELATIONS. AS FOR THE REST, HE GAVE THE STRONG IMPRESSION THAT HE DID NOT AGREE WITH HIS MINISTER'S BRIEF. ON THE SHOPLIFTING CHARGES, IN PARTICULAR HE CLEARLY DID NOT REALLY BELIEVE WHAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SAY.

10. THERE IS NOT, I THINK, ANY NEED TO RESPOND TO ALL OF THESE CHARGES, BUT YOU MAY WISH ME TO SAY MORE ON THE MATTER OF PASSPORT VALIDITY. I WILL ENSURE THAT HM AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE IS FULLY BRIEFED ON THE MATERIAL ALREADY AVAILABLE HERE, THIS WILL, I THINK, SUFFICE. THE PROBLEM OF THE VISAS FOR MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE IRAQI EMBASSY IS, HOWEVER MUCH MORE SERIOUS.

Mr Clark *8/27/74*Mr Burton *8/30/74*RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35

30 SEP 1974

NBR 1/2

## MEDICAL SUPPLIES FOR KURDS

1. Following <sup>(23)</sup> yesterday's meeting, reported in FCO telegram No 399 to Tehran, Sir Alexander (not Sir Arthur as incorrectly stated in our telegram) Drummond telephoned me this afternoon to say that he had seen the Iranian Ambassador for about a quarter of an hour and had explained to him the purpose of his visit to Tehran. In response to questions Sir Alexander had emphasised that his interest in the Kurds was purely humanitarian and that any information he gathered as a result of his visit would be passed to the Iranian Ministry of Health.
2. Mr Afshar had asked what organisation was sponsoring General Drummond's visit. He had explained that Mr Richard Hauser was one of a group of wealthy Jews who were anxious to help the Kurds in recognition of their assistance during the war in allowing the Jews to pass through Kurdistan. General Drummond said that his explanation seemed to have adequately resolved any doubts which the Iranian Ambassador might have had.
3. General Drummond also told me that he had mentioned his visit to the Pakistani Ambassador though he did not explain why. He told me however that the Pakistani Ambassador had warmly welcomed the idea of his visit.

  
P R H Wright  
Middle East Department

27 September 1974

cc Chancery, Tehran



(62)

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FM TEHRAN 020800Z OCT

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RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 31  
-30 OCT 1974  
NBR 1/2

TOP COPY

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 529 OF 2 OCT 1974.

FOR WRIGHT MED FROM ELLINGWORTH IN AMBASSADOR'S ABSENCE ON TOUR.

MEDICAL SUPPLIES FOR KURDS.

1. DRUMMOND CALLED ON ME YESTERDAY. HE APPEARS TO BE APPROACHING THE POTENTIAL PITFALLS SENSIBLY. MY MAIN WORRY IS WHETHER AT HIS AGE AND AFTER A BOUT OF FLU, HE IS ROBUST ENOUGH FOR THE GUERILLA LIFE.

2. IF HIS VISIT IS PICKED UP BY THE PRESS, WE PROPOSE TO EMPHASISE THAT HE IS A PRIVATE CITIZEN AND NOT A SERVING OFFICER, AND THAT WE UNDERSTAND THE PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT TO BE TO LEARN AT FIRST HAND FROM THE IRANIANS THE DIMENSIONS OF THE KURDISH REFUGEE PROBLEM, PARTICULARLY THE MEDICAL ASPECTS. IF ASKED WHETHER HE IS VISITING IRAQI KURDISTAN, WE SHALL SAY THAT WE HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF THIS.

3. PLEASE INFORM BAGHDAD AS APPROPRIATE.

PARSONS

FILES

MED  
UND  
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NEWS D  
MR WEIR

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

(63)



BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

1 October 1974

1/2

G S Burton Esq  
Middle East Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
LONDON



*10/10/74*  
*12*

*G S Burton*

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL FOR KURDISTAN

1. It was announced last week that the Revolutionary Command Council has appointed 12 more members to the Legislative Council for Kurdistan, and it is expected that the Council itself will nominate the remaining 8 members to make up the numbers to the full 80. The only important name amongst those nominated is Hashim Hassan al-Aqrawi, who has also been appointed as President of the Executive Council for Kurdistan.

2. The Legislative Council opens on 5 October, and there have been a number of articles in the papers about its importance - apparently 110 Arab and foreign journalists are going to attend the inauguration.

*Yours ever,*

K D Temple

RESTRICTED

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(64)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 - 8 OCT 1974
NBR 1/2



BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

1 October 1974

1/2

G S Burton Esq  
Middle East Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
LONDON

*M. Bingsley*

✓ see X  
10/10  
Copy sent with comps.  
8/X 10/10

*See Graham*

KURDS

1. Thank you for your letter of 20 September enclosing copies of correspondence between Mr Russell Johnston MP and Mr Ennals, and the letter from the Kurdish Red Crescent Society. If you could send us a copy, we would be interested to see the booklet by KRCS, "Help the Victims of Kurdistan War", which was enclosed with the letter to you. *W 55*

2. Thank you also for warning us about the ATV documentary due for 29 October - no doubt after it is shown we shall receive complaints from the MFA.

*Yours be*

*Delane back.*

*R G*

R G Giddens

CONFIDENTIAL

crisis the crisis of cheap energy because the price is less than the actual value of oil. Oil is not [words indistinct] but also to operate industrial machines and vital projects.

I hope I shall see a Europe which is not merely a satellite of the United States, he said. He added that he had discussed the energy crisis in the light of President Ford's recent speech and his threats to the oil-producing countries with President Bumadayan in Algiers.

#### **Iraqi Measures for Administration of Kurdish Autonomous Area**

INA 1121 gmt 3 Oct 74

Excerpt from report:

Baghdad, 3rd October: President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr has delegated Vice-President Taha Muhyi ad-Din Ma'ruf to open the first session of the first Legislative Assembly for the autonomous area. The session will begin next Saturday and will last nine months. Ma'ruf will make the opening speech on behalf of the President.


INA has learned that Hashim Hasan Aqrabi, who on 24th September was entrusted by the President with chairing and forming the Executive Council for the autonomous area, will submit a Bill to the Legislative Assembly on the formation of the Executive Council.

INA has also learned that Aqrabi's proposed formation of the Executive Council, which he will submit to the Legislative Assembly, is as follows:

Chairman	Hashim Hasan Aqrabi
Vice-Chairman	Su'ad Adib
Interior Department	Su'ad Adib
Finance and Economy	Nuri Rashid Mahmud
Social Affairs	Muhammad Zaywar Sharif
Summer Resorts and Tourism	Sirwan al-Jaff
Agriculture and Agrarian Reform	Bashir Abd ar-Rahman al-Atrushi
WAQFS	Ala ad-Din Najm ad-Din as-Sajjadi
Transport and Communications	Adil al-Haji Salim
Culture and Youth	Uthman Muhammad Fa'iq
Education	Musa Abd as-Samad
Works and Housing	Shirwan Ali Amin

The Executive Council will also include Ihsan Tahir al-Mufti, Ahmad Abd al-Qadir an-Naqshabandi and Ahmad Hamid Qadir as members.

In accordance with the Law on Autonomy the Chairman of the Executive Council must obtain [vote of] confidence in the Legislative Assembly on his proposal. He will then submit the Bill to the President of the Republic... [Review of Law on Autonomy.]



**Bilid Abd as-Salam on Oil Prices**

Algiers home service in Arabic 2030 gmt 3 Oct 74

Excerpts from report:

The Minister of Industry and Energy, Bilid Abd as-Salam, arrived this morning in Beirut from Kuwait. . . Replying to journalists' questions, Bilid Abd as-Salam said. . . We believe that the prices of commodities in industrialized countries are the basis of the current inflation which is the major problem of today. In fact, the present world economic system is responsible for the vast profits reaped by companies, and this is the main reason for world inflation.

The Minister said: Oil prices are not high; they are reasonable. It is the old prices that were unreasonable. He explained that the meetings he had held with the Kuwait Oil Minister had produced positive results, and that their views were identical. . .

To another question the Minister said: While oil prices remained fixed and very low for a number of years in the past, the prices of other goods kept going up steadily. In the last few years, the prices of industrialized goods went up at the rate of 400%. After the adjustment of the oil prices, the energy supplied by oil now constitutes only two to four per cent of the energy consumed. Oil represents only a fraction of the main and real source of energy - electricity.

Replying to another question, Bilid Abd as-Salam said: there is an economic problem bedevilling the economy of the industrial countries. When facing this problem, they try to put the responsibility for it on others. The problem does not lie in oil, but they found it easier to place this responsibility on the Arabs. The Minister said: Western and American campaigns have a Zionist motive, for in the past the Jews had controlled the economic centres [of the world]. But now the situation has changed because of the emergence of the Arabs and oil. Also, world colonialist quarters do not want the Arabs to have any standing in the world economy; they merely want to exploit the Arabs. . .

**Military Affairs**

**End of Syrian military exercise** (Excerpts) . . . One of our armoured formations today, 3rd October 1974, ended a tactical exercise in which it used various modern combat weapons and new tactical combat methods acquired from its fighting experience in the October liberation war. The exercise demonstrated the co-operation and interdependence (tadafur) of the various weapons, especially with the Air Force, in the circumstances and speed of modern warfare. The exercise was attended by the Deputy C-in-C and Defence Minister, the CGS and a number of general staff officers. . . (Damascus home service 1215 gmt 3 Oct 74)

(Excerpts) Syrian forces have held exercises over the past few days. . . Like the Egyptians, the Syrians ended their defensive training in case of an Israeli offensive some time ago. The Syrian exercise led to an alert on our side. . . When the Syrian exercise ended, tension in the Golan Heights eased. . . (Israel home service 1610 gmt 3 Oct 74)

**Chinese militia delegation in Syria** Maj-Gen. Mustafa Talas, Syrian Deputy C-in-C and Defence Minister, last night received the Chinese militia delegation headed by a commander in the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The meeting was attended by the Commander of the Popular Army. (Damascus home service 0415 gmt 4 Oct 74)



~~Mr. B. J. M. E.~~  
~~Chairman~~  
~~Refugees~~  
**STANDING CONFERENCE OF  
BRITISH ORGANISATIONS FOR AID TO REFUGEES**


(Association with the Voluntary Committee on Overseas Aid and Development) (6)

International Development Centre · Parnell House · 25 Wilton Road · London SW1V 1JS

Telephone: 01-828 7611

Chairman:  
Airey Neave DSO, OBE, MC, TD, MP

Secretary: Miss N. Rice-Jones MBE  
Asst. to Secretary: Mrs. E. Dony



*David (ME)*  
**SPECIAL MEETING ON KURDS**

*Emery*  
*DF/ls*

This meeting will be held at 2.30 p.m. on Thursday  
10 October 1974 in Room 15, Friends House, Euston Road,  
London NW1.

It is very much hoped that all those with interest  
in and concern for the situation of the Kurds will be  
able to attend.

N. Rice-Jones

Secretary

3 October 1974

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
FM BAGHDAD 100526Z OCT.

S E C R E T

TO PRIORITY TEHERAN TEL NO 22 OF 10 OCTOBER 1974,  
INFO ROUTINE MODUK.

DIG FOH.  
FOR DA.  
FROM DA.

KURDISTAN.



*Mr. Burt* 10/10

GWYNNE ROBERTS FINANCIAL TIMES, CURRENTLY IN BAGHDAD  
WITH IAN COLVIN TELLS ME DAVID HIRST MANCHESTER GUARDIAN  
IS NOW IN KURDISTAN. COULD YOU LOCATE AND DEBRIEF HIM WHEN  
HE COMES OUT.

GRAHAM  
BT

SENT TO D.C.C.

NNNN

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


BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

10 October 1974

P K Williams Esq  
Middle East Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
LONDON



*W. Roberts 14/10*  
*R 14/10*

*See later,*

#### THE KURDISH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

1. The Council was opened by the (Kurdish) Vice President, Taha Ma'arouf, on Saturday 5 October, in the presence of a large contingent of invited foreign journalists. Amongst the journalist were Ian Colvin of the "Daily Telegraph" and Gwynne Roberts for the "Financial Times" (your tel No. 248 of 3 October). Much of our knowledge of the proceedings comes from Colvin and Roberts, whom we were able to see before their departure.
2. Both thought there was a distinct lack of popular enthusiasm about the ceremony in Arbil itself. There appear to have been no crowds, and applause during the Session itself was no more than "polite". Colvin said that membership of the Assembly comprised both Kurds and Arabs, which seemed to be an admission that the "Self Rule Area" is a geographical rather than an ethnic entity.
3. Much of the Press reporting was predictable, but there were one or two interesting points:-
  - The oath which members of the Council took included the words "..... to preserve the safety of the Iraqi Republic and its territorial integrity."
  - Ma'arouf said that he had briefed members of the Council on the "directives" of the President.
  - The Council is to resume its meetings within a month.
4. Whilst the military were sufficiently sure of themselves to permit the Session to take place in Arbil, it is perhaps significant that journalists were flown to Kirkuk, and not taken by car. Security was apparently strict with many guards visible on rooftops and elsewhere. The Iraqis did the journalists well: the travelling expenses of all 110 attending were paid for and some (including Dana Schmidt of the "Christian Science Monitor") took photographers with them at Iraqi expense. There was no censorship of their reporting, but officials of the Ministry of Information required to see copies of everything sent.

/5.

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- 2 -

5. The Diplomatic Corps was not invited.

6. What significance, if any, is to be attached to the new body? It is very difficult to see this Assembly as anything but a facade. All its members are appointed by the Central Government and there is likely to be little that is democratic about its deliberations. It is true that the rest of the country has no similar body, but as the Assembly has no executive authority, it has no real meaning. When speaking to the Vice Chairman of the Eritrean Liberation Front during his recent visit, Ali Ghannam (of the Ba'ath National Leadership) stressed the "speeding up of democratic dialogue for arriving at national unity". If the Council is intended to be evidence of that dialogue, then it will not impress many people.

*per se*

*R G Giddens*

R G Giddens

cc: Chancery  
TEHRAN

cc: Capt D Norbury  
DI4  
Ministry of Defence

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British Embassy  
Tehran

69  
h Bowtan Vo see.  
Any comments on  
para 6? 2/14  
K 1/x

P K Williams Esq  
Middle East Department  
FCO

Your reference

Our reference 3/2

Date 10 October 1974

## KURDISTAN

1. We owe you another letter on what we have been <sup>(50)</sup>able to pick <sup>(51)</sup>up about the Kurdish situation since our telegrams Nos 498 and 499. Since then, little has appeared in the local press, but we have heard a detailed account of the picture in Kurdistan itself from David Hirst of the Guardian who visited the area from 22 September.

2. Much of what Hirst told us will no doubt appear in his articles, so I will only mention what seemed to us to be the most interesting points. He is in no doubt that the Kurds can hold out until the onset of winter and in fact thinks that the Iraqi army will have some difficulty in holding the main towns that they have captured once the bad weather starts. He is inclined to agree with the theory that back in August Barzani was indeed exaggerating his difficulties in order to extract more help from the Iranians. He seemed to believe stories that he had heard from the Kurds that such were the demands being made on the Iraqi soldiers in a desperate attempt to finish things that some were deserting. He had also found that the Kurds thought that since Saddam Hussein had staked everything on success, the internal pressures on him would increase considerably. They hoped that if they could hang on, there might well be a coup d'état in Baghdad which would bring a more reasonable régime to power. He had found no slackening in Kurdish morale. The Kurds were still travelling from the plains back to the mountains, many of whom were educated men.

3. The Kurds had showed Hirst one piece of "evidence" which had apparently convinced them, but not entirely him, that the Russians were flying bombing sorties. The Iraqis had made several low level attacks on a particular bridge but had failed to hit it. After several days of abortive bombing, a plane came along at a very high level and destroyed the bridge first time. The Kurds argued that the Iraqis were incapable of this.

4. We also recently asked the US Embassy what their reading was of the situation. They too believed that the Iraqis were unlikely to win the decisive victory they wanted. They had hoped to confuse the Kurds by pinning them against the borders and then attacking in circumstances where women and children would restrict the Kurds' freedom of action. They had failed because the Iranians had let the refugees across the frontier. The Iraqis had now lost the initiative and the Kurds were finding themselves able to counter-attack. They

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/also





also believed that the Kurds had been exaggerating their plight in August.

5. I had an opportunity myself to visit the refugee camps in West Azerbaijan and the border area around Piranshahr on 29 September. I enclose, for you and Baghdad only, a copy of an extract from a rather discreditable and seriously report that I wrote on my return, which will I hope give you some idea of what the situation is like on the ground. What emerged clearest from my visit was that once the Kurds entered Iraq, they were being well looked after. For, as I said some weeks ago, the refugee problem in Iraq is not at all as very severe. I was also impressed by the fact that the Iraqis are obviously doing much more to help the Kurds than they do after refugees. There are four hospitals for treating military casualties. The border point between Piranshahr and Iraq is generally open to anyone who wishes to cross. At least of the border areas of the Iraqis, it seems to be partly also the Iraqis' responsibility. On 29 September, when going south by road, I counted a convoy of trucks full of armed Kurdish soldiers moving south, apparently being transferred from one front to another by the Iraqis. In fact, I agree that Kurdish morale is good. There is very little sign of defeatism either among the casualties or among the Kurds in the camps themselves. As you know, General Arbak was not on my heels and will no doubt tell us more.

6. Incidentally, you may have wondered why we sent our telegram 100 and 499 immediate. The object was to catch the Middle East CIG meeting; we were then rather surprised that no assessment emerged. It would be helpful to know at some stage whether the reports we are sending about Kurdistan are on the right lines and whether we are attaching the correct priority to them.

N W Browne

cc:

Chanceries, Baghdad, Kuwait, Ankara  
A Reeve Esq, Washington  
Captain Norbury, DI48, MCD

29 September

7. Telephoned the Governor General's office to ask about my plan to visit the refugee camps and was quickly put through to the Governor General. He was friendly and business-like and said that the Head of the Red Lion and Son Society, Mr Jam, would /take

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pick me up from the hotel to take me on a guided tour.

8. At 8,30 we set out south towards Oshnaveh. The road was tarmaced most of the way except for one stretch 50 km out of Rezaiyeh. After 40 km the first refugee camp, at Aghbolagh, was visible 5 km off the road to the right. Jam said that there was a total of 95000 refugees in Iran of which 30000 were accommodated in West Azerbaijan province. The rest were in Kordistan, Kermanshah and Khuzestan provinces. In West Azerbaijan, 24000 were housed in 4 camps of 6000 people each; there were a further 6000 refugees billeted with friends or relatives on the Iranian side. We were to visit this camp later.

9. Just before Oshnaveh, we saw a second camp, at Nalivan, not far off the road to the right. We then passed through Oshnaveh itself, the Kurdish village where Reza Shah's agents assassinated a Kurdish leader, Ismael Khan. The road then changed to gravel surface for 15 km to Jaldyan where it met an East-West road running from Naqadeh. There was a barracks on the right which Jam thought was for training. There were perhaps 3000 soldiers there. We turned right to go West, passing a further fork left - an unmade-up road to Mahabad. The road was now asphalted. After 15 km we reached Piranshahr. There the road goes straight on for 10 km to Haji Omran and is visible winding over the pass. Traffic was heavy but I could not make out whether it was military or not. A left leads south to Sardasht, the site of one of the camps which I did not visit.

10. We saw the Red Lion and Lion hospital which had been improvised from a clinic opened by the Prime Minister 3 years ago. The hospital catered exclusively for Pish Margeh, wounded in action and had started up in tents when the current campaign first began. Apart from the hospitals in the refugee camps and the Red Lion hospital in Rezaiyeh itself, there were three others, treating Kurdish casualties, at Sardasht, Mahabad, Pashvah, (on the Piranshahr/Mahabad road).

11. The Piranshahr hospital had room for 25 patients who were being treated by three nurses, two doctors and a surgeon. The doctor on duty had been a teacher at the Medical Faculty at Tabriz University and had volunteered to come to Piranshahr. The nurses were also volunteers from Tehran, and were doing a 6-week stint each. There was a good stock of drugs but accommodation, being improvised, was fairly rudimentary.

12. One of the doctors was an Iraqi/Kurd who was to do one week at Piranshahr before returning across the border. He explained vividly that there was no problem in Iran itself; the Iranians were being an enormous help. The situation across the border in Iraq was very serious. Refugees were still piling up at Haji Omran and there were now 450 families waiting to cross. The Iranians were processing these new arrivals at a rate of 100 families a day and sending them by rail to Dezful via the station of Maragah as there was no more room in West Azerbaijan and there would be no problem of winter accommodation in the warm climate of Dezful. He described conditions in Haji Omran. Iraqi bombing was regular and refugees, particularly the children, were dying of malnutrition and sun-stroke. Further back into

<sup>mountains</sup>  
into the ~~camp~~ it was worse still. Before going on to Piranshahr he had been in the Turkish border region where his patients had died because he lacked the basic medicines. There was a desperate need for help. He gave me a letter which read as follows:

"Our Kurdish Nation who fights for simple rights, facing a very great war, whose enemies uses the most modern Russian weapons and airplanes. We have thousands of homeless civilians and children without food and shelter. I hope you can give a hand to save them from disease and hunger. We demand:

- i. medicines:
- ii. blankets
- iii. food
- iv. tents
- v. milk for the children
- vi. clothes
- vii. any other things which are useful for the simplest life.

We hope you will not disappoint us.

You can send any of the former to Dr Asfandiar, c/o Red Lion and Son Society, Piranshahr."

*Safe*  
While I was at the hospital, 5 new patients, who had been wounded in the previous night's fighting, were admitted. They arrived in battered ambulances with their comrades holding up saline drips out of the back windows of the vehicles. They claimed that there had been a Kurdish attack near Rawanduz in which 300 Iraqis had been killed. The Kurds had an upper hand in Rawanduz by night but they could not hold the city by day in the face of the persistent bombing. I talked to some of the casualties, with the doctor interpreting. One, who had been shot in the hand, came from Rawanduz itself; his family was sheltered in Khuzestan. Another had been wounded attacking a tank by day; a group of them had hidden in an Iraqi held area, waited for the tank to pass and opened fire. You had to be very brave as their weapons were only effective at a range of 150 metres. Unfortunately, the tank had been able to return fire. Another casualty, hit by shrapnel, had been a student in Baghdad and, with 500 others, had left for Kurdistan in April when negotiations broke down. They said that they were not fighting for independence from Baghdad but for autonomy for Kurdistan. They did not seem to have thought out very clearly what autonomy would really mean. What if the Iraqis succeeded in cutting all their lines of communications? /looks of intense conviction they said they would sacrifice their lives rather than accept rule from Baghdad.

/With

13. I also visited Kohsh Lahijan, the village which was bombed by Iraqi aircraft. It is off the road to Sardasht, about 5 km south of Piranshahr and 5 km from the border, very clearly on the Iranian side of the mountains. It is a very small village, the total population being perhaps 300 inhabitants. Of these

/too 6

Reference

constructed after only 3 months work. The site gave the appearance of a new town being started. Jam was confident that everything would be ready in time. The two winter camps were costing \$20 m (this sounds a lot).

18. We were back in Rezaiyeh by 7 pm. We had seen little military traffic all day; only one convoy of 21 trucks heading south from Oshnaveh, some of which were pulling what looked like field guns. There had also been a small barracks outside Piranshahr itself which looked as if it had been reoccupied *after falling into disuse.*



into the ~~camps~~ <sup>mountains</sup> it was worse still. Before going on to Piranshahr he had been in the Turkish border region where his patients had died because he lacked the basic medicines. There was a desperate need for help. He gave me a letter which read as follows:

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Safe  
/With

13. I also visited Kohsh Lahijan, the village which was bombed by Iraqi aircraft. It is off the road to Sardasht, about 5 km south of Piranshahr and 5 km from the border, very clearly on the Iranian side of the mountains. It is a very small village, the total population being perhaps 300 inhabitants. Of these

/too 6

100 were killed and 25 families are now homeless. Several houses were destroyed and pathetic remnants stick out of the piles of collapsed mud. The Iranians have collected some fragments of bombs including a whole tail-fin with Russian writing on the side. Considering the size of the bombs it looks as if they should have done more damage. From the site of the village, there seems no doubt that it was a deliberate attack.

14. On the way back we first visited the Nalivan refugee camp. There was a SAVAK superintendent who knew Kurdish and Persian but no English so I was able to speak to some English speaking Kurds without being overheard. The camp was in reasonable condition, except that the tents were very close together. Food was plentiful; they were supplied with flour and vegetable oil daily, meat 5 times a week, and fruit and other extras occasionally. All of which they cooked themselves. There were complaints about lack of baby milk but this was apparently because they did not like powdered milk. There was a well equipped hospital, a brick bathhouse and plenty of fresh water. Most of the inhabitants were women, children and older ~~men~~ men. They looked no poorer or in any worse health than any typical Iranian village. Jam said that the refugees cost 10 toman per head per day to subsist, which for refugees throughout Iran amounts to a cost of £55,000 per day.

15. I spoke to the Kurdish superintendent through an interpreter who was a Kurdish English teacher. The superintendent had been a Government official in Erbil until he fled from arrest in 1972. He would prefer to be fighting but the Pesh Margeh had allocated him this job which he was doing his best to carry out. When I left him, there was a long queue of Kurds outside his tent waiting for rulings on administrative matters and for arbitration in disputes. The teacher came from a village near Chuman and visited his family at the camp once a week. Lessons continued at his school. If he heard a bomber coming he took the children into shelters. There had only been two deaths in his village so far.

16. We then visited the next camp along the road, Agbulagh. This was even tidier. It apparently had taken two months to build from when the Red Lion and Son Society first got the word. The Kurdish superintendent was a young agricultural engineer who had been trained at Mosul University and had only been working for two months when the war broke out. He had then left for Khodestan. I asked him when he expected to go back. He had no idea and wondered any way whether there was any point. All the Kurdish towns were in ruins. A third further to the north at Zibeh near the Iran/Iraq/Turkish border town, was the same. There was another Kurdish doctor there who had left his practice in Baghdad when war broke out. He said there was no shortage of qualified people in Khodestan — there were perhaps 100 doctors. It was supplies that were needed.

17. Zibeh was also the site of a new winter camp which was being built to accommodate the West Azai-bajan refugees when the snow came. It would take 12000 refugees; the remaining 12000 were being sent to a similar camp being built at Sardasht. Building was progressing at a frenetic rate and several long barrack-like buildings had been /constructed

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British Embassy  
Tehran

69  
Bowman Vo see.

Any comments on  
para 6? *2/14*  
*KG*

P K Williams Esq  
Middle East Department  
FCO

Your reference

Our reference 3/2

Date 10 October 1974

## KURDISTAN

1. We owe you another letter on what we have been <sup>30</sup>able to pick <sup>51</sup>up about the Kurdish situation since our telegrams Nos 498 and 499. Since then, little has appeared in the local press, but we have heard a detailed account of the picture in Kurdistan itself from David Hirst of the Guardian who visited the area from 22 September.

2. Much of what Hirst told us will no doubt appear in his articles, so I will only mention what seemed to us to be the most interesting points. He is in no doubt that the Kurds can hold out until the onset of winter and in fact thinks that the Iraqi army will have some difficulty in holding the main towns that they have captured once the bad weather starts. He is inclined to agree with the theory that back in August Barzani was indeed exaggerating his difficulties in order to extract more help from the Iranians. He seemed to believe stories that he had heard from the Kurds that such were the demands being made on the Iraqi soldiers in a desperate attempt to finish things that some were deserting. He had also found that the Kurds thought that since Saddam Hussein had staked everything on success, the internal pressures on him would increase considerably. They hoped that if they could hang on, there might well be a coup d'état in Baghdad which would bring a more reasonable régime to power. He had found no slackening in Kurdish morale. The Kurds were still travelling from the plains back to the mountains, (many of whom were educated men.

3. The Kurds had showed Hirst one piece of "evidence" which had apparently convinced them, but not entirely him, that the Russians were flying bombing sorties. The Iraqis had made several low level attacks on a particular bridge but had failed to hit it. After several days of abortive bombing, a plane came along at a very high level and destroyed the bridge first time. The Kurds argued that the Iraqis were incapable of this.

4. We also recently asked the US Embassy what their reading was of the situation. They too believed that the Iraqis were unlikely to win the decisive victory they wanted. They had hoped to confuse the Kurds by pinning them against the borders and then attacking in circumstances where women and children would restrict the Kurds' freedom of action. They had failed because the Iranians had let the refugees across the frontier. The Iraqis had now lost the initiative and the Kurds were finding themselves able to counter-attack. They

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/also



SECRET

70

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK DESKBY 150600Z TELNO 141100Z OCT INFO ROUTINE  
KUWAIT TEHRAN ANKARA DAMASCUS BEIRUT AND JISNE.

DIG FOM

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35  
15 OCT 1974

DA'S WEEKLY SUMMARY.

ONE. KURDISTAN.

N8R 1/2

HEAVY FIGHTING IN RAWANDUZ, RANIA AND GALATDIZAH SECTORS CONTINUES. ALL THREE TOWNS STILL IN GOVERNMENT HANDS AND LIKELY TO REMAIN SO. KURDISH HARRASSMENT OF L OF C, REAR AREAS AND FWD POSNS CONTINUES ON WIDE FRONT FROM ZAKHO IN NORTH TO KHANEGIN IN NE. IRANIAN HEAVY ARTY AND MORS CONTINUE TO FIRE IN SUPPORT OF KURDISH ATTACKS FROM BOTH IRAN AND WITHIN KURDISH HELD TERRITORY. GOVT HAS MOVED HEAVY ARTY INTO QALADIZAH AND RAWANDUZ AREAS TO COUNTER THIS BOMBARDMENT. <sup>Two</sup> TWO STRONG UNCONFIRMED REPORTS IN BAGHDAD SPEAK OF A MAJOR ATTACK ON ZUZAK HEIGHTS 6650 FEET IMMEDIATELY NORTH AND DOMINATING ROAD BETWEEN RAWANDUZ AND BARSARIN TO EAST MOUNTED BY IRAQIS BETWEEN 27 SEPT TO 5 OCT WITH VERY HEAVY GOVT CASUALTIES (850 DEAD). BUT EVENTUAL CAPTURE BY IRAQIS OF THESE HEIGHTS WHICH THEY STILL HOLD. REPORTS OF SIMILAR ATTACK AND CAPTURE OF HEIGHTS OF HANDREN 8630 FEET IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF THE ROAD AND ZUZAK ARE ALSO CIRCULATING. IF IRAQIS ARE TO PROGRESS ANY FURTHER EAST OF RAWANDUZ OR REMAIN THERE DURING WINTER MONTHS THEY MUST HOLD THE HIGH GROUND.

THREE. WEATHER. BAGHDAD MAXIMUM 34 DEGREES MINIMUM 13 DEGREES. MOSUL 33 DEGREES AND 15 DEGREES. A LITTLE RAIN REPORTED IN KURDISTAN AT END OF SEP. WEATHER NOT BROKEN YET. CLOUDLESS SKIES. TEMPERATURES IN RAWANDUZ AREA PROBABLY IN REGION OF 25 DEGREES BY DAY BUT BELOW FREEZING AT NIGHT. WEATHER NOT EXPECTED TO BREAK FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER TWO OR THREE WEEKS. FOUR. BRIG TANA SEKERGI FORMER COMD 8 DIV MOVED TO COMD 4 DIV END AUG NOW RETIRED AND REPLACED AT 4 DIV BY COL SADULLAH YUNUS FORMERLY CHIEF OF STAFF TO COMD NORTHERN AREA.

FIVE. KURDISH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OPENED 5 OCT IN ERBIL. OVER 100 PRESS INCLUDING COLVIN, D.T., AND ROBERTS, F.T., FLOWN TO KIRKUK IN ANTONOUS AND ON TO ERBIL BY HELICOPTER. PRESIDENT AND SADDAM NOTICEABLE BY THEIR ABSENCE. VERY STRICT SECURITY AND NO PUBLIC MANIFESTATION OF JOY FROM LOCAL POPULACE FURTHER ATTEMPTS BY COLVIN AND ROBERTS TO RETURN NORTH TO REPORT OBJECTIVELY ON SITUATION IN IRAQI KURDISTAN UNSUCCESSFUL. ROBERTS INTENDS TO RE-ENTER VIA IRAN A.S.P.

SIX. OBAIDULLAH BARZANI SON OF BARZANI BY FIRST WIFE APPOINTED MINISTER OF STATE FOR N. AFFAIRS IN GOVT 7 APR 73. BELIEVED TO HAVE BROKEN WITH FATHER OVER FAMILY FEUD IN EARLY 60'S. RECONCILIATION IN 1970 BUT FURTHER BREAK EARLY THIS YEAR. SEVEN. IRAQIS PREPARING FOR WINTER. FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND

STA. US/ISRAELI BUREAU SON OF BUREAU BY FIRST TYPE APPROVED  
MINISTER OF STATE FOR N. AFFAIRS IN GOVT 7 APR 73. BELIEVED  
TO HAVE BROKEN WITH FATHER OVER FAMILY FEUD IN EARLY 60'S.  
RECONCILIATION IN 1970 BUT FURTHER BREAK EARLY THIS YEAR.  
SEVEN. IRAQIS PREPARING FOR WINTER. FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND  
BLANKETS BEING PURCHASED FROM INDIA AND OR CHINA. URGENT REQ-  
UESTS FOR ALL TYPES AMMO ADE TO PAKISTAN, TURKEY SPAIN AND  
NO DOUBT OTHER COUNTRIES THIS WEEK. SUSPECTED HERE THAT CGS  
AND COMD IAF VISITS TO MOSCOW A WEEK AGO FOR FURTHER MILITARY  
SUPPLIES SPARE PARTS AND AMMO NOT AS SUCCESSFUL AS THEY HOPED.  
EIGHT. LT COL SALIM SHAKER AL IMAMIS NOMINATED AS NEW MA  
IN LONDON. KNOWN TO ME. FULLER REPORT IN NEXT BAG.  
NINE. H.E. PRESENTED CREDENTIALS 12 OCT. BAKR LOOKED ILL  
AND VERY TIRED WITH BLOODSHOT EYES. !

GRAHAM  
BT

[Sent 67cc]

NNNN

CCN... PSE INSERT "TWO" AFTER "COUNTER THIS BOMBARDMENT"

....

NNNN

1586807



16 0845

(71)

FO 714/E 19/16

LLC NR 692/16

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PP MODUK

~~MED~~

RR BAGHDAD

GR 100

CYPHER CAT A

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 16 OCT 1974 NBR 1/2
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*Mr. [signature] 16/10/74*  
*W. [signature] 14/10/74*

FM TEHRAN 160600Z OCT

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TO PRIORITY MODUK TEL NO FOM 1229 OF 160500Z OCT  
RPTD FOR INFO TO ROUTINE BAGHDAD.

FOR DI4BN BAGHDAD FOR DA, FROM AMA.

KURDISTAN.

REF A: BAGHDAD TEL NO 22 OF 18 OCT.

REF B: MY 111/DA OF 11 SEP.

1. SAW HIRST ON RETURN. HE ADDED NOTHING REALLY TO REF B  
EXCEPT, OF COURSE, TO CONFIRM KURDS FAR FROM BEATEN.

CYPHER CAT A

FM TEHRAN 160600Z OCT

CONFIDENTIAL

REGISTRY N-35
16 OCT 1974
NBR 1/2

*Mr. [unclear]*  
*W. [unclear]*

TO PRIORITY MODUK TEL NO FOH 1229 OF 160500Z OCT  
RPTD FOR INFO TO ROUTINE BAGHDAD.

FOR DI4BN BAGHDAD FOR DA, FROM AMA.

KURDISTAN.

REF A: BAGHDAD TEL NO 22 OF 18 OCT. <sup>67</sup>

REF B: MY 111/DA OF 11 SEP.

1. SAW HIRST ON RETURN. HE ADDED NOTHING REALLY TO REF B EXCEPT, OF COURSE, TO CONFIRM KURDS FAR FROM BEATEN.
2. HE SAID HE WAS TAKEN ROUND KURD ARTILLERY SCHOOL WHERE HE SAW WHAT I THINK FROM HIS DESCRIPTION WOULD BE ONE 122MM HOW M3. AND ONE 122MM GUN D74.
3. WOULD REF B BE USEFUL TO BAGHDAD QUERY. COULD YOU PLEASE SEND.

PARSONS

BT

NNNN

1300

... WERE AGO FOR FURTHER MILITARY  
... SUCCESSFUL AS THEY HOPED.  
... AS NEW HA

FO 420/E 093/14

LKS 04/14

OO MODUK

RR KUWAIT

RR TEHRAN

RR ANKARA

RR DAMASCUS

RR BEIRUT

RR JISNE

GRS 700A/7

DESKBY 150600Z

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 141100Z OCT

SECRET

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(70)

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK DESKBY 150600Z TELNO 141100Z OCT INFO ROUTINE  
KUWAIT TEHRAN ANKARA DAMASCUS BEIRUT AND JISNE.

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Met

Mr. Briggs 14/14

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15 OCT 1974  
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18/11  
Mr Burton Middle East Dept W 92)

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRATION 35  
21 OCT 1974

NBR 1/2

1. I was telephoned yesterday by Mr Ian Colvin of the Daily Telegraph who had just returned from Baghdad.
2. He wanted to let us know his impressions of the visit; and to register his view that the Iraqis seem to be working hard to show a new face to the outside world.
3. He and the group of about 110 journalists from all over the world, had received very good treatment from the Iraqis. He mentioned two problems: first that although 30/40 of them asked to go to the Kurdish frontier, nothing was organized, and secondly, they were not able to meet any Minister. In other regards, the Iraqis went to any amount of trouble to arrange a suitable programme.
4. Mr Colvin thought that the person responsible for the improved PR approach was a Palestinian with an office in Beirut who handled PR for Qatar and Abu Dhabi (he could not recall his name). His directive appeared to be to open up Iraq.
5. Mr Colvin's summary was that the Iraqis had laid on an expert PR operation, but the shell of reticence had not yet been cracked.

16 October 1974

*D A MacLeod*  
D A MacLeod  
News Department  
W 21



**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**  
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

73

N Browne Esq  
British Embassy  
TEHRAN

Your reference

Our reference

Date

RECEIVED  
REGISTRY N  
18 OCT 1974  
NBR 1/2  
18 October 1974

*Dear Nick,*

**KURDISTAN**

1. Thank you for your letter of 10 October. I write in haste to catch the bag and to reassure you (your paragraph 6) about the value ~~we~~ attach to your reporting on the situation in Kurdistan. We are hoping to produce the JIC assessment on the situation in the week beginning 10 November. This has been deliberately delayed in the hope that the fighting will be halted by the weather by the end of October and that a clearer overall situation will have emerged by then.

*yours*  
*Peras*

P K Williams  
Middle East Department

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**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**  
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

74

18 OCT 1974

R G Giddens Esq  
British Embassy  
BAGHDAD

Your reference

Our reference NBR 1/2

Date 18 October 1974

*Dear Dick,*

**KURDISTAN**

1. On the assumption that hostilities in the north will have been temporarily halted by the weather by the end of October, we are intending to produce an assessment of the situation in the north and its possible effects on the internal situation within the Ba'ath Party in the week beginning 10 November. We have seen indications that Bakr may be seriously ill and that Saddam Hussain has now assumed greater control over the armed forces (your tel MODUK 161015Z). As the forces drift back to Baghdad for the winter and rumours of the heavy losses in the north become more publicly known, there is clearly a possibility that the split within the Party on the conduct of the campaign in the north will widen. I should be grateful if you could let me have, by early November, any additional thoughts you may have on the present stability of the régime and the likely future developments in Kurdistan, in Iraq/Soviet relations and in Iraq/Iranian relations.

2. You may have seen in "The Times" of 16 October an article on the Kurds by Chris Goddard. Edward Mortimer of "The Times", who apparently commissioned Goddard to write this article, is himself hoping to visit Kurdistan (via Tehran) early next month. He has told me that Goddard works for ATV and it is he who is producing the ATV documentary due to be shown here on 29 October. His article was clearly pro-Kurdish and I expect his television documentary to be the same. The Iraqis may well take exception to it, particularly if the television programme plays up the suggestion in the last sentence of Goddard's article.

*Yours ever  
Graham*

G S Burton  
Middle East Department

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SECRET

GRS 480

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 210700Z OCT.

SECRET

RECEIVED IN REGISTRATION 21 OCT 1974 NBR 1/2
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TO ROUTINE MODUK TEL OF 21 OCTOBER 1974, INFO ROUTINE  
FCO, BEIRUT, KUWAIT, TEHERAN AND ANKARA.

DIG FOH.

WEEKLY REPORT. (DESPITE MY FOH 161015 NOT TO ALL).

1. KURDISTAN.

A. TURKISH MA CONFIRMS THAT AFTER INTENSIVE FIGHTING  
FOR ZUZAK AND HANDREN HEIGHTS OVER PAST TWO WEEKS KURDISH  
FORCES RECAPTURED THEM FROM IRAQIS ON 17 OCT.

B. IRANIAN MA CONFIRMS CERTAIN IRAQI UNITS, AS YET  
NUMBERS AND TYPE NOT IDENTIFIED, HAVE MOVED OUT OF  
KURDISTAN TO BAGHDAD AND SOUTH IN LAST WEEK.

C. WEATHER STILL NOT BROKEN. TEMPERATURES YESTERDAY,  
BAGHDAD MAXIMUM 34 MINIMUM 9, MOSUL MAXIMUM 32 MINIMUM 8.

2. MR. ROBINSON OF TREVOR CROCKER AND PARTNERS JUST  
RETURNED FROM SURVEY OF NEW RAIL LINK MOSUL - ERBIL AND  
REALIGNMENT OF RAILWAY ERBIL - KIRKUK. HE TELLS ME HE  
NEVER HAD LESS THAN A PLATOON ESCORT WHICH USUALLY INCLUDED  
ARMOURED CAR, OF REGULAR SOLDIERS. HE WAS ALLOWED TO VISIT  
SHAQLAWA BUT NO FURTHER EAST. THERE WAS A TREBLE RING OF  
TPS ROUND ERBIL ON 5 OCTOBER INCLUDING HELICOPTER AIR COVER  
DURING OPENING OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AND AN OUTBREAK OF  
FIRING 2300HRS THAT NIGHT. THERE IS A NIGHT CURFEW ON  
MOSUL-ERBIL-KIRKUK RDS. CIVILIAN TRAFFIC ONLY MOVES ON  
THESE RDS BY DAY IN TWO ESCORTED COVOYS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS.  
FULL DETAILS OF DEBRIEFING IN MONTHLY REPORT.

SECRET

/3. REQUESTS

**S E C R E T**

**3. REQUESTS FOR ARMS.**

ITALIAN MA ON CURRENT VISIT TO BAGHDAD FROM BEIRUT TELLS ME HE HAS COME TO SORT OUT IRAQI REQUESTS FOR HELICOPTERS BOTH TROOP CARRYING AND RECCE, ARMoured CARS, MOR AND HEAVY ARTY AMMO, TRAINER A/C.

**4. BAGHDAD OBSERVER 14 OCT REPORTS HEAD OF A SAUAK GP IN BAGHDAD YADALLAH ALI QAMBAR AL QANA WATI ARRESTED.**

GRAHAM

**F I L E S**

MED

DEF D


MR WEIR

MR THOMSON

76

Mr Giddens

Mr Temple



## THE KURDISH QUESTION

1. When I called on the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs this morning he asked me for some bomb containers, obviously for use in ground attack. I took the opportunity to raise the Kurdish question. I said that the British Government obviously must have a good deal of sympathy for any Government faced with minority problems since we had our own very difficult questions of this kind. I had made this point to a visiting British journalist, who had not perhaps in the past been particularly friendly to Iraq, and had said to him that while one was entitled to take issue with particular policies, it was necessary to try to understand the problem facing the Iraq Government to write of it with sympathy.

2. The Minister said that it was indeed a very difficult problem. Mulla Mustagha was a very complicated person, but in his own view the matter was no longer merely a minority question: indeed, although the Barzanis themselves were Kurds, a number of Mulla Mustagha's followers were drawn from other ethnic groups, Arabs, Assyrians, Turks and so on, some of whom had no common language. It was a political movement in reaction to some of the things, eg the land reform programme, which the Iraq Government was trying to put through, and aimed at destroying the present regime in Iraq. That being so, it was inevitable that the Iraq Government should try to put the movement down but it was difficult and, as we knew, they had problems with their neighbour, Iran (though he did not say Iran).

J A H Graham

15 October 1974

Copy to:  
P R H Wright Esq  
Middle East Department

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(77)

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GRS 325  
PRIORITY  
CYPHER CAT A

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 28 OCT 1974 NBR 1/2
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GB OR

FM BAGHDAD 260955Z OCT.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 388 OF 26 OCTOBER 1974.  
AND SAVING TO TEHRAN.

55

BURTON'S LETTER TO GIDDENS OF 20 SEPTEMBER : KURDISTAN  
RED CRESCENT SOCIETY.

1. I WAS SUMMONED THIS MORNING BY THE DIRECTOR- GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND CONFERENCES DEPARTMENT IN THE MFA WHO HANDED ME A NOTE ABOUT THIS SOCIETY (TRANSLATION BY BAG). PITCHING HIS APPROACH IN MODERATE TERMS, BUT STRESSING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING AS A RESULT OF AN INITIATIVE BY THE MINISTER OF HEALTH WHO IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE R.C.C., HE SAID THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT DISPUTED THE EXISTENCE OF A SEPARATE KURDISTAN OR THE RIGHT OF ANY BODY TO USE THE TITLE KURDISTAN RED CRESCENT SOCIETY. MOREOVER THE SOCIETY'S ACTIVITIES WERE OFFENSIVE TO IRAQ AND ITS CLAIMS WERE UNTRUE. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN THE NORTH, WHICH HAD RECEIVED WIDESPREAD SUPPORT IN IRAQI KURDISTAN, REMOVED THE BASIS FOR KURDISH DISSIDENCE. IN VIEW OF ALL THIS AND OF THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT'S WISH TO OPEN A NEW CHAPTER IN IRAQI-BRITISH RELATIONS, THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL HOPED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ABLE TO CURB OR END THE ACTIVITIES OF THIS ALLEGED SOCIETY.

2. I UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY THIS APPROACH TO YOU BUT ADDED A WARNING THAT UNDER BRITISH LAW THE GOVERNMENT LACKED POWER TO CONTROL THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ORGANISATIONS OF THIS KIND, PROVIDED THEY COMPLIED WITH THE LAW. I INSTANCED THE PLO OFFICE AND THE ACTIVITIES OF MARK PRESS ON BEHALF OF BIAFRA IN 1968-70. I WAS SURE WE WOULD SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE BUT I DID NOT WANT TO MAKE ANY PROMISES THAT WE COULD NOT CARRY OUT.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 3. THE DIRECTOR-



CONFIDENTIAL

3. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL SAID THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY BE SPEAKING TO THE RED CROSS SINCE HE BELIEVED THAT UNDER THEIR RULES SOCIETIES USING NATIONAL TITLES MUST REPRESENT INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES.

4. THE DOCUMENTS IN IRAQI HANDS ARE THOSE ATTACHED TO BURTONS LETTER UNDER REFERENCE. IN ANY REPLY TO THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT THAT I AM INSTRUCTED TO GIVE, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW WHETHER THIS BODY RECEIVES ANY PRIVILEGES, EG TAX PRIVILEGES ON CONTRIBUTIONS, OR ANY OTHER HELP OR COUNTEANCE.

5. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO TEHRAN.

GRAHAM

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FILES

MED

MR CAMPBELL

MR WEIR

CONFIDENTIAL

(78)

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GRS 100  
PRIORITY  
CYPHER CAT A

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PA.

FM BAGHDAD 280936Z OCT.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 389 OF 28 OCTOBER 1974.

BURTON'S LETTER NBR 1/2 OF 18 OCTOBER TO GIDDENS : KURDISTAN.

1. WEATHER IN THE NORTH HAS NOT (NOT) YET BROKEN AND FIGHTING IN SOME AREAS IS STILL INTENSE. ASSESSMENT BEFORE MID-NOVEMBER WOULD THEREFORE BE PREMATURE. FURTHER, I HOPE TO OBTAIN A BETTER FEEL (FROM MY CALLS ON MINISTERS) ON QUESTIONS RAISED IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 1 THAN I NOW HAVE. UNTIL THIS IS OBTAINED, ANY COMMENT NOW COULD ONLY BE HIGHLY SPECULATIVE. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND ASSESSMENT BE DELAYED FOR THREE WEEKS.

GRAHAM

FILES

MED  
DEFENCE DEPT  
GIPD  
NEWS DEPT  
PUSD  
MR CAMPBELL  
MR WEIR  
MOD INTERNAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

Reference.....

(79)

Note for the Record.

U.K. relief for Kurdish refugees

I was telephoned this afternoon by a Mr Cumbers of the Save the Children Fund who said that their Committee had decided to devote "a fairly sizeable amount" to the Kurdish refugees. He said this was on the basis of a report by a Miss Lander (of which he subsequently sent a copy now on file) describing conditions. He implied that this referred to the refugees in Iran but the report clearly refers to Kurdistan itself. I told him briefly of the situation in Iran and the extreme sensitivity of the Iraqi Government. I said that I thought the essential first steps were:

- (a) to contact the Iranian Ambassador.
- Mr Cumbers readily agreed and said he would ask Lord Gonsalves to speak to Mr Afshar

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29 OCT 1974

NBR 1/2

Raiffe  
R.

Afghanistan

b) to establish where exactly relief operations were to take place bearing in mind the total undesirability of UK relief operations in Iraqi territory. U. Cumber also agreed.

2. I subsequently received a visit from a Major Cooper of the same organisation who said he was to go out to Tehran to see how the money could be used. I made the same points to him and urged him to get in touch with the Embassy at Tehran.

P. S. Miller

18/X

80

CYPHER CAT A

SECRET

GRPS 150/2

FM BAGHDAD 290700Z OCT

RECEIVED IN REGISTRATION 35 29 OCT 1971 NBR 1/2
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SECRET

G30R

TO ROUTINE MODUK TELNO 290700Z OCT INFO ROUTINE FCO.

DIG FOH

155 #11  
pa

JIC KURDISH ASSESSMENT.

D14/IQ 703/4 OF 10 OCT PARA 4 REFERS.

1. AS WINTER HAS NOT STARTED YET IN KURDISTAN AND FIGHTING IN SOME AREAS IS STILL INTENSE WE FEEL AN ASSESSMENT BEFORE MID NOVEMBER WOULD BE PREMATURE.
2. I PROPOSE DOING A NORTHERN TOUR MID NOVEMBER.
3. /6TWO HIGH LEVEL EGYPTIAN DELEGATIONS ONE AT PRESENT IN BAGHDAD THE OTHER EXPECTED IN TWO WEEKS WI W ALSO PRODUCE SOME USEFUL INFO FROM MY EGYPTIAN COLLEAGUE.
4. IN VIEW OF THIS WOULD PREFER TO DELAY MY COMMENTS UNTIL AFTER NORTHERN TOUR.

GRAHAM

[SENT TO D C C]

FILES

M E D

DEFENCE DEPT

P U S D

MR CAMPBELL

MR WEIR

SIR G ARTHUR

MR THOMSON

SECRET



SECRET

GRS 450/2  
IMMEDIATE  
CYPHER CAT A  
FM BAGHDAD 290700Z OCT  
SECRET  
DESKBY 290900Z

(81)

TOP SECRET

GB OR

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TELNO 290700Z OCTOBER AND TO PRIORITY  
JISNE SAVING KUWAIT DAMASCUS BEIRUT ANKARA AND TEHRAN.

DIG FOH

WEEKLY REPORT

RECEIVED  
29 OCT 1974  
NBR 1/2

2554  
P

1. KURDISTAN

ALPHA. INTENSIVE FIGHTING IS STILL GOING ON ON ZUZAK HEIGHTS  
E. OF RAWANDUZ BUT WE ARE NOT SURE WHO IS HOLDING THEM.

BRAVO. FIGHTING IS ALSO CONTINUING IN THE RANIA AND QALATDIZAH  
SECTORS. AND A/C CONTINUE BOMBING AND STRAFFING RAIDS.

CHARLIE.

CHARLIE.

TURKS REPORT A MEETING APPROX 15 DAYS AGO BETWEEN SADDAM HUSSEIN  
AND CGS AND COMDS OF DIVS INVOLVED IN FIGHTING WHERE LATTER  
POINTED OUT THAT THEY COULD NOT ACHIEVE THEIR MILITARY AIMS  
IN THE NORTH. OUTCOME OF THIS MEETING IS NOT KNOWN BUT IT  
CONFIRMS CURRENT RUMOURS OF WIDESPREAD DISSATISFACTION AMONGST  
SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS OVER FUTILITY OF CONDUCT OF MILITARY  
OPERATIONS AND THEIR DESIRE FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE  
CONFLICT.

DELTA. WEATHER STILL FINE. TEMPERATURES 27 OCT BAGHDAD MAX  
33 MIN 11; MOSUL MAX 31 MIN 11, KIRKUK MAX 30 MIN (CHECKED  
TWICE WITH AIRPORT) 21.

ECHO. TURKISH MA VISITING ERBIL AND KIRKUK 21-23 OCTOBER  
HAD SECURITY CAR AHEAD AND BEHIND HIM THROUGHOUT HIS TRIP AND  
AT TIMES A SECURITY MAN IN HIS CAR WITH HIM.

SECRET

/FOXTROT

SECRET

FOXTROT. PARA SIX WEEKLY SUMMARY FOH 141100Z OCT REFERS.  
FURTHER URGENT DEMANDS FOR HEAVY ARTY, MORTAR AND SMALL  
ARMS AMMO PUT TO JORDAN, BELGIUM, SWITZERLAND AND WEST  
GERMANY.

FCO PASS SAVING TO KUWAIT DAMASCUS BEIRUT ANKARA AND  
TEHRAN.

GRAHAM

PASSED TO MOD/DCC.

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

FILES

MED  
DEFENCE DEPT  
NENAD  
PUSD  
MR CAMPBELL  
MR WEIR  
SIR G ARTHUR  
MR THOMSON

2  
SECRET

(82)

3/2

SECRET

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
TEHRAN.

24 October 1974

PRH Wright Esq  
Middle East Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
SW1

*Mr. Lytton shall see*

*Mr. C. ... 29/10*  
*Mr. ... 29/10*  
*Mr. ... 29/10*

Dear Patricia  
KURDISTAN

REC-117  
29 OCT 1974  
NBR 1/2

When I saw the Shah on 23 October we briefly discussed the situation in Kurdistan. He confirmed that it was a bit better than it had been a month or so ago. Barzani was in Tehran and he had seen him the previous day. Barzani was still asking for more arms and ammunition. It was difficult to tell whether he was trying to make the Shah's flesh creep in order to get more help, or whether he was genuine.

2. The Shah said that he was still faced with the old dilemma. He had to support the Kurds. If he did not, either the Baathist regime in Iraq would become unacceptably strong or the Kurds might all go Communist, or both. Meanwhile his commitment grew greater. He admitted in strict confidence that he had permitted cross border operations from Iran.

3. There is not much in the above except that it was the first time the Shah or anyone else had admitted to me that cross border operations were going on and that Barzani was in the habit of visiting Tehran. It was also interesting that the Shah made no attempt to ask for support from us.

*Yours ever*  
*Tony*  
A D Parsons

cc JAN Grahan Esq CMG  
Baghdad  
RA Sykes Esq CMG MC  
Washington

SECRET

No 4/31/10/31438



Republic of Iraq  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
International Organisations  
and Conferences Department

Baghdad, 26 October 1974

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the Embassy of the United Kingdom and have the honour to state that a committee has lately been established in the United Kingdom under the name of the Red Crescent of Kurdistan which has started practising misleading and suspicious activities divorced from reality. Among these are its call upon British citizens to offer help on the pretext of Kurdistan's need for this assistance, its attack against the Iraqi Red Crescent Society, and accusing it falsely. Obviously Kurdistan is a geographic area spread among a number of neighbouring countries which enjoy full sovereignty over their regions, including the Kurdish districts; it is not for a handful of unknown adventurers to speak in the name of Kurdistan as a whole. Therefore these adventurers should not be allowed to practise hostile activities and to appoint themselves to positions for which they are not legally qualified. The Autonomy Law for Iraqi Kurdistan has been enacted, is being implemented and has been welcomed by the Kurdish people and blessed by their various organisations. The Legislative and Executive Councils which represent the Kurds of Iraq, speak in their name and practise wide constitutional authority covering all the daily affairs of a Kurd in addition to the rights and duties granted by the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq.

The use of the term Red Crescent is restricted to the independent Islamic countries as their distinctive slogan and the International Red Cross Society will not approve of its being used by other than independent states. Moreover, the Government of the Republic of Iraq intends to strengthen its relations with the Government of the United Kingdom on the basis of cooperation and good will and wishes to achieve mutual benefits as a result of opening a new page in their relations. Therefore the Government of the Republic of Iraq requests the Embassy to mediate with their

/esteemed






esteemed Government to put an end to the suspicious activities and conduct which are beginning to be practised against Iraq by elements which have no official entity and which represent only themselves, because they are not authorised to work by any recognised party. Ignoring these elements will produce unhealthy results for British citizens themselves, as spreading lies among them and blurring facts damages the reputation of Iraq and creates an atmosphere which does not serve good relations between the two countries. Therefore the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, due to their desire to develop those relations and to avoid anything that may blemish them, hope that the British departments will exert a special effort to liquidate the so-called Red Crescent Committee for Kuridstan and prevent those running it from spreading lies and creating trouble against Iraq.

In awaiting the result of their urgent effort the Ministry avail themselves of this opportunity to express their highest consideration and esteem.



(24)

GRS 350



TOP COPY

CYPHER CAT A  
FM TEHRAN 030800Z  
CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 581 OF 3 NOVEMBER, 1974,  
INFO BAGHDAD.

4/11  
4/11  
4/11

KURDISTAN

1. ALAM SENT FOR ME ON 1 NOVEMBER. HE SAID THAT THE SHAH HAD ASKED HIM TO SPEAK TO ME ABOUT AN ITV PROGRAMME ON KURDI<sup>S</sup>TAN WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE ON 29 OR 30 OCTOBER. HE GAVE ME A COPY OF A BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF THE PROGRAMME WHICH CONTAINED REMARKS LIKE "THE SHAH OF PERSIA ..... IS EXPLOITING KURDISH NATIONALISM FOR HIS OWN INTERNATIONAL PURPOSES. HIS POLICY TOWARDS THE KURDS IS GEARED TO MAINTAINING NOT ENDING THE WAR WHICH IS A CONTINUING EMBARRASSMENT TO HIS IRAQI ENEMIES..." "THE SHAH'S LONG STANDING OPPOSITION TO KURDISH NATIONALISM MAKES HIM AN UNRELIABLE FRIEND".
2. ALAM SAID THAT THE SHAH<sup>A</sup>TA WANTED HIM TO EMPHASISE THAT HE WAS NOT COMPLAINING ABOUT THE PROGRAMME. THE SHAH ONLY WANTED TO WARN US THAT THE DISSEMINATION OF REMARKS OF THIS KIND (A KURDISH REPRESENTATIVE APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN TAKING PART IN THE PROGRAMME) WAS DAMAGING TO "OUR COMMON CAUSE". I SPOKE ON FAMILIAR LINES ABOUT THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE MEDIA.
3. I DO NOT THINK THAT WE NEED TAKE ANY FURTHER ACTION ON THIS APPROACH. IT IS A SIGN OF GRACE THAT THE SHAH MADE THE POINT THAT HE WAS NOT COMPLAINING - OF THE BBC AFFAIRS LAST YEAR - AND THAT THIS IS THE FIRST TIME SINCE I HAVE BEEN HERE THAT I HAVE HAD ANY OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT THE BRITISH MEDIA.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. THERE HAS BEEN ANOTHER RECENT EXAMPLE OF THE SHAH'S NEW AND MORE SOPHISTICATED POLICY TOWARDS CRITICISM BY THE WESTERN MEDIA. THERE WAS A RECENT COVER STORY ON IRAN IN NEWSWEEK WHICH CONTAINS SOME OFFENSIVE ALLEGATIONS, PARTICULARLY ABOUT SAVAK. A FEW MONTHS AGO THE OFFENDING ISSUE WOULD HAVE BEEN SEIZED AND SUPPRESSED. ON THIS OCCASION THE FULL ARTICLE WAS NOT ONLY PUBLISHED IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE PRESS BUT WAS TRANSLATED AND PUBLISHED IN ALL PERSIAN LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS.

PARSONS

FILES

MED  
GIPD  
NEWS DEPT  
MR CAMPBELL  
MR WEIR  
MR WILFORD

From:- Lieut-General Sir Alexander Drummond.

(85)

Chase Lodge,  
27 North Side,  
Clapham Common, S.W.4  
2nd November, 1974

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 -6 NOV 1974 NBR 1/2
---

*Dear Mr Wright,*

*RB 6/11  
J9*

Enclosed is a copy of the Report on the Kurd Refugees in the Camps in the area of Rezayeh that I have sent to the Director-General of the Red Lion and Sun Association of Iran.

The nearest Camp to Rezayeh is forty kilometers distant. The refugees are under guard and more or less kept in quarantine. In charge of each Camp there is an Iranian Civil Servant and the local administration is under a Kurd official. The liaison between the two I found to be good.

In order to avoid inferring any criticism of the Association my remarks are directed entirely towards the Kurd administration.

Shelter is provided for each family in two single fly tents but huts are in an advanced state of preparation. Food including meat five times a week is provided by the Association. They also provide one Iranian doctor with the minimum of medical equipment and medicines.

The Kurds provide the refugees with clothing, bedding and creature comforts. Their medical support consists of three doctors, three nurses and two dressers. *(at each camp)*

As happens in the case of all Red Cross organisations, the Association can offer no help whatsoever to the Kurdish civilians across the Iranian border, unless they receive a specific request for help from Iraq through the Headquarters of the Red Cross in Geneva.

However, the Red Lion and Sun Association and the Royal Imperial Government special agent at Rezayeh raise no objection to the Kurds helping their displaced civilians (refugees) across the border via the Resayeh corridor.

Patrick Wright, Esq.,  
The Foreign Office.

Oxfam has decided to send five thousand blankets and medicines to these civilians through this channel.

Medically, the most urgent problem at the moment is the containing of the spread of pulmonary tuberculosis among these people. There are some twenty known open cases in each Camp and there is an approximate total of ten thousand children most of whom are in a condition which renders them an easy prey. If these children are not immunized they are likely to present a problem of great magnitude in the near future.

With the worsening of climatic conditions these refugees to keep warm, will huddle together. The danger here is of typhus fever and cerebro-spinal meningitis. This danger will hang like a sword of Damocles over the heads of both the Kurds and the Iranians. Should a case of either infection arise, the sole life saving corridor will be instantly closed.

After the provision of medicines and protective clothing the most urgent need is the immediate training of intelligent young people as paramedical personnel, in the methods of vaccination, the use of a microscope for the scanning of slides in the detection of the tubercle bacillus and the malarial parasite and the immediate care of a patient.

To this end I requested the Red Lion and Sun Association to allow me to vaccinate the children against tuberculosis and at the same time begin the training of paramedical personnel.

*Yours sincerely*  
*W. J. ...*



Note on October visit to Teheran

At our Embassy I was very courteously and cautiously received and was strongly advised to visit the Minister of Health which was accordingly arranged.

Minister of Health was extremely satisfied with what his Government was doing for the Kurd refugees and would be pleased if I visited all camps. Meantime, his P.A. who had left the room, returned with a message that I should go immediately to the Foreign Office, despite the fact that it was after twelve o'clock and a holiday

Foreign Office Teheran - met Mr Ghassemi, Head of the First Political Department which extends to the frontiers of Iraq and Turkey. With him was his friend, Mr Parvizan to help him with the English ??

Over a cup of coffee we had a very pleasant and cordial meeting, ending with a request that :-

If however I crossed the border into Iraq it might or would be a serious embarrassment to them and perhaps to my own people in Baghdad. I assured them that I would not attempt to cross the border.

At Rezayeh I learnt much. There is without let or hindrance a constant to and fro of civil and Army personnel from General Barzani's H.Q..

The Kurdish establishment in Rezayeh is at Hotel Karon, Belavi Street.

There is apparently no shortage of money. The senior officers are well clad in a light khaki cloth uniform. Some distance outside Maleewan I slept hard with the General's son and nephew. Their meals were very good and well served.

They were sure that the winter conditions would hold up the Iraq force and the Kurds would be able to exploit this situation.

AS.



REPORT OF:

SIR ALEXANDER DRUMMOND, K.B.E., S.Pk., LL.D., F.R.C.S.

ON HIS VISIT IN OCTOBER 1974

TO THE CAMPS OF THE KURD REFUGEES

IN IRAN

UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE RED LION

AND SUN ASSOCIATION OF IRAN.

  
A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Alexander Drummond", is written over a horizontal line.

PRIVATE AND STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT ON THE STATE OF HEALTH IN THE KURD REFUGEE CAMPS  
AT ZEWA, AG BLAG AND MALEEWAN IN THE REGION OF RIZAYEH,  
NORTH WEST IRAN.

OCTOBER 1974

THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION gives the prevalent diseases in North Iraq as:-

Ingestion Group., Diarrhoea and Gastro-enteritis especially in children, Typhoid and Dysentery.

Insect Borne. Malaria, Infective Hepatitis, Dengue Fever, Typhus and Relapsing Fever.

Air Borne. Tuberculosis, Smallpox and Diphtheria. Measles.

Eye Infection. Angular Conjunctivitis and Trachoma.

Effects of Climate. In the mountainous areas - Frost Bite.

N.B. Every disease seen in Great Britain is found in Northern Iraq but in a more severe form.

DISEASES IN EPIDEMIC FORM which have already occurred in these Camps are:-

Gastro-enteritis	1000 with 89 deaths
Typhoid and Enteric Fevers	60
Infective Hepatitis	500 No deaths
Measles	2000 with 5 deaths

ENDEMIC INFECTIONS AND DISEASES

Malaria

Infantile Gastro-enteritis

Pulmonary Tuberculosis .

Fevers of unknown origin (PUO) Dengue or other virus infections?

Inflammation of the areolar tissue (I.A.T.) e.g. abscess etc.

PREVENTIVE MEASURES

When individuals have to live in close proximity to each other as in refugee camps, vaccination is essential in order to prevent or minimise the risk of recurrence of some of these diseases even as epidemics.

Typhoid - paratyphoid A and B - T.A.B. vaccine  
After two years of age by the intradermal method.

Pulmonary Tuberculosis - Bacillus Calmette-Guerin (B.C.G.) vaccine  
Intradermal or multiple puncture. It gives immunity to  
those exposed to the risk of infection.

Smallpox Routine primary vaccination before the age of two years is  
advised. Multiple pressure form of vaccination.

PATHOLOGY LABORATORY to cover all the Refugee Camps.

It is essential that, in the diagnosis of an infection or infestation,  
the specific organism for example, malarial parasite, spirochaete of relapsing  
fever or species of worm, be determined in order to decide the appropriate  
treatment.

In the case of bacterial infections the sensitivity of the bacillus  
to a particular drug should be known in order to avoid the expense and danger  
of giving ineffective drugs in a trial and error manner.

There is also a serious need for control in the sterilizing of dressings  
and instruments.

To meet these requirements a small pathology laboratory under the  
direction of a pathologist is considered essential.

#### CONDITIONS MET WITH IN THE CAMPS

Diarrhoea in adults remains very prevalent.

Infantile Gastro-enteritis is present in epidemic form which entails  
a very severe recorded mortality.

Zewa. One thousand cases with 98 deaths in infants.

Ag Blag. Fifty deaths of which 45 were in infants.

Maleewan. One hundred and twenty deaths, the vast majority being  
infants.

In addition, in the lines, many more infants have died of this affection  
but not all these deaths have been recorded. The most important factor causing

this high death rate is the delay in seeking medical treatment. This lack of urgency is a common feature under refugee conditions. It can best be dealt with by the introduction of women 'health attendants'.

Para-medical trained young women who are given areas of the camp to visit daily ostensibly to give advice and guidance to the mothers and families, can at the same time seek out the seriously ill and report to the doctor on duty.

They can also accept responsibility for seeing that patients take the prescribed medicines at the correct time and complete the full course of treatment. This avoids the danger of a patient who feels better sharing his medicine with a friend before completing the course thus risking the production of resistant strains of the infecting organism. With little training these women can take blood smears from patients with fever for diagnosing malaria, or, slides of sputum for the evidence of the tubercle bacillus. They can be taught to regulate saline drips in seriously ill patients. In a short time they can become reliable antennae of the doctor.

#### Typhoid and the Enteric Fevers

ZEWA reports 60 cases.

MALEEWAN - 10 cases. None was confirmed by blood culture. The danger here is not only of wrong diagnosis but also the missing of contacts and carriers of the disease. A carrier must on no account be allowed out of surveillance.

Fully appreciating the difficulties of these isolated camps, I would again stress that a central small laboratory for pathology services is essential in obtaining a correct diagnosis and limiting the disease.



### Malaria

Malaria is endemic, cases being reported from all camps, those from Zewa and Maleewan fortunately being confirmed by laboratory diagnosis, at the Civil Hospital.

Ag Blag records 7 new cases daily, all diagnosed clinically. The danger here is that, if the full treatment is not controlled resistant strains of parasites will be developed making the infection a serious difficulty to deal with.

This during the operations in Malaya, 1952, was amply demonstrated when Army personnel who had been and were under strict preventive treatment, entered an area in which resistant parasites had been developed because of uncontrolled treatment. Their preventive treatment was thus of no avail and every man developed malaria of this resistant strain.

### Infective Hepatitis

This virus infection has reached epidemic proportions. Zewa in the past two months has had 500 cases, Ag Blag and Maleewan 20 cases. Fortunately, no deaths occurred. Subsequent infections are very likely to be more serious.

One of the causes of the spread of this infection was probably faulty sterilization of syringes and needles. From two hospitals I learned that abscess formation after sub-cutaneous injection was very common obviously due to inadequate sterilization.

There is therefore a strong case for adopting the use of pre-sterilized disposable syringes and needles.

### Dengue Type of Fever

No cases had been diagnosed as such but patients with fever and complaining of severe pain in the back and lower limbs are suggestive of this



type of virus infection. A close study of detailed and accurate temperature charts, case sheets and the appearance of a rash about the fifth day would help in diagnosis.

#### Pulmonary Tuberculosis

At Maleewan there are 16 positive cases diagnosed by X-ray. Zewa has 20 and Ag Blag reports 12 cases (diagnosed clinically in the past two weeks) one of which has an old discharging empyema sinus.

These 48 cases are but the tip of the iceberg. A thorough examination of their families and all immediate contacts should be undertaken as an essential and urgent emergency.

I was informed that while the local civilian hospital puts itself out to diagnose the malarial blood slides, it has not got the facilities to undertake the scanning of sputum slides for tubercle bacillus.

There should be no difficulty in training para-medical personnel preferably women (they have a better aptitude for this work than men) to fix and stain sputum slides for the detection of the tubercle bacillus, using the microscope at the Zewa Hospital.

Here again, the sensitivity of the causal organism to the drugs to be used in treatment must be tested.

The serious danger both to the refugees and to their outside contacts is the spread of infection from open cases to healthy individuals.

The examination of random samples of children reveals that many of them are suffering from chronic cough, are under-weight and are anaemic, with large glands in the neck - a very fertile ground for the development of tuberculosis.

In these circumstances the immediate and essential need is for Bacillus

Calmette-Guerin vaccination of all children more than one year old.

#### Measles

Zewa reported an epidemic of 1,000 cases with 2 deaths and Maleewan a similar number with three deaths.

#### Eye Infections

A simple angular conjunctivitis (pink eye) was noted in three cases. There is a liability of spread by contagion.

#### Trachoma

Although no case was seen it was reported that there were 15 cases, in Zewa Camp.

#### Verminous conditions

No case was observed during examination of the children but medical officers at Ag Blag and Maleewan report that a number of children were infected.

In all the Camps a number of children were seen to be dirty and requiring regular bathing.

#### General Health

Adults and adolescents compared with the civil population of Rizayeh appear reasonably healthy.

In Zewa, the oldest established camp, the children are in better condition than in the other two.

#### Ill-nourished

A small number of children in all camps appear ill nourished.

#### Food

All food is provided by the Red Lion and Sun Association. Meat is supplied five times a week. Cooking is under family arrangements. On

questioning no complaints were received regarding quality or quantity.

#### Accommodation

At present in tents. Two 160 lb. tents to each family.

#### Morale

There is throughout the three camps great appreciation for the help so generously given by the Royal Imperial Government of Iran and the Red Lion and Sun Association.

In addition, there is a natural feeling of anxiety for their kinsmen existing under the worse conditions of war and climate on the other side of the border.

Most wives receive part of their husbands pay from across the border which helps in the buying of creature comforts, especially for the children.

#### Water Supply and Availability

Except for Ag Blag there is abundance of water which is piped from springs to stand pipes in the camp. At Ag Blag water due to a poor spring supply has to be collected at night and stored for use in the day.

#### Cleanliness

In Zewa and Maleewan hot baths are supplied on alternate days to male and female personnel. In Ag Blag those wishing to bath are taken by bus to Rizayeh.

#### Hygiene:

##### Disposal of Refuse

Follows the Iranian pattern. Garbage is collected in very large string baskets and is disposed of daily by burning. In camps it is a source of fly breeding. The water channels which run at the side of the lines of tents are used to dispose of slops but are frequently blocked by garbage.

### Disposal of Excreta

Deep trench latrines. There are an adequate number of places but to eliminate the smell more water should be poured into them. There is need of a Senior Camp Hygiene Inspector to check continuously and report defects to the Officer in charge.

### 1. Medical Resources

- |  |   |   |
|--|---|---|
| Doctors  | - | Their number is adequate.   |
| Nurses   | - | I am unhappy about their standard.  |
| Dressers and Hygiene<br>para medical personnel | - | I'm sure, with better training could<br>be used with great advantage to take<br>the load off the doctors. |

### 2. Hospital Facilities

Zewa: has the best hospital accommodation but it is not used to the best advantage. Facilities for washing Doctors' and attendants' hands could be provided or improvised; the practice of rubbing hands with a few drops of spirit is unsatisfactory.

The Zewa hospital autoclave sterilizes the dressings for two other hospitals who first pack and send them to Zewa. A more efficient service could be obtained if Zewa packed, autoclaved and dispatched the sterile dressings to the sister hospitals.

### Lack of Privacy

I did not see any screens in the hospitals. There is no reason why the woodwork class at Zewa should not make the frames for screens to allow a patient who is very ill and being examined to have privacy.

The Hospitals at Ag Blag and Maleewan are in temporary accommodation i.e., tents. In consequence most of the sick including the tubercle cases have to



be accommodated in the lines.

The intention is to move everybody into newly built accommodation including a hospital in Zewa as soon as possible.

### SUMMARY

Sites of Camps: ZEWA, AG BLAG, MALEEWAN.

<u>Population:</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Children</u>	<u>Infants</u>
	5,964	6,371	8,094	1,428+

### Total

21,857 includes 2,375 pregnant women over 500 of whom are more than six months pregnant.

### Births

473 recorded (not all however are reported)

ZEWA: 203 The majority of confinements are dealt with as a family affair in the lines.

AG BLAG: 20 in the hospital maternity tent in the last 3 weeks.

MALEEWAN: 250, majority in the lines in the last 5 months.

Ante-natal care and post-natal follow up clinics have not yet been established.

### Sickness

The total daily average seen by doctors in all camps is 451.

ZEWA: 120: tonsillitis 30, bronchitis 50, gastroenteritis 40

AG BLAG: 131: tonsillitis 40, bronchitis 50, gastroenteritis 20, malaria 7, sores and injuries 7, otorrhoea 7.

MALEEWAN: 200 cases seen included daily, similar conditions, as at the other two camps; also included are T.B. 16 positive cases which are ambulatory, Typhoid 10, clinical hepatitis 20, malaria 20 slides, of which all are positive.

Total: 451



LIST OF DISEASES LIKELY TO BE MET IN NORTHERN IRAQ  
AND INDICATIONS OF TREATMENT

By Professor W. O'Brien M.D., F.R.C.P.  
Royal Army Medical College, London  
Hospital For Tropical Diseases,  
London.

1. Tuberculosis.

All forms, often very advanced.  
For this sort of population best treatments

Streptomycin	1g	} daily 6 months
Isoniazid	300mg	
Rifampicin	500mg	

2. Leprosy

Likely to be common - still best form of treatment is D.D.S.  
(Diamino-diphenyl sulphone)

3. Typhus

Mainly Louse-Borne - epidemics - tetracycline

4. Cholera Outbreaks

I.V. Saline + Tetracycline

5. Malaria

Benign Tertian - Proguanil, but in severe outbreaks - Chloroquine

6. Leishmaniasis

Cutaneous - Tropica (minor and major)	} Pentostam
Kala Azar	

Dysenteries

7. Bacillary - Sulphonamides, Tetracycline

8. Amoebic - Emetine EBI, Metronidazole

9. Diphtheria

Vaccination, Antitoxin, Penicillin

10. Syphilis

Venereal	} Penicillin
Non-Venereal	

11. Rabies

Antisera + Vaccine

**12. Typhoid**

**Chloramphenicol**

**13. Worms**

**Ankylostomiasis**

**Ascaris**

**Strongyloides**

**Tape Worms**

(  
  **Bephenium Hydroxynaphthoate**  
  **Ferrous sulphate**  
  **Piperazine**  
  **Thiabendazole**  
  **Niclosamide (Yomesan)**

**14. Eye Lesions**

**From Vit. A deficiency in children**

**Oral water dispersible Vit. A Palmitate**

**15. Tetanus**

**16. Trachoma**

**Aureomycin Drops**

**Necessary Vaccinations**

**Vaccination**

**B.C.G.**

**Typhoid Enteric**

**Intradermal Painless**

**Cheapest and most effective**

**Small Pox**

**Diphtheria**

86



RECEIVED  
REGISTRY  
-6 NOV 1974  
NBR 1/2

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

4 November 1974


6/11  
vbb  
ja

Lt General Sir Alexander  
Drummond KBE CB  
Chase Lodge  
27 North Side  
Clapham Common, SW4

Dear Sir Alexander,

Thank you for your letter of  
2 November with which you kindly sent  
me a copy of the report on your recent  
visit to Iran.

I am most grateful to you for  
sending me this.

Yours faithfully,  
  
P R H Wright  
Middle East Department

Mr Clark  
Mr Burton

*Tehran sh'd be an fait, but Baghdad not. Better do a round-up for both.*  
20/11/74  
pa (85)  
5/11 (87)

RECEIVED  
RECEIVED N-33

-6 NOV 1974

NBR 1/2

1. I attach a letter which I have received from General Sir Alexander Drummond, together with a report of his recent visit to Kurdish refugee camps in Iran (FCO telegram No 399 of 26 September to Tehran refers). I have acknowledged General Drummond's letter. (86) (58)

2. General Drummond telephoned me on 1 November to say that he had been shocked by the conditions in the refugee camps and that the death-rate among the refugees is alarmingly high. He had called on the Foreign Ministry in Tehran and had been advised strongly by them not to cross into Iraqi territory since this might cause difficulties both for the Iranians and for the British Embassy in Baghdad (!) General Drummond had accepted this advice.

3. General Drummond went on to say that he was now attempting to buy surplus clothing and blankets from the Ministry of Defence but that there were some difficulties about this. He claimed that PS 13 (DS 13?) were worried about allowing surplus clothing to go overseas and that a "nudge" from the FCO would help. I asked whether the clothing would be consigned to the Iran Red Lion and Sun Society. He said that they did not wish to take this on and that he would be sending the equipment direct to the camps. I said that it would be difficult for us to take any action with the Ministry of Defence unless he was purchasing the equipment for a government organisation. He did not press the point and I see that he does not refer to it in his letter to me.

4. Would you please consider whether copies of General Drummond's letter and report should be sent to Tehran and also possibly to Baghdad with an explanation of the background.



P R H Wright  
Middle East Department

5 November 1974

FO 900/E106/86

LKS NR 191/6

PP FCO

RR TEHRAN

RR TEL AVIV

GRS 570

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 260910Z NOV.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 406 OF 6 NOVEMBER 1974, INFO  
ROUTINE TEHRAN AND TEL AVIV. SAVING TO PARIS,  
WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PEKING AND UK MIS NEW YORK.

KURDISTAN :

1. I WAS SUMMONED THIS MORNING BY HADITHI, THE UNDER SECRETARY IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEALING WITH NON ARAB MATTERS, AND WAS SHOWN INTO A ROOM, IN THE CORNER OF WHICH WAS STACKED A MINOR ARMOURY. WITHOUT BEATING ABOUT THE BUSH, HADITHI SAID THAT HE WANTED TO TALK ABOUT IRANIAN INTERVENTION IN IRAQI KURDISTAN. THE IRAQIS SINCERELY DESIRED GOOD RELATIONS WITH IRAN BUT IRANIAN ACTIONS IN KURDISTAN MADE THIS IMPOSSIBLE. WITHOUT IRANIAN SUPPORT THE KURDISH REBELLION WOULD HAVE BEEN CRUSHED. ON 29 AND 30 OCTOBER THERE HAD BEEN AN ENGAGEMENT NEAR QALA'DIZEH IN WHICH THE IRAQIS HAD CAPTURED SOME IRANIAN EQUIPMENT. HE HAD SUMMONED ME AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF ONE OF THE GREAT POWERS TO DISPLAY TO ME THIS PROOF OF IRANIAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT.
2. A CAPTAIN IN THE ARMY, WHO WAS PRESENT, THEN TOOK OVER. HE POINTED OUT A 175MM SHELL WHICH HAD FAILED TO EXPLODE. THIS WAS OF AMERICAN ORIGIN AND THE ONLY ARMIES IN THE AREA EQUIPPED WITH IT WERE THE IRANIAN AND THE ISRAELI. IT HAD BEEN FIRED FROM IRANIAN TERRITORY. THIS AND

*Mr. Campbell*  
*Mr. Lewis*  
*Mr. MEA*  
*Mr. Deferre*  
*Mr. VNS*  
*Mr. McNamara*

**ADVANCE COPY**  
*[Departmental]*

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NOV 25  
- 6 NOV 1974  
NBR 1/2

*Mr. Burton* *10/25/74*  
*BB*  
*No response needed*  
*I think?*



IT HAD BEEN FOUND  
FRAGMENTS OF SEVERAL SHELLS OF 203MM, 155MM AND 122 MM CALIBRE,  
ALL OF AMERICAN ORIGIN, WERE PROOF POSITIVE OF DIRECT  
INTERVENTION BY THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES SINCE WEAPONS OF THIS  
KIND WERE NOT AVAILABLE TO GUERRILLAS AND BECAUSE OF THEIR  
WEIGHT COULD NOT BE HANDLED BY THEM.

3. OTHER WEAPONS ON DISPLAY INCLUDED 60MM MORTAR, ALLEGEDLY  
AMERICAN, TOGETHER WITH A BOMB PACKING CASE WITH THE  
IRANIAN IMPERIAL CROWN ON IT AND THE MARKING ST M50 A2,  
SAID TO HAVE BEEN MANUFACTURED IN IRAN, A 2 AND A HALF INCH  
MORTAR SAID TO BE OF ISRAELI MANUFACTURE, THE REMAINS OF  
WHAT WAS DESCRIBED AS A WIRE-GUIDED ANTI-TANK MISSILE DESCRIBED  
AS AMERICAN, AND 2 RIFLES, A SUB MACHINE GUN AND AN LMG,  
ALL DESCRIBED AS MANUFACTURED IN IRAN AND AS THE  
STANDARD EQUIPMENT OF THE KURDISH FORCES. EACH OF THE SMALL  
ARMS BORE THE IRANIAN IMPERIAL ARMS AND THE LMG HAD, IN  
PERSIAN, THE WORDS "KARHANAT ASLIHAT SAZI BANCU". THERE  
WAS ALSO A CORRUGATED PAPER WRAPPING FOR SPARE PARTS LABELLED  
IN ENGLISH "IMPERIAL IRANIAN ARMED FORCES" AND ON ANOTHER  
LABEL "20KG-111E."

4. HADITHI SAID THAT HE WAS DRAWING THIS TO MY ATTENTION NOT  
FOR ANY PARTICULAR ACTION. HE HAD SPOKEN ALREADY TO THE  
SOVIET AMBASSADOR AND WOULD BE SPEAKING TO THE CHINESE AND  
FRENCH AMBASSADORS, AS REPRESENTATIVES OF PERMANENT  
MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I ASKED WHETHER IRAQ INTENDED  
TO RAISE THE MATTER IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE SAID THAT  
ALTHOUGH THIS WAS POSSIBLE, THEY DID NOT INTEND TO DO SO  
AT THE MOMENT.

5. I SAID THAT I HAD TAKEN NOTE AND WOULD REPORT<sup>RT</sup>. MY ONLY  
COMMENT ON THE SPOT WAS THAT HMG HAD GOOD RELATIONS WITH IRAN  
AND WANTED GOOD RELATIONS WITH IRAQ : FOR THEIR PART HMG  
WOULD WELCOME THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN  
IRAQ AND IRAN, WHICH WAS WHAT HADITHI HAD SAID IRAQ DESIRED.

6. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO PARIS, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW,  
PEKING AND UKHIS NEW YORK.

GRAHAM


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FM BAGHDAD 060910Z NOV.

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TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 406 OF 6 NOVEMBER 1974, INFO  
ROUTINE TEHRAN AND TEL AVIV. SAVING TO PARIS,  
WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PEKING AND UK MIS NEW YORK.

KURDISTAN :

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OF ONE OF THE GREAT POWERS TO DISPLAY TO ME THIS PROOF  
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IT HAD BEEN FIRED FROM IRANIAN TERRITORY. THIS AND  
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INTERVENTION BY THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES SINCE WEAPONS OF THIS  
KIND WERE NOT AVAILABLE TO GUERILLAS AND BECAUSE OF THEIR  
WEIGHT COULD NOT BE HANDLED BY THEM.

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/ 3.

3. OTHER WEAPONS ON DISPLAY INCLUDED 60MM MORTAR, ALLEGEDLY AMERICAN, TOGETHER WITH A BOMB PACKING CASE WITH THE IRANIAN IMPERIAL CROWN ON IT AND THE MARKING ST M50 A2, SAID TO HAVE BEEN MANUFACTURED IN IRAN, A 2 AND A HALF INCH MORTAR SAID TO BE OF ISRAELI MANUFACTURE, THE REMAINS OF WHAT WAS DESCRIBED AS A WIRE-GUIDED ANTI-TANK MISSILE DESCRIBED AS AMERICAN, AND 2 RIFLES, A SUB MACHINE GUN AND AN LMG, ALL DESCRIBED AS MANUFACTURED IN IRAN AND AS THE STANDARD EQUIPMENT OF THE KURDISH FORCES. EACH OF THE SMALL ARMS BORE THE IRANIAN IMPERIAL ARMS AND THE LMG HAD, IN PERSIAN, THE WORDS "KARHANAT ASLIHAT SAZI BAKOU". THERE WAS ALSO A CORRUGATED PAPER WRAPPING FOR SPARE PARTS LABELLED IN ENGLISH "IMPERIAL IRANIAN ARMED FORCES" AND ON ANOTHER LABEL "28KG-111E."

4. HADITHI SAID THAT HE WAS DRAWING THIS TO MY ATTENTION NOT FOR ANY PARTICULAR ACTION. HE HAD SPOKEN ALREADY TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AND WOULD BE SPEAKING TO THE CHINESE AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS, AS REPRESENTATIVES OF PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I ASKED WHETHER IRAQ INTENDED TO RAISE THE MATTER IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH THIS WAS POSSIBLE, THEY DID NOT INTEND TO DO SO AT THE MOMENT.

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6. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO PARIS, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PEKING AND UKMIS NEW YORK.  
GRAHAM

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
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]



**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**  
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

R G Giddens  
BAGHDAD



Your reference

Our reference

Date 7 November 1974

(89)

WBB/4  
pa

**MEDICAL SUPPLIES FOR THE KURDS**

1. In September this year General Alexander Drummond, a former Director-General of the Army Medical Service, called on Patrick Wright to say that he had been asked to undertake a survey of Kurdish medical requirements. I now enclose a copy of our telegram 399 to Tehran informing them of General Drummond's visit.
2. General Drummond has now returned and has written to Patrick Wright enclosing a copy of his report on his mission (copies enclosed). You will see that the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spoke well to General Drummond about the implications should he cross the border into Iraq.
3. General Drummond told Patrick Wright recently that he is attempting to buy surplus clothing and blankets from the MOD but is encountering some difficulty. Patrick asked whether the clothing would be consigned to the Red Lion and Sun Society but was told that since the latter did not wish to take this on the equipment would be sent direct to the camps. Patrick said it would be difficult for us to take any action with the Ministry of Defence unless General Drummond was purchasing the equipment for a Government organisation. General Drummond did not press the point.

G S Burton  
Middle East Department

Encs

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**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**  
**London SW1A 2AL**

Telephone 01.

**N W Browne**  
**TEHRAN**

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-7 NOV 1974  
NBR 1/2

Your reference

Our reference

Date 7 November 1974

(90)

25/11  
12

**MEDICAL SUPPLIES FOR KURDS**

1. Please refer to the previous correspondence about General Sir Alexander Drummond's visit to Kurdistan. I now enclose a copy of a letter General Drummond has sent Patrick Wright together with his report on the visit.
2. General Drummond told Patrick on the telephone recently that he was attempting to buy surplus clothing and blankets from the MOD but was encountering some difficulty. Patrick asked whether the clothing would be consigned to the Red Lion and Sun Society but was told that since the latter did not wish to take this on the equipment would be sent direct to the camps. Patrick said it would be difficult for us to take any action with the Ministry of Defence unless General Drummond was purchasing the equipment for a Government organisation. General Drummond did not press the point.


**G S Burton**  
**Middle East Department**

**Enc**

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CYPHER CAT A



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TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 409 OF 7 NOVEMBER 1974, INFO  
ROUTINE TEHRAN AND TEL AVIV. SAVING PARIS, WASHINGTON,  
MOSCOW, PEKING, UNKPMIS NEW YORK.

*Handwritten notes:*  
Duf  
11/11  
ja

MY TEL NO 405 <sup>-88</sup> : KURDISTAN.

1. I LEARNED THAT A NUMBER OF HEADS OF MISSION HAVE IN FACT BEEN GIVEN THE SAME TREATMENT OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS. IN PARTICULAR THE IRAQIS CONFRONTED THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR WITH THE EVIDENCE AND THE TURKISH AND ARAB AMBASSADORS HAVE BEEN SHOWN IT.
2. THE KUWAIT AMBASSADOR TOLD ME THAT THE ARMS HE WAS SHOWN INCLUDED ARMS OF RUSSIAN, CHINESE, CZECH AND FRENCH ORIGIN AS WELL AS AMERICAN, IRANIAN AND ISRAELI. THE EXCLUSION OF THESE FROM WHAT I WAS SHOWN IS NOT WITHOUT INTEREST.
3. LIKE ME, NONE OF MY COLLEAGUES HAD BEEN ASKED FOR ANY SPECIFIC ACTION AND FORMALLY NO RESPONSE WOULD SEEM TO BE REQUIRED. I SHOULD HOWEVER BE GRATEFUL TO RECEIVE ANY COMMENTS THAT YOU MAY HAVE FOR USE WITH IRAQIS AS THE OCCASION OFFERS.

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/4. THE FRENCH

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4. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HAS A STORY THAT AT THE RABAT SUMMIT MEETING, A COMMITTEE OF ARAB COUNTRIES INCLUDING EGYPT AND JORDAN WAS SET UP TO MEDIATE BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN IN THEIR PRESENT DISPUTES. HE TOLD ME THAT WHEN HE WAS RECEIVED BY HADITHI TO BE SHOWN THE CAPTURED ARMS, HE ASKED ABOUT THIS AND THAT HADITHI CONFIRMED THE REPORT. I WILL TRY TO FIND OUT MORE ABOUT THIS IF I CAN.

5. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO PARIS, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW PEKING AND UK MIS NEW YORK.

GRAHAM

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Mr Clark JH  
~~Mr W. H. Hines~~  
 Mr Wright

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--

Kundistan

Flags A.B.

Baghdad tel nos 406 and 409 Mr Wright  
 has agreed that there is nothing we can  
 add to Mr Graham's line with the Nazis.  
 I submit a draft tel to Baghdad  
 with which D-4-Med concurs

tel to D-4-Med as  
 amended.

W. H. Hines 8/11  
 JH 7/11  
 W. H. Hines 8/11

1000 402

GR 70

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REC'D	D.
REG.	23
11 NOV 1974	
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MSB 11/11  
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TO ROUTINE BAGHDAD/TELEGRAM/NUMBER 289 OF 8 NOVEMBER. 1974  
YOUR TELEGRAMS 406 AND 409: KURDISTAN.

1. WE HAVE NOTHING TO ADD TO THE LINE IN PARA 5 OF YOUR TELEGRAM  
NUMBER 406. YOU MAY HOWEVER BE INTERESTED TO KNOW THAT THE 122 MM  
CALIBRE SHELL DESCRIBED IN PARA 2 IS EXCLUSIVELY RUSSIAN AND THAT  
NO OTHER COUNTRY MANUFACTURES A SHELL OF THAT TYPE. WE ARE TOLD  
THAT IT HAS NEVER BEEN SUPPLIED TO IRAN.

CALLAGHAN

FILES  
MED  
EESD  
SIR J KILLICK  
MR WEIR

COPIES TO:

DI 4 MOD

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British Embassy  
Tehran

*Curry*  
*R 11/xi*


(94)

P K Williams Esq  
Middle East Department  
FCO

Your reference

Our reference 3/2

Date 6 November 1974



*Dear Peter,*

GENERAL DRUMMOND

1. We have heard nothing of General Drummond since he called on Dick Ellingworth on 1 October. Given his age and his state of health, it would be reassuring to hear that he had safely returned to England. Do you have any news of him?

*Yours ever*  
*Peter.*

P J Westmacott

*Tehran will now have  
seen 790 of the 7<sup>th</sup> Nov.  
pa. R 12/xi*

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SEM

RECEIVED IN REGISTER N. 35 12 NOV 1974
NBR 1/2

LOOSE MINUTE

D/DS13/173/38

AD/Sales Supply 6

Copy to:  
/FCO(MED)(Mr P Raftery)

CLOTHING FOR KURDISH REFUGEE RELIEF ORGANISATION

Reference: D/Sales Supply 6/59/21/549 dated 25 Oct 74

This is to confirm our telephone conversation of 31 October in which I told you that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had no objections to your supplying clothing to the Kurdish refugee relief organisation referred to in your minute at reference. It should, however be made clear to those concerned that we regard this as a normal commercial transaction which has in no way received special consideration.

5<sup>th</sup> Nov 74

A B FAYLE  
DS13b  
MB 0201 6603 MB

FO 928/E 91/12

LKS 248/12

OO MODUK

PP JISNE

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DESKBY 121300Z NOV

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FM BAGHDAD 121120Z NOV

SECRET

DESKBY 121300Z NOV

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TELNO 121120Z NOV INFO PRIORITY JISNE SAVING  
KUWAIT DAMASCUS BEIRUT ANKARA AND TEHRAN.

DIG FOH


WEEKLY REPORT

# 1. KURDISTAN

ALPHA. SITUATION APPEARS TO HAVE STABILISED IN RAWANDUZ AND  
RANIA AREAS. IRAQIS CONSOLIDATING ON ZUZAK AND ATTEMPTING TO  
MOVE SOUTH TO SECURE HANDREN HEIGHTS AND LINK UP WITH FORCES NORTH  
OF RANIA.

BRAVO. AREA NORTH OF RANIA QUIET WITH LITTLE FIGHTING REPORTED.

CHARLIE. FRENCH MA CONFIRMS KURDS MOUNTED HEAVY ATTACK ON



Mr. Williams <sup>13</sup>/<sub>11</sub>  
(no 53)  
Randa pa -

CHARLIE. FRENCH MA CONFIRMS KURDS MOUNTED HEAVY ATTACK ON QALAT DIZAH 8 NOV AND ENTERED THE TOWN ON 10 NOV. HE IS NOT SURE WHO IS HOLDING THE TOWN AT PRESENT BUT BELIEVES HEAVY FIGHTING IS CONTINUING.

DELTA. EGYPTIAN MA WHO LAST WEEK ACCOMPANIED EGYPTIAN MILITARY DELEGATION ON TOUR OF NORTH WAS TOLD BY GEN SAID HAMO NORTHERN AREA COMMANDER THEY WERE AIMING TO LINK UP BETWEEN HANDRAN AND RANIA TO BREAK KURDISH L OF C BEFORE ONSET OF WINTER, THAT MOST DIVS IN THE NORTH NOW HAD A MINIMUM OF FOUR REGULAR AND FOUR RESERVE BDES. RESERVE BDES WERE BEING USED IN MAIN TOWNS AND TO KEEP MAIN ROADS OPEN. HE ALSO IDENTIFIED 100, 101 AND 102 RESERVE BDES ON IRAQI OPERATIONS MAP.


IRAN ARTY FIRE DOES NOT SEEM TO BE AS EFFECTIVE OR DAMAGING AS WE ARE LED TO BELIEVE. DURING ONE 4 HOUR BARRAGE ON QALAT DIZAH AREA DURING EGYPTIANS' VISIT TO IRAQI OPS ROOM ONLY CASUALTY WAS ONE IRAQI SOLDIER WOUNDED IN ARM.

ECHO. WEATHER STILL FINE. TEMPERATURES 11 NOV BAGHDAD MAX 28 MIN 10, MOSUL MAX 28 MIN 8, KIRKUK MAX 29, MIN 17.

FOXTROT. FRENCH AMBASSADOR TOLD ME FRENCH JOURNALISTS WERE RECENTLY TAKEN TO RAWANDUZ AND OFFERED TO BE TAKEN TO ZUZAK. THEY DECLINED SAYING THEY HAD SEEN ENOUGH.

GOLF. WILL VISIT ALL TOWNS IN NORTH 14-18 NOV.

TWO. EGYPTIAN DELEGATION REFUSED PERMISSION TO VISIT UM QASR ON GROUNDS THERE WAS NOTHING INTERESTING TO SEE THERE.


THREE. DETAILS OF TODAY'S CABINET CHANGES IN IRAQ CONTAINED IN OUR TEL NO. 418 OF 12 NOV TO FCO. 

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO KUWAIT DAMASCUS BEIRUT ANKARA AND TEHRAN.

GRAHAM



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BRITISH EMBASSY  
BAGHDAD

5 November 1974

P R H Wright Esq  
Middle East Department  
F C

Dear Patrice,

## IRAQI-IRANIAN RELATIONS

/82

1. In his letter 3/2 of 24 October, Tony Parsons recorded a conversation he had had with the Shah about Iraq and Kurdistan.
2. When I called on 5 November on Abdul Hussain al Jamali, the Under Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he said with apparent sincerity, that the Iraqi Government desired nothing more than good neighbourly relations with Iran. They had achieved this with Turkey and saw no reason why they should not do the same with Iran. The obstacle was Iranian support for the Kurds in northern Iraq, including the despatch of Iranian troops across the border, and Iran's expansionist policy in the Gulf. I said that it was a great pity that the talks, which I believed had been due to be continued after New York, had been called off. Jamali agreed, but said that Iraq would persevere.
3. This conversation followed a certain amount of publicity in the Iraqi press for Arab irridentist claims to Khuzistan. In the Baghdad Observer of 4 November there was a long article about the removal and death of Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah in 1925; and at the recent conference of Arab lawyers, the "Liberation Front of Ahwaz" sent fraternal greetings, which were read out to the assembled company. I am not sure whether this is a real agitation or whether it is merely tactical, in retaliation for Iranian activities in the North. If Jamali is telling the truth, it is the former, but I could not confidently say that this was so.
4. I enclose a copy of the article on Mohammerah in case it is of interest to your Department and to Tehran. I have asked Graham Burton separately if there is a Research Department paper on this old story for my background information.


Yours ever  
JAGCopy to:  
HE Mr A D Parsons CMG MVO MC  
TEHRAN

J A N Graham

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Mr Facey - UN Dept

Legal Advisers Mr Eaton Minute 8/11/74



Kurdistan Red Crescent Society

Flag A

I should be grateful for your advice on the problem raised in Baghdad tel no 388. It seems to me to be a parallel with the Bangladesh Red Cross (Crescent) which I believe operated here before Bangladesh gained independence and about which Pakistan probably complained.

Flag B

I should be grateful for advice on how to reply to the Note (I imagine we would not be able to 'liquidate' the society!) and for an answer to the question posed in paragraph 4 of Mr Graham's telegram. The offending documents are also attached.

11/11  
MEI



Mr. Burton


1. I am afraid I have little ~~to~~ advice to give on reply to Note, which will have to be merely an expansion of the position given in first two sentences of para 2 of Tel no 388 from Baghdad.

2. However Bangladesh parakeet may prove useful, and I have asked SAD to research it. I will pass on any results as soon as possible. If nothing else, it may provide a model of apologetic style without apology!

Robert Jacey

4/10.

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Mr Burton ✓  
Middle East Dept

*Mr Wright*  
*you will wish to look at these*  
*papers before Today's meeting*  
*18/11*

KURDISTAN RED CRESCENT SOCIETY

1. We have spoken about the problem raised in your minute to Mr Facey (UN Dept) of 1 November. I confirm the appointment I have made, with your approval, for Mr Brian Hodgson, the director-general of the British Red Cross Society, and Mr Donald Piggott, the International Secretary of the Society, to call tomorrow afternoon at 3 pm to see Mr Wright in his office, with yourself and myself in attendance. As I reported to you from my conversations with Mr Piggott, the British Red Cross have quite a lot of background of dealings with organisations representing the Kurdish cause in this country. They have also known from the outset of the proposal to set up a Kurdistan Red Crescent Society, which was made about August this year, and they also have been following the dealings the Society have had with the Central Red Cross Authorities in Geneva. This is for them a question of some delicacy as for us, and Mr Piggott told me they welcomed the opportunity to discuss the matter with us.
2. I shall be attending the meeting and so will be able to give an account them of the legal considerations which we have just spoken. It might be useful, however, if I set them down briefly now.
3. Mr Facey has suggested that the reply to the Iraqi Note of 26 October should follow the line taken initially by the Ambassador, viz that "under British law the Government lacked power to control the establishment of organisations of this kind, provided they complied with the law" (paragraph 2 of Baghdad telegram No. 388 of 26 October). I fear that in the circumstances, unlike the two examples which the Ambassador gave, of the PLO Office and the Mark Press Biafra campaign, there do exist powers under law which could be used to prevent the activities of the Kurdistan Red Crescent in their present form.
4. The powers are contained in section 6 of the Geneva Conventions Act 1957. Subsection 1 of section 6 states -  
 "(1). Subject to the provisions of this section, it shall not be lawful for any person, without the authority of the Army Council, [now Defence Council] to use for any purpose whatsoever any of the following emblems or designations, that is to say -

/ (a)

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- (a) the emblem of a red cross .... or the designation "Red Cross .... ;
- (b) the emblem of a red crescent moon on, and completely surrounded by, a white ground, or the designation "Red Crescent"; ....

By subsection(3) any person contravening this <sup>section</sup> ~~decision~~ shall be guilty of an offence and be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds and to forfeit any goods upon or in connexion with which the emblem or designation was used.

By subsection (7) proceedings under this section are not to be instituted in England, except by or on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

6. This section of the Act is designed to fulfil the obligations laid on contracting parties to the first Geneva Convention of 1949 on the Sick and Wounded, in Articles 53 and 54. Article 53 states :-

"The use by individuals, societies, firms or companies either public or private, other than those entitled thereto under the present Convention, of the emblem or designation "Red Cross" or "Geneva Cross", for any sign or designation constituting an imitation thereof, whatever the object of such use, irrespective of the date of its adoption, shall be prohibited at all times".

By the last paragraph of the same Article this prohibition is applied also to the other emblems authorised by the Convention, including the Red Crescent. By Article 54 the High Contracting Parties have to take measures for the prevention and repression at all times of the abuses referred to under Article 53 if their legislation is not already adequate.

6. On this basis the Kurdistan Red Crescent Society would be committing an offence in using the emblem and designation "Red Crescent" unless they were able to convince the Defence Council that they were persons entitled to use the emblem or designation under the first Convention. The persons so entitled are set out in Article 44. They include of course medical units and personnel in time of war and the International Red Cross organisations at all times. The only category into which the Kurdistan organisation could fit however is that of a National Red Crescent Society, which, by paragraph 2 of Article 44, "may, in time of peace, in accordance with their national legislation, make use of the name and ~~employment~~ of the Red Cross for their other activities which are in conformity with the principle laid down by the International Red Cross Conferences". The difficulty here is that the Kurdistan organisation does not fulfil the criteria for being National Red

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/ Crescent

## CONFIDENTIAL

Crescent Society. I attach copies of the Regulations on Recognition of New National Red Cross Societies and for the admission of new national societies to the League of Red Cross Societies. Conditions (2)↓(3) of the Recognition Rules are fatal to the Kurds so long as they remain part of Iraq (and other States) and are not an independent State. In the circumstances it became as no surprise to hear from Mr Piggott that the Kurds got a dusty answer when they went to Geneva to ask for recognition from the ICRC and the League.

6. Any question of implementing the Act or conveying any warning to the Kurdistan Red Crescent could only follow further consultations with the Ministry of Defence, who presumably advise the Defence Council on this matter and with the Home Office, who are the guardians of the 1957 Act; they may take a different view of its provisions. In any event the decision to prosecute would be for the DPP and he might justifiably in his discretion decide that it was not an appropriate case. However, the first question is what we can say to the Iraqis. My conclusion is that we cannot tell them that we have no legal powers to curb the activities of the Kurdistan Red Crescent in their present form. Of course if they called themselves the Kurdish Relief Organisation, or something similar, there would be no problem. However they have chosen to ally themselves to the prestige and reputation of the National Red Cross Organisation by using ~~the implement~~ title. It is of course precisely this kind of unauthorised use that the Convention and the Act aim to prevent and punish.

7. Finally, on the specific question in paragraph 4 of the Ambassador's telegram, I understand from Mr Piggott that the Kurdistan Red Crescent are seeking registration as a charity, but how far they have got is not known.

*MR Eaton*

M R Eaton  
Legal Advisers

8 November 1974

(dictated 7 Nov)

cc Mr Facey UND.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Wright


RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 14 NOV 1974
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Kinchston Red Crescent Society

I attach a draft letter from you to  
Mr Graham explaining the latest position.  
At your suggestion, I have 'borrowed' 3  
paragraphs of the Eaton's minute to give the  
legal background.



Yours faithfully,





101



**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**  
**London SW1A 2AL**

**Telephone 01-**

His Excellency  
Mr J A N Graham CMG  
BAGHDAD

### Your reference

### Our reference

**Date**

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35

14 NOV 1974

NBR 1/2

12 November 1974

*[Handwritten notes on document:]*

- 11/11
- MSB
- BU 2 weeks
- noted MSB 20/11
- 2 weeks
- noted MSB 20/11
- 2 weeks
- BU
- BR 1/2
- 2 weeks
- 1974

Dear Johnny.

KURDISTAN RED CRESCENT SOCIETY

1. The Iraqi approach, as reported in your telegram No 388 of 26 October, has posed something of a problem for us. The Iraqis are, in fact, correct in stating that the organisation, currently operating in London and apparently elsewhere in Europe, is not entitled to call itself a Red Crescent Society nor to use the official Red Crescent emblem. Moreover there do exist powers under law which could be used to prevent the activities of the Kurdistan Red Crescent in its present form.

2. For the contents of the next three paragraphs I am indebted to our Legal Advisers. The powers are contained in section 6 of the Geneva Conventions Act 1957. Subsection 1 of section 6 states:

"(1). Subject to the provisions of this section, it shall not be lawful for any person, without the authority of the Army Council [now Defence Council] to use for any purpose whatsoever any of the following emblems or designations, that is to say:

(a) the emblem of a red cross ... or the designation "Red Cross"... ;

(b) the emblem of a red crescent moon on, and completely surrounded by, a white ground, or the designation "Red Crescent"; ... "

By subsection (3) any person contravening this section shall be guilty of an offence and be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds and to forfeit any goods upon or in connexion with which the emblem or designation was used. By subsection (7) proceedings under this section are not to be instituted in England, except by or on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions.



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

3. This section of the Act is designed to fulfil the obligations laid on contracting parties to the first Geneva Convention of 1949 on the Sick and Wounded, in Articles 53 and 54. Article 53 states:

"The use by individuals, societies, firms or companies either public or private, other than those entitled thereto under the present Convention, of the emblem or designation "Red Cross" or "Geneva Cross", for any sign or designation constituting an imitation thereof, whatever the object of such use, irrespective of the date of its adoption, shall be prohibited at all times."

By the last paragraph of the same Article this prohibition is applied also to the other emblems authorised by the Convention, including the Red Crescent. By Article 54 the High Contracting Parties have to take measures for the prevention and repression at all times of the abuses referred to under Article 53 if their legislation is not already adequate.

4. On this basis the Kurdistan Red Crescent Society would be committing an offence in using the emblem and designation "Red Crescent" unless they were able to convince the Defence Council that they were persons entitled to use the emblem or designation under the first Convention. The persons so entitled are set out in Article 44. They include of course medical units and personnel in time of war and the International Red Cross organisations at all times. The only category into which the Kurdistan organisation could fit however is that of a National Red Crescent Society, which, by paragraph 2 of Article 44, "may, in time of peace, in accordance with their national legislation, make use of the name and emblem of the Red Cross for their other activities which are in conformity with the principle laid down by the International Red Cross Conferences". The difficulty here is that the Kurdistan organisation does not fulfil the criteria for being a National Red Crescent Society. I attach copies of the Regulations on Recognition of New National Red Cross Societies and for the admission of new national societies to the League of Red Cross Societies. Conditions (2) and (3) of the Recognition Rules are fatal to the Kurds so long as they remain part of Iraq (and other States) and are not an independent State.

5. I had a meeting on 8 November with Mr Brian Hodgson, the Director General of the British Red Cross Society, and Mr Donald Piggott, the Society's international secretary. They confirmed that they were aware of the Red Crescent's activities in London and that the ICRC in Geneva had refused its request for recognition. Mr Hodgson added that he had warned the Charity Commissioners that the organisation was operating illegally and should not therefore be considered for registration as a charity.



CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

6. The position at present is that Mr Hodgson, who is well known to Dr Hanari, the London representative of the Kurdistan Red Crescent Society, has kindly offered to explain informally to the latter that, unless the Kurds stop using this title and emblem, the Red Cross Society will have no option but to report the facts to the Ministry of Defence who in turn will probably send the papers to the Director of Public Prosecutions. The Kurds are likely to take the hint and change the name of the organisation, which would incidentally enable them to register themselves as a charity. If the Iraqis then complained, we would have grounds to deploy the "no powers to intervene" argument. Meanwhile Mr Hodgson is also discreetly checking with Geneva to see whether the Iraqis have made their threatened approach to the ICRC (paragraph 3 of your telegram).

7. I hope therefore that this problem can be resolved without either a fight with the Iraqis or embarrassing legal action against the Kurds; Ministers would certainly be concerned about public opinion if the second course became necessary. I shall, of course, let you know as soon as there are any developments to report but in the meantime suggest you make no reply to the Iraqi Note other than a formal acknowledgement.

*John*  
*Parish*

P R H Wright  
Middle East Department

Encls

c.c.

HE Mr A D Parsons CMG CVO MC (Tehran)

## VII

### RECOGNITION OF NEW NATIONAL RED CROSS SOCIETIES <sup>1</sup>

*To become a member of the International Red Cross, the applicant Society must satisfy the ten conditions for recognition listed below, and submit a request for recognition to the International Committee of the Red Cross, together with all relevant documents, in particular the following :*

- (a) an authenticated copy of the governmental decree granting the National Society recognition in conformity with Condition No. 3 below;*
- (b) a copy of the Statutes of the Society in force;*
- (c) a copy of the latest report on activities.*

*The request for recognition must contain a statement in which the Society undertakes to comply with any conditions for recognition which may not have been the subject of statutory provisions.*

### CONDITIONS FOR THE RECOGNITION OF NATIONAL RED CROSS SOCIETIES

*(Drawn up by an ad hoc joint Commission of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies, and approved by the XVIIth International Red Cross Conference, Stockholm, 1948)*

**The Society shall :**

- (1) Be constituted on the territory of an independent State where |**

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<sup>1</sup> For regulations for admission into the League of Red Cross Societies, see p. 334.

the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of August 12, 1949, is in force.<sup>2</sup>

- (2) Be the only National Red Cross Society of the said State and be directed by a central body which shall alone be competent to represent it in its dealings with other members of the International Red Cross.
- (3) Be duly recognized by its legal Government as a Voluntary Aid Society, auxiliary to the public authorities, in particular in the sense of Article 26 of the I. Geneva Convention of 1949, or, in States which do not maintain armed forces, as a Voluntary Aid Society auxiliary to the public authorities and acting for the benefit of the civilian population.
- (4) Be an institution whose autonomous status allows it to operate in conformity with the fundamental principles of the Red Cross, as formulated by the International Red Cross Conference.
- (5) Use the title and emblem of the Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun), in conformity with the Geneva Convention.
- (6) Be so organized as to enable it to deal effectively with the tasks incumbent upon it. Become prepared in time of peace for war-time activities.
- (7) Extend its activities to the entire country and its dependencies.
- (8) Not withhold membership from any of its nationals, whoever they may be, on grounds of race, sex, class, religion or political opinions.
- (9) Adhere to the Statutes of the International Red Cross, share in the fellowship which unites its members—the National Societies and the international bodies—and keep in close touch with them.
- (10) Honour the fundamental principles of the Red Cross as defined by the International Red Cross Conferences : impartiality ; political, religious and economic independence ; the universality of the Red Cross and the equality of all National Societies ; and be guided in all its work by the spirit of the Geneva Convention and the Conventions which complete it.

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<sup>2</sup> Under the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, the accessions of Governments to the Geneva Conventions are notified in writing to the Swiss Federal Council and become effective six months after the date on which they are received.

The Swiss Federal Council communicates such accessions to the Governments of all countries in whose name the Conventions have been signed or whose accession has been notified.



**VIII**  
**REGULATIONS**  
**FOR THE ADMISSION**  
**OF NEW NATIONAL SOCIETIES**  
**TO THE**  
**LEAGUE OF RED CROSS SOCIETIES**

*(Adopted by the Board of Governors in 1948)*

**ARTICLE 1**

Admission to membership in the League of Red Cross Societies is open to any Red Cross or Red Crescent Society officially recognized by the government of its country and working in the spirit of the "Fundamental Principles" of the League, agreed upon at the 19th session of the Board of Governors held at Oxford in 1946<sup>1</sup>.

**ARTICLE 2**

Any applicant National Red Cross or Red Crescent Society must belong to a country where no other Red Cross or Red Crescent Society is yet in existence, and should embrace, in its sphere of activity, its entire country and its dependencies.

**ARTICLE 3**

National Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies wishing to adhere to the League must send in their application to the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the League.

**ARTICLE 4**

The following should be annexed to the application :

- (a) Articles of Association of the applicant Society.
- (b) An account of the Society's activities during the year preceding the application.

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<sup>1</sup> See The Principles of the Red Cross, pp. 377-380.

- (c) The document evidencing the circumstances which brought about the formal recognition of the Society by the government of its country.
- (d) A statement in which the applicant Society acknowledges having taken cognisance of the Statutes of the League at present in force, and in which it binds itself to conform to them.
- (e) A statement in which the applicant Society pledges itself to pay its financial contribution for the current financial year.

#### ARTICLE 5

The Secretariat of the League will examine the application submitted to it as well as the documents annexed thereto.

If the documents annexed are in accordance with the Fundamental Principles of the League, the admission of the Society will be put up for consideration at the next session of the Executive Committee of the League, together with the comments of the Secretariat.

Should the Secretariat consider that the documents presented do not comply with the Fundamental Principles of the League, it will submit to the Executive Committee a report containing its comments.

#### ARTICLE 6

The Executive Committee decides initially on the admission of the Society to membership in the League.

#### ARTICLE 7

A Society admitted by the Executive Committee is considered as being admitted provisionally until the next session of the Board of Governors of the League with which rests the final decision. If such decision is favourable the Society becomes a full member of the League. If the Executive Committee denies in the first instance a Society, it may still appeal to the Board of Governors.

#### ARTICLE 8

Any member Society may withdraw from the League by giving six months' prior notice to the Chairman of the Board of Governors.

With Compliments

of

SAVE CHILDREN OF KURDISTAN SOCIETY

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO 35
14 NOV 1974
NBR 1/2

c/o The Centre,  
St. Martin in-the-Fields,  
12 Adelaide Street,  
London WC2N 4HW.

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14/11  
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# **SAVE THE CHILDREN OF KURDISTAN**



**PUBLISHED BY :**

**SAVE THE CHILDREN OF KURDISTAN SOCIETY**

**OCTOBER 1974 .**

**WE APPEAL TO :**

- UNITEDNATION**
- INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL RED CROSSES**
- INTERNATIONAL CHILIDRENS WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS  
OF ALL THE WORLD**
- ALL CHARITY ORGANIZATION TAKING PART IN THE  
RELIEF EFFORTS FOR AREAS IN DISASTER.**



## **I N T R O D U C T I O N**

**to the**

### **SAVE THE CHILDREN OF KURDISTAN SOCIETY (SCKS)**

Our society has been formed as a direct result of the present war in Kurdistan. We consider it to be the most savage war so far waged against the Kurdish people, and feel it necessary to devote as much time and effort as is possible to the urgent needs of those children who have found themselves caught up in this tragic situation. Many of whom have already perished.

Our society in Europe is but one part of a larger organisation which has its roots inside Kurdistan and consists mainly of women. It is non-political and has as its sole aim, the interests of those war children. There is little we can do to prevent the anguish suffered by these children, for whom war is the most traumatic of experiences, but what we can do, is to help in a material sense, by collecting together, clothing, books and foodstuffs to name but a few of those items now urgently needed in Kurdistan.

In order to gather as much help as we can, we intend to contact all international humanitarian organisations, such as the Red Cross, Save the Children Fund etc. and we are also depending heavily on all humane individuals to give whatever they can, no matter how small. High on the list of priorities is of course clothing and foodstuffs. So that we may buy foodstuffs in bulk we desperately require money, and would ask for your donations, again, no matter how small, that we may somehow bring comfort and help to the children of Kurdistan.



## The Constitution of THE SOCIETY

- (1) The Society's full name shall be: **SAVE THE CHILDREN OF KURDISTAN SOCIETY**
- (2) It shall be based in the United Kingdom.
- (3) It shall be a voluntary charity society with the sole aim of bringing relief to those children in Kurdistan who fall victims to the present war, or to poverty and cruelty in general.
- (4) The relief shall consist of the voluntary donations of the Society's own members, or of individuals and organisations outside Kurdistan.
- (5) Membership shall be open to all individuals of good will who wish to play a part in lessening the tragedy that befalls Kurdish children. Members' conduct should be constructive and in accordance with the spirit of the Society; otherwise, they may be suspended by the Executive Committee and expelled by a two-third majority at a general meeting. Membership fee will be six pounds per annum.
- (6) The Executive Committee shall have five members chosen through secret ballot at the Annual General Meeting every September. They are directly elected as Chairman, Vice Chairman, General Secretary, Treasurer and Member. They can be dismissed by a vote of non-confidence of a simple majority of the Society's members. Committee decisions, and decisions made by the Annual General Meeting, are not valid if a simple majority of the Committee and Society, respectively are not present. In the case of the AGM, a subsequent meeting may be called at which it will not be necessary for a simple majority of the members to be present.
- (7) This Constitution can be changed or modified only at Annual General Meetings or Special General Meetings called specifically for the purpose. The approval of a simple majority of all members of the Society will be sufficient for the adoption of any new changes or modifications in the Constitution at such times.
- (8) This Constitution was unanimously adopted by the founding members of the Society at their second meeting on 1st October, 1974, in London.







With a history which goes back to 3,000 B.C. the Kurdish nation is one of the most ancient, linguistically and racially belonging to the Indo-European group of nations.

Although Kurdistan is seen today as only parts of other Middle Eastern countries, geographically and ethnically these parts of Kurdistan combine to form one homogeneous and contiguous unit where the Kurds form the majority of the population.

Kurdistan has suffered twice from major divisions, once during the 17th Century when it was divided into spheres of influence between the Ottoman and Persian Empires and more recently after World War I when various parts of Kurdistan were added to the territories of the modern states of Iraq, Syria and Turkey. At present, therefore, Kurdistan can be said to form the N.Eastern part of Turkey, N.Eastern part of Syria, North and N.East of Iraq, part of Soviet Armenia and Western Iran. Kurdish Society, as with other Middle Eastern Societies, is both urban and rural and Kurds are perhaps best characterized as being basically a mountain people, brave and sincere. Kurdish women, compared to those women of neighbouring states, do enjoy more freedom.

Judging from their rich folklore, the Kurds are fond of music, dancing and poetry. The 1st Kurdish newspaper, which was published in Cairo in 1882, and the organisation of Hoybun which was formed in 1927 and of Hiwa in 1938 are but a few landmarks in a long series of literary and political efforts made by Kurds during the 19th and 20th Centuries, in the struggle for their freedom.

After World War I the Kurds continued to struggle for their freedom and self-determination and for this they achieved recognition as a nation within the framework of the Treaty of Sevres in 1920, which specifically provided for the establishment of an independent Kurdistan. However, the Kurds were betrayed by the victorious powers of Britain and France and their suppression continued at the hands of the Turks, Arabs and Persians. Continuing their struggle for liberation the Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan rose in arms in 1961.

From 1961 to 1970 consecutive Iraqi governments did nothing to solve the problem peacefully, but have instead pursued the same brutal policies. As a result of their failure to carry out the promises made to the Kurds, war has once again started, and with it comes the inevitable consequences, the destruction of town and countryside, but more tragic, the deaths of innocent civilians, women and children.

The most important and hopeful agreement reached between the Iraqi regime and the Kurdish revolution was on 11th March, 1970 when it was agreed that the Kurdish people in Iraq should be granted autonomy within the Republic of Iraq. It has been with deep regret that the Kurds have seen the Ba'athist regime dishonour this agreement, and in the following four years since the signing of the Agreement have witnessed their programme of the Arabization of Kurdish areas, and the attempted assassination of the Kurdish leader, Mustafa Barzani, together with almost every other kind of intimidation. As a consequence on March, 12th 1974 the Kurdish people again rose in arms to defend their rights, whilst the Iraqi regime gathered together its army reservists, lackeys, etc. to start an all out offensive against the Kurds. Since March until now the Iraqi Air Force has carried out a programme of saturation bombing on the defenceless villages and cities of Kurdistan in the hope that they may, somehow, break the morale of the Kurdish people. Hundreds of women, old people and children have, as a result, perished. We consider this war to be the most savage and the most dirty, ever waged against the Kurdish people. The Iraqi regime has, not only, a total disregard for the basic rights of the Kurds, but also totally disregards the principles on Human Rights as laid down by the United Nations Organisations:-

1. The Right to Self determination.
2. Racial equality.
3. Sexual equality.

The Iraqi regime has violated the United Nations Charter on Human Rights by the following:-

- a. Bombing urban and rural areas.
- b. Imposing economical blockades as a means of causing starvation.
- c. Using all means of civil war to implement their objectives.
- d. Using internationally condemned weapons, the use of napalm.
- e. Setting fire to villages and farms.
- f. Totally disregarding human rights to education, work etc.

The Kurdish revolution is a social movement which depends on the support of its own people and strives to implement its own achievements into tangible services for the people of Kurdistan.

Having suffered many years of official neglect and lack of development, the Kurdish community has remained entrenched in many social and economic ills, which require immediate and full attention. More than 75% of the people of Iraqi Kurdistan are illiterate and this situation is worsened by the disruption of schooling during the military campaigns carried out by the authorities in Baghdad.

A brief summary is presented here of what is going on now in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Since the middle of April until 15th June, 1974, Iraqi jets made 1,328 attacks, concentrated on heavily populated areas. These attacks happened very frequently, for example the province of Chomman was bombed 22 times in three days. With the result that 368 villages were destroyed, 440 civilians killed and some 500 injured. It is worth mentioning that most casualties were old people, women and children. A list is given here of dates of attacks by Iraqi jets and the names of Kurdish children killed as a result of this savage bombing:-

- 24/5/74 The village of Kernic in the area of Telafar near Mosul. Several women and children killed.
- 6/6/74 Balak area - a boy, Rahman Karim 15yrs. and a child were killed.
- 10/6/74 The village of Kakay Shameran near Darbandikhan. two children killed:-  
Faik Haj Faraj - 6yrs. old.  
Mohamed Muhmud - 5yrs. old.
- 15/6/74 The villages of Deleza,  
Many people killed, among them an old man of 90yrs. and a 2yr. old child.

The most bitter bombing occurred in and around the city of Qala Diza, about 50 miles from Sulimanieh. That was on 24/4/74 and as a result about 134 people were killed and some 52 injured, most of those killed were children, as well as a number of students and members of staff of the Sulaimani University, who had left the university as a protest against the Iraqi policies against the Kurdish people. In that attack, at least one complete family comprising of a mother and her eight children were killed:

Fakhria - the mother

Salih Ahmed Haji Sabir - child

Salam " " " "

Jabbar " " " "

Jowan " " " "

Pakeza " " " "

kazhal " " " "

Shahla " " " "

Rizgar " " " "

Another family comprising a pregnant mother and five children were killed. Many other children, some of whom are named here have been killed:

Goolala Ali	Khidir
Soran Mohamed	"
Demam Abdulrahman	"
Parzheen Kadir	"
Komri	"
Amanj	"
Habib	"
Piroz	"

Two days after the bombing of Qala Diza, Iraqi jets bombed another large city, Halabja, about 30 miles east of Sulaimani. 32 people were killed and 40 injured, again most of them were women and children. The following are the names of children killed:-

Azi Ali Ismail  
 Aiar " "  
 Borhan " ", plus others

Three women killed: Hamida Mohamed, Kafia Haj Majid, Bahian Hassan Kadir

15/16 June, Iraqi Air Force shelled the village of Ishafta in the area of Akra, as a result two women, a child, and several old men killed, all defenceless civilians living in the village.

The above mentioned are but a few of those who have died in Iraqi Kurdistan during this bitter war. The inhuman military campaign of the Iraqi Ba'athists continues to destroy the urban and rural areas of Kurdistan, causing death and destruction, with the people fleeing to the mountains to avoid the bombing and invasion of the army. Another foul tactic practised by the Iraqi regime is to force many families of Kurds from various Iraqi cities, including Baghdad, onto army lorries where they are then transported to the war front.

For example:-

- \* On 14/6/74 about (28) families, comprising 92 people the majority of whom were women and children, were forced out of Mosul, and Dohok.
- \* 7/6/74 - 12 Kurdish families from the city of Khanakain were gathered together and forced to leave their homes and all their belongings.



- \* 20/6/74 (400) women and children from Mosul and Kohak, imprisoned in a school.
- \* A woman, Samera Muhmed was forced to leave her home in Kirkuk and was not permitted to take her baby of a few months old. She later made an appeal, through the Voice of Kurdistan, the Kurdish Radio, to her neighbours, pleading with them to save the child's life.

These are but a few examples, hundreds of families have fled to Iran, where they are now refugees, and others are now living without shelter, on very little food and without medicines etc.

Of the numerous inhumane methods of killing used against Kurdish children, one of the worst is the use of toy explosives, i.e. explosives embodied in various toys which are thrown at the children, causing death and severe injury.

The renewal of the war in Iraqi Kurdistan will once again bring about a generation of uneducated Kurdish children, together with other social diseases, and it is well worth mentioning that Iraqi jets have concentrated much of their bombing missions on schools in order, it would seem, to increase the illiteracy amongst Kurds.

Since last March, there has been a steady stream of students, and teachers leaving their cities, villages and towns in order to join the Kurdish Revolutionary Army (Pesh Merga) to defend the rights and freedom of their people. Although the Administration of the revolution has always emphasised the importance of continued schooling, these constant bombing raids have made this impossible, and the children have had to stop their studying. More than 4,000 students of the final year of Primary school could not attend the final examinations, and more than 2,500 students from secondary schools have been placed in the same position. The majority of them are now in refugee camps in Iran.

In the name of all those suffering mothers and children of Kurdistan, we call upon all peace-loving people to protest to their governments about these inhumanities being dealt to the Kurdish people. We also urge you to encourage the various humanitarian organisations in your countries to heed the call of the needy, by offering help in the way of clothing, medical care, food and other basic needs for those people now suffering in Kurdistan.



**For information on the Save the Children of Kurdistan Society please telephone day or night: 459 5139**

**or write to: Save the Children of Kurdistan Society,  
c/o The Centre,  
St. Martin-in-the-Fields,  
12 Adelaide Street,  
LONDON, WC2N 4HW**

**Contributions may also be sent to the above address.**

**Please send postal orders and cheques made payable to:**

**Save the Children of Kurdistan Society,  
National Westminster Bank Ltd., (U.K.),  
Account No. 39354180,  
Walham Green Branch,  
Fulham Broadway,  
LONDON, S.W. 6**

**WARM CLOTHING FOR CHILDREN URGENTLY**

**NEEDED FOR THIS COMING WINTER**

**PLEASE HELP US TO SAVE LIVES**

103



**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**  
London SW1A 2AL


Telephone 01- 930-8440 Ext 664

A B Hodgson Esq  
The British Red Cross Society  
9 Grosvenor Crescent  
London SW1

Your reference

Our reference

Date 15 November 1974



*Dear Mr. Hodgson,*

Thank you very much for your letter of  
14 November in which you told me about  
your conversations with Dr Henari and Mr Quatan.

*att'd.*

I am also grateful to you for sending me a  
copy of the minutes of the meeting on  
10 October.

*Yours sincerely,*

P R H Wright  
Middle East Department

# THE BRITISH RED CROSS SOCIETY

9 GROSVENOR CRESCENT  
LONDON, SW1X 7EJ

Telephone:  
01-235 5454

Telex:  
918657

A/B BRITREDCROS, LDN.



Overseas Cables:  
REDCROS, LONDON, S.W.1

Inland Telegrams:  
REDCROS, LONDON, TELEX

Patron and President: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Chairman of the Council:

Executive Committee:

Chairman: SIR EVELYN SHUCKBURGH, G.C.M.G., C.B.

Vice-Chairman: DAME ANNE BRYANS, D.S.E.

Director General: A. B. HODGSON, ESQ., C.M.G.

ABH/DJP/SW

P.R.H. Wright, Esq.,  
Middle East Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
King Charles Street,  
London, SW1A 2AH.

I have acted.

N. Kim / 15  
N. B. / 11

14th November, 1974.

Dear Mr Wright.

## The Kurdistan Red Crescent Society

I refer to our conversation of 8th November. The Kurdish representatives, Dr Henari and Mr Quatan, came to see me on Tuesday; Mr Piggott was also present.

We drew their attention to the restrictions imposed by Section 6 of the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 on the use of the Red Cross and other emblems and pointed out that the use of the title 'Kurdistan Red Crescent Society' and the accompanying emblem on the stationery used by the 'European Liaison Committee' in this country was illegal unless it had been authorised by the Defence Council.

We suggested to them that their use of the title and/or the emblem of the Red Crescent could thus well be counter-productive to their efforts to enlist sympathy and support for their cause and that, if this contravention of the Act came to the notice of the Defence Council, (as it would be likely to do if they continued with it), it could lead ultimately to a prosecution.

/over.....

Dr Henari expressed his appreciation to us for pointing out the legal position and undertook to discuss the matter with his colleagues. He made the point that the headquarters of the Kurdistan Red Crescent Society was in 'Kurdistan' and referred to a telegram dated 1st October from the Society, a copy of which is enclosed with this letter. He emphasised, however, that his organisation's only aim was to provide some practical relief for his countrymen, and had no political objectives. We, therefore, encouraged him to change the title of his Committee.

He also said that London was the only centre from which the European Liaison Committee operated.

The meeting was conducted in a very amicable spirit and we can only hope that the Kurdish representatives will see that it is in their interest to accept our advice and will act accordingly.

You may be interested to see a copy of the minutes of a meeting arranged by the Middle East Committee of the Standing Conference of British Organisations for Aid to Refugees to discuss the Kurdish problem. You will see that Dr Henari appears there as a representative of the Kurdistan Medical Association (although its address is the same as that of the European Liaison Committee of the Kurdistan Red Crescent Society).

There was also a meeting at Guys Hospital in August of the 'Kurdistan Medical Aids Committee' which then decided to rename itself the 'Kurdistan Humanitarian Aids Committee'.

We suggested to Dr Henari that the appeal effort could be conducted no less effectively under one of these names, without encountering the legal hazards which surround the use of the Red Crescent title and symbol.

I will keep you informed of any further developments.

*Yours sincerely*  
*A. B. Hodgson*  
A. B. Hodgson  
Director General.

0

ZCZC TIA054

OSLE CO IRTN 320

TEHRAN 320/ 1 1641

502

KURDISTAN RED CRESCENT SOCIETY -EUROPE

C/O J.ALI

4 CRANE COURT

FLEET ST

LONDON EC4

AS A TERRIBLE WAR CONTINUES TO RAGE THROUGHOUT IRAQI KURDISTAN  
WINTER APPROACHES WITH ITS SEVER COLD AND HEAVY SNOWS EXTENSIVE  
IRAQI AIR BOMBARDMENT AND GROUND MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST  
THE

PAGE/2

CIVILIAN POPULATION HAS ALREADY RESULTED IN HUNDREDS OF  
THOUSANDS OF HOMELESS PEOPLE ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND REFUGEES  
WOMEN CHILDREN AND OLD MEN HAVE ALREADY BEEN FORCED TO TAKE  
REFUGE IN IRAN THIS HAS ALREADY BECOME A HEAVY BURDEN ON THE  
REFUGE IN IRAN THIS HAS ALREADY BECOME A HEAVY BURDEN ON THE  
IRANIAN RED LION AND SUN NEEDLESS TO SAY THAT OUR OWN

PAGE/3

MEAGR

RESOURCES FALL FAR SHORT OF MEETING THE URGENT NEEDS  
OF THE DISPLACED CIVILIAN POPULATION THE COMING OF WINTER  
AND LACK OF SHELTER AND ADEQUATE NUTRITION WILL NO DOUBT  
CONTRIBUTE TO A FURTHER DETERIORATION OF AN ALREADY SUB-STANDARD  
HEALTH SITUATION TO ALLEVIATE THESE BASIC NEEDS WE URGENTLY  
REQUIRE MEDICAL



PAGE/4

SUPPLIES IN THE FORM OF ANTIBIOTICS DRUGS FOR  
RESPIRATORY DIGESTIVE AND HAEMOPOITIC SYSTEMS ANALGESICS AND  
SEDATIVES VITAMINS ANTIHISTAMINICS ANTIALLERGIES AND STEROIDS  
ENT PREPARATIONS AND SURGICAL INSTRUMENTS OTHER URGENT NEEDS  
INCLUDE DRIED MILK FOR INFANTS DRIED AND CANNED FOOD PROTEINS  
WHEAT FLOUR BLANKETS POTABLE BEDS HEAVY TENTS AND CLOTHING  
FOR CHILDREN

PAGE/5

A DETAILED LIST OF THE ABOVE NEEDS WILL IMMEDIATELY  
FOLLOW WE APPEAL TO YOU TO MAKE THESE URGENT NEEDS KNOWN TO  
THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY AND TO SEEK THEIR  
IMMEDIATE HELP IN THIS MATTER WE HAVE IN OUR HANDS CLOSE TO  
200 IRAQI PRISONERS OF WAR WHOSE SAFETY AND TREATMENT ACCORDING

PAGE/6

TO INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS IS A QUESTION OF PARAMOUNT  
CONCERN TO US HOWEVER IN THE MIDST OF A WAR WHERE  
THE OTHER SIDE SPARES NO SANCTUARY WE CANNOT FULLY SAFEGUARD THE  
SAFETY OF THE WAR PRISONERS WE APPEAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL  
RED CROSS AND OTHER CONCERNED ORGANISATIONS TO INTERVENT IN THIS

PAGE/7

MATTER

TO HELP US MEET THE NECESSARY SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR THEM

KURDISTAN RED CRESCENT SOCIETY

KURDISTAN - IRAQ

OCTOBER 1, 1974

COL 4 EC4 1, 1974

11 NOV 1974

KURDS GROUP

MINUTES of the meeting held on Thursday 10 October 1974 at 2.30 p.m. in Room 15, Friends House, Euston Road, London NW1.

PRESENT:

Mr. A.F.J. Reddaway (in the Chair)	Chairman, Middle East Committee of the Standing Conference. (19 Woodsyre, Sydenham Hill, London SE26.)
Miss V. Ferguson	Christian Aid, 2 Eaton Gate, London SW1
Dr. F. Hanari	Kurdistan Medical Association, PO Box 668, London SW5
Mr. Steve Jones	Anti-Slavery Society, 60 Weymouth Street, W1.
Mr. Howard Kafuni	10 Airlie Gardens, London WC 2AL
Miss M. Middleton (in place of Mrs. C. Lane)	Help the Aged, 8/10 Denman Street, W1A 2AP.
Mr. Andrew Murray	Attending in individual capacity, (2 Park Square News, London NW3.)
Mr. Warren Pinegar	UK Representative of the UNHCR, 14/15 Stratford Place, London W1.
Mrs. S. Watson	Save the Children Fund, Jebb House, 157 Clapham Road, London SW9.

1. Apologies for Absence were received from the following:-

Mr. J. Ali	213 Princes Gardens, London W3.
Miss E. Nares ) Mr. J. Piggott)	British Red Cross Society, 9 Grosvenor Crescent, London SW1 7EJ.
Miss B. Pratt	Oxfam, 274 Banbury Road, Oxford OX2 7DZ
Mr. I. MacDonald) Dr. J. Webb )	War on Want, 467 Caledonian Road, N7 9BE
Mr. Frank Field	UN Association, 93 Albert Embankment, SE1
Miss K. Brill	Friends Service Council, Friends House, Euston Road, London SW1
Miss W.I. Rouse	International Social Service, Cranmer House, 39 Brixton Road, London SW9 6DD
Lady Jane Willoughby	4 Wilton Row, London SW1.

2. Introduction

All attending were asked to introduce themselves and explain the connection of their organisation - or of themselves as individuals - in the situation of the Kurds.

The Chairman explained the interest of the Standing Conference, which aimed at bringing together the agencies for the exchange of information on refugee matters. It was limited to humanitarian aspects and was definitely non-political. The Conference was not an operational body - though it did occasionally take joint action - but it aimed to encourage action by its member organisations.

Usually the Standing Conference limited its interests to "refugees" under the UN definition but sometimes it extended its concern to cover "displaced persons." The Kurdish people under discussion were at first "displaced persons" but since the recent war those who fled across the border into Iran were now "refugees."

The meeting had been called to try and get a picture of the situation of the Kurds in both Iran and Iraq.

### 3. The General Situation

a) Mr. Andrew Murray, a free-lance journalist, had recently returned from the Iraqi/Iran borders. It had been difficult for him to get very accurate figures of the position but it did seem certain that some 72,000 to 80,000 had crossed as refugees into Iran and it was estimated that about 350,000 had left their homes and were congregated in camps in Iraq near the Iran border. These were people who had fled, mainly from four towns, because of bombing by the Iraqi forces, into infertile mountain regions.

Some 30,000 had crossed over into Turkey but the Turkish border was now closed. Those in the camps in that area were in serious need because of the price of food, and desolate conditions.

Mr. Murray circulated a report on his visit.

b) Dr. Hanari referred to a recent telegram from the Kurdistan Red Crescent Society giving new statistics.

Some 150,000 women, children, and old men, had now crossed to Iran. This was straining the resources of the Iranian Red Lion and Sun Society which was responsible for looking after them.

Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Red Crescent was not able to meet the needs of the displaced civilian population in Iraq especially with the onset of winter. An appeal was therefore made to the international community, particularly for the immediate supply of drugs, dried milk, protein foods, etc.

A copy of the telegram was circulated.

A detailed list of requirements would be circulated later.

Dr. Hanari said that unsuccessful approaches had been made to the Iraqi medical union by 65 Kurdish doctors.

c) Mr. Pinegar reported that the UNHCR had sent staff to study the situation in Iran, at the request of the Government and the Red Crescent. They had found that the Red Lion and Sun were caring well for the refugees. Certain recommendations had been made which were being followed up.

The High Commissioner had not been asked to intervene in Iraq where the grave situation was and it was difficult for him to act directly without invitation.

### 4. Action Taken so far by Organisations

a) Save the Children Fund - Mrs. Watson

The International Union of Child Welfare had recently sent an expert to Iraq. SCF was studying her report which had stressed the urgent need for clothing, tents, blankets, and medical supplies especially for children and old people. There was to be a meeting about this next week and it was expected that SCF would send aid.

A copy of the IUCW report was circulated.



b) Christian Aid - Miss V. Ferguson

The World Council of Churches was sending someone to Iraq and his report would be discussed at Christian Aid. It was expected that aid would be forthcoming.

c) Help the Aged - Miss Middleton

It had already been agreed to send supplies for old people but the ways of doing so were still under discussion.

Further needs were discussed and it was agreed to send information to:-

- i) World University Service - to see if they could help students. The University had been closed and also Kurdish students in the UK were in difficulties over scholarships, etc.
- ii) Wings of Friendship } - to encourage them to supply books, paper and other
- iii) Ockenden Venture } school equipment.

Professor K. Majid, a Kurdish Professor at Aston University, Birmingham, would be able to give further information about the educational position.

It was agreed to approach him.

5. Further Action

It was agreed that the Secretary in her forthcoming visit to Geneva should discuss with the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and should ask them to raise the problems of the Kurds at the next meeting of the Refugee Commission.

A list of organisations and addresses would be drawn up for ICVA.

6. Any Other Business

Film

It was announced that Mr. Chris Goddard, who had been invited to this meeting, had made a film called Peshmargo which would be shown on Tuesday 29 October at 10.30 p.m. on ITV.

7. Date of Next Meeting

To be left to the call of the Chairman and Secretary, after consultation with Dr. Hanari.

8 November 1974

Enter

EMBASSY OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ21, QUEEN'S GATE,  
LONDON SW7 5JG

104

No. 685

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq presents its compliments to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to advise that it has come to the knowledge of the Government of Iraq that a Committee has been set up recently in the United Kingdom under the name of "The Red Crescent of Kurdistan" whereupon the said committee engaged in misleading and suspect activities that are quite far from the truth, such as inviting British nationals to make contributions to it on the pretext that Kurdistan is in need of such assistance, denigrating the Iraqi Red Crescent Society and making false accusations against it. It is evident that 'Kurdistan' is a geographic term which denotes an area in the territories of a number of neighbouring countries that enjoy full sovereignty over all their regions, including the Kurdish areas. Hence it is not the right of a handful of unknown adventurers to speak for Kurdistan as a whole. Consequently, it is of the opinion of the Government of Iraq that such adventurers should not be allowed to engage in hostile activities and take upon themselves functions for which they are not legally qualified.

In view of the fact that the Autonomy law for Iraqi Kurdistan has been promulgated and is now in implementation with the full support of the Kurdish masses and the blessing of their various institutions, In view of the formation of the legislative and Executive assemblies which represent the Kurds of Iraq, speak for them and enjoy/

enjoy



**EMBASSY OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ****21, QUEEN'S GATE,  
LONDON SW7 5JG**

enjoy extensive constitutional powers relating to all the aspects of the Kurdish individual's everyday life, in addition to the rights the said individual enjoys and the duties incumbent upon him under the constitution of the Republic of Iraq,

Inasmuch as the use of the ' Red Crescent ' is restricted to independent Islamic states as a distinctive emblem the use of which is not permitted by the International Red Cross for other than independent states, and

In view of the fact that the Government of the Republic of Iraq intend to cement their relations with the Government of the United Kingdom on the basis of cooperation and good intentions, and wish to achieve the mutual benefit of both countries through the turning of a new leaf in thier relations,

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq wishes to bring this matter to the attention of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in the hope that the Government of the United Kingdom will see fit to put an end to the suspect activities engaged in against Iraq by elements which have no official status and which represent no one but themselves as they are not authorized to act by any recognized body.

As the continuation of such activities by the said elements will prove detrimental to the sound judgment of British citizens through the deliberate propagation of lies and the distortion of truth by such elements in a manner that is undoubtedly injurious to the reputation of Iraq and, in this way, artificially create an atmosphere that does not serve good relations between the two countries,

/The embassy

**EMBASSY OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ**  
21, QUEEN'S GATE,  
LONDON SW7 5JG

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq, in pursuance of the Government of Iraq's desire to promote and safeguard the said relations between the two countries requests that due attention be given to this matter by the Competent Authorities in the United Kingdom with view to the dissolution of the so-called ' Kurdistan Red Crescent Committee ' and the prevention of those responsible for it from propagating lies against Iraq.

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq, while looking forward to the results of urgent efforts of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in this respect, avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurances of its highest consideration.

London, November 13th 1974

Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
London.



Mr. Burton 1946 Memo  
Minute 7 at Folio 57  
CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.....

(105)

*Mr. Burton*  
*May 1 see full H's per*  
*AB 18/11*

Mr Burton (Middle East Department)

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FIELD NO 35  
18 NOV 1974  
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HMG'S PLEDGES TO THE KURDS, 1919-1932

1. I attach some notes on this, based on the Annual Colonial Reports for Iraq, files in the Public Records Office, Kurds Turks and Arabs by Edmonds, and the 1946 Research Memorandum which you have.
2. I think the essentials in refuting any idea that we owe the Kurds a debt are that
  - (a) It was Turkish opposition to the creation of a separate Kurdish State which made it impossible.
  - (b) HMG and the Iraq Government in their 1922 announcement recognised the right of the Iraqi Kurds to a measure of autonomy, but Kurdish disunity and lawlessness and Turkish intrigues eventually made incorporation in Iraq the only realistic policy. The majority of Kurdish opinion agreed to this policy by taking part in elections to the Iraq Constituent Assembly from 1923 onwards.
  - (c) Kurdish rights were, in theory at least, safeguarded by the terms of the League of Nations award in 1925 and by the Iraq Government's declaration at the time of independence in 1932.
3. One can nevertheless understand the Kurds believing that we owe them a moral debt in that our policies under the Mandate failed to create a lasting solution to their problems; but the same general charge could be made by the peoples of any territory which we used to administer.

*C J S Rundle*

C J S Rundle  
Research Department

15 November 1974

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PLEDGES TO THE KURDS, 1919-1932

1. An Anglo-French declaration of November 1918 defined the Eastern war aim of the British and French Governments as "the complete and final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations". Although neither the Kurds nor any other people was specifically mentioned, this declaration plainly covered the Kurds.
2. Under the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) Britain, France and Italy were to draft a scheme of local autonomy for "the predominantly Kurdish areas lying East of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia". Further, if demanded by a majority of the population within a year, an independent Kurdish State was to be created at the discretion of the League, and the Kurds of the Mosul vilayat were to be allowed to adhere to it. But because of Turkish opposition to its implementation the Treaty of Sèvres was stillborn and the possibility of creating an independent Kurdish State disappeared.
3. The status of the Kurdish areas in Iraq was undetermined during 1920-23 and there was widespread tribal unrest - much of it instigated by Turkey, who wished to regain the Mosul vilayat. In 1921 the Kurdish districts round Mosul and Arbil twice declared their intention of uniting with Iraq - once in June before the arrival of King Faisal and again in August when, with the exception of the Rawanduz qadha, they swore allegiance to him as King; at the same time they asked for a measure of decentralisation. (The majority of the inhabitants of the Kirkuk district asked that their decision on union with Iraq be postponed, while the Sulaimaniya district rejected the idea altogether.)
4. In November 1922 the High Commissioner for Iraq telegraphed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies as follows:

"You are aware of wave of Kurdish national feeling which has arisen and of the impetus which it has received owing to the successful termination of negotiations with Feisal and the publication of the Treaty. Owing to their uncertainty as to our intentions towards them the more enlightened Kurds are reluctant to produce a definite programme while more ignorant and fanatical elements as typified by Sheikh Mahmud and his party are indulging in more or less fantastic demands which according to them represent wishes of all true Kurds. It would greatly assist to stabilize situation and encourage more moderate to come forward with reasonable proposals if I could announce that both His Majesty's Government and the Government of Iraq recognise right of Kurds within the frontiers of Iraq to set up for themselves a national Government within their frontiers. Such an announcement would have effect of consolidating Kurds and rallying them to us and would thus provide us with a most valuable weapon for countering Turkish activities from which we are now suffering and for resisting any serious attack which might be made."

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5. The following announcement was accordingly made in December 1922:

"His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of Iraq recognize the right of the Kurds living within the boundaries of Iraq to set up a Kurdish Government within those boundaries and hope that the different Kurdish elements will, as soon as possible, arrive at an agreement between themselves as to the form which they wish that the Government should take and the boundaries within which they wish it to extend and will send responsible delegates to Baghdad to discuss their economic and political relations with His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of Iraq."

6. It is clear from the records that the Iraq Government did not mean this to imply political or economic separation for the Kurds, but a full measure of autonomy.

7. By the Treaty of Lausanne (July 1923) it was agreed that the frontier between Iraq and Turkey should be laid down by friendly arrangement between Turkey and Britain, failing which the dispute should be referred to the League of Nations. Because of the Turkish attitude, no reference was made to the Kurds. The theoretical obligation on HMG to keep open for the Kurds of Mosul the possibility of adhering to a Kurdish State was thus ended. Because of this, together with Kurdish disunity and lawlessness and Turkish intrigues, it was by now clear to British officials that incorporation in Iraq offered only viable future for the Kurds.

8. In 1923-24 all the Kurdish districts with the exception of the area round Sulaimaniya took part in the elections to the Iraq Constituent Assembly. Prior to the elections the Government made the following announcement:

"The Iraq Government does not intend to appoint any Arab officials in the Kurdish districts except technical officials, nor do they intend to force the inhabitants of the Kurdish districts to use the Arabic language in their official correspondence. The rights of the inhabitants and the religious and civil communities in the said districts will be properly safeguarded."

9. Because Britain and Turkey were unable to reach agreement over the Iraq-Turkey frontier as envisaged in the Treaty of Lausanne, the League of Nations appointed a Commission (known as the Mosul Commission) to determine where the frontier should lie. As a result of the Commission's recommendations, in 1925 the League awarded the Mosul vilayat to Iraq on the condition that "regard should be had to the desire expressed by the Kurds that officials of Kurdish race should be appointed for the administration of their country, the dispensation of justice, and teaching in the schools, and that Kurdish should be the official language of all these services".

10. In 1932, when Iraq became independent and was admitted to the League of Nations, a fresh statement of undertakings concerning the rights of the Kurds and other minorities in Iraq was given by the Iraq Government (Appendix A of the 1946 Research Department memorandum on The Kurdish Problem).



ALBORN

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~~LLC NR 465/18~~

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~~RR MODUK~~

~~CRC 60~~

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Mr. Byrd 18/11

CYPHER CAT A  
FM TEHRAN 180515Z  
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TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TELNO FOH 1374 OF 180515Z NOV.  
INFO MODUK.

FOR DA.

MODUK FOR DIA, FROM AMA.

COLVIN (D TELEGRAPH) CALLED. HE LEFT IRAQI KURDISTAN  
NIGHT 15 NOV. SAID YOU WOULD BE INTERESTED IN WEATHER  
WHICH HAD NOT BROKEN: ONLY LIGHT COVER OF SNOW ABOVE  
ABOUT 8000 FT. REST OF HIS NEWS NOT STARTLING AND  
WILL FOLLOW BY BAG.

PARNIS

~~BT~~

Sent See

~~NAHIN~~

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TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 298 OF 18 NOVEMBER AND TO TEHRAN.

BURTON'S LETTER TO GIDDENS AND WILLIAMS' LETTER TO BROWNE BOTH OF 18 OCTOBER; KURDISTAN.

ASSESSMENT WILL NOW BE PRODUCED NEXT WEEK. GRATEFUL ANY COMMENTS BY 22 NOVEMBER.

CALLAGHAN

FILES

MED

MR. CAMPBELL

MR. WEIR

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1974  
TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TELNO 190710Z NOV/INFO PRIORITY JISNE SAVING  
KUWAIT DAMASCUS BEIRUT ANKARA AND TEHRAN.

DIG FOH

WEEKLY REPORT

1. KURDISTAN

ALPHA. FIGHTING HAS CONTINUED IN RAWANDUZ, RANIA AND QALAT  
DIZAH AREAS WITH UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF AN IRAQI ATTEMPT TO  
OPEN ROAD FROM DOHUK TO AMADIA.

BRAVO. UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC FROM  
TURKISH BORDER ZAKHO TO MOSUL HAS BEEN STOPPED AND FIRED UPON  
BY KURDS.

CHARLIE. WEATHER HAS PROBABLY BROKEN. HEAVY RAIN OVERNIGHT IN  
BAGHDAD AND OVER NORTHERN IRAQ. TEMPERATURES BAGHDAD M MAX 14  
MIN 28 KIRKUK MAX 26 MIN 15 MOSUL MAX 19 MIN 14 YESTERDAY.

DELTA. PLANNED VISIT TO NORTH DELAYED FOR OFFICIAL ATTACHES  
VISIT ARRANGED FOR 23 - 25 NOVEMBER TO INCLUDE VISITS TO  
MOSUL, ERBIL, SALAHUDIN, KIRKUK. ALTHOUGH NO DOUBT WE WILL BE  
SUBJECT TO USUAL PROPAGANDA.

SECRET

/ 2. PRESIDENT

**S E C R E T**

2. PRESIDENT BAKR'S WIFE DIED OF CANCER 17 NOVEMBER. PRESIDENT ABSENT FROM FUNERAL AND SUBSEQUENT FATEHA. THIS SURPRISES US AND LOCALS WHO PUT IT DOWN TO EITHER BAKR'S POOR HEALTH OR DEEP DEPRESSION.

3. IRAQI NAVY VISIT TO GULF CONTINUES WITH LATEST REPORTED CALL AT DAMMAM (SAUDI ARABIA).

4. MINISTERIAL CHANGES. PLEASE SEE OUR TELS 418 AND 419 OF 12 NOV TO FCO.

PLEASE PASS SAVING KUWAIT, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, ANKARA AND TEHERAN.

GRAHAM

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

**F I L E S**

**MED**

**DEFENCE D**

**PUSD**

**MR CAMPBELL**

**MR WEIR**

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 429 OF 19 NOVEMBER/AND TO IMMEDIATE  
TEHRAN.

107  
YOUR TELNO 298 : KURDISTAN

1. DEFENCE ATTACHE AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAVE BEEN INVITED TO  
TOUR NORTHERN AREAS FROM 23-26 NOVEMBER. THIS WILL BE THE  
FIRST OPPORTUNITY WE HAVE HAD FOR FIRST HAND OBSERVATIONS IN  
THE AREA, AND MUCH OF HIS REPORT WILL CLEARLY BE RELEVANT  
TO THE ASSESSMENT. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND POSTPONEMENT OF  
THE PAPER FOR A FURTHER 10 DAYS.

GRAHAM

BT

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DEFENCE D  
MR CAMPBELL  
MR WEIR

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TO ROUTINE BAGHDAD TELNO 300 OF 19 NOVEMBER/AND TO ROUTINE TEHRAN  
BAGHDAD TELNO 429: KURDISTAN

1. AGREED. ASSESSMENT HAS BEEN POSTPONED FOR ONE WEEK. GRATEFUL  
FOR TELEGRAPHIC SUMMARY OF DDA'S REPORT AND OTHER COMMENTS BY  
28 NOVEMBER.

CALLAGHAN

FILES

MED

MR WEIR

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY  
CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 201415Z NOV.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 433 OF 20 NOVEMBER 1974.  
INFO ROUTINE TEHRAN AND KUWAIT.

**KURDISTAN.**

1. THOUGH I DID NOT HEAR IT MYSELF, IT HAS BEEN REPORTED TO ME THAT THE BBC'S WORLD SERVICE PROGRAMME 24 HOURS LAST NIGHT CARRIED A REPORT THAT THE FIGHTING IN KURDISTAN WAS GOING VERY BADLY FOR THE IRAQI ARMY WHICH WAS ON THE BRINK OF REVOLT. I HAVE NOT BEEN ASKED BY THE IRAQIS ABOUT THIS, BUT SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR A SUMMARY BY TELEGRAM WITH ANY COMMENTS.
2. THIS REPORT BEARS LITTLE RELATION TO THE FEEL OF THINGS HERE AND IS NOT BORNE OUT BY THE REPORTS REACHING US, SUCH AS THEY ARE.

2. THIS REPORT BEARS LITTLE RELATION TO THE FEEL OF THINGS HERE AND IS NOT BORNE OUT BY THE REPORTS REACHING US, SUCH AS THEY ARE.

**GRAHAM**

FILES  
MED.  
GIPD.  
NEWS D.  
MR CAMPBELL  
MR WEIR.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

112

REC'D IN
REC'D IN 35
21 NOV 1974

R G Giddens Esq  
BAGHDAD

Your reference

Our reference

NBR 1/2

Date 21 November 1974

Dear Dick,

45622/1  
ja

KURDISTAN RED CRESCENT SOCIETY

(101)

1. In paragraph 6 of Patrick Wright's letter of 12 November to the Ambassador he reported that Mr Hodgson of the Red Cross Society had ~~thought~~ to take up the question of the nomenclature of the Red Crescent Society in London with its representative Dr Hanari. We have now received a letter from Mr Hodgson, a copy of which is enclosed, reporting on his conversation with Dr Hanari. I hope we will soon hear that the term Red Crescent Society has been dropped.

1/afford

w/103

2. You may like to know that we have received a note from the Iraqi Embassy here along the same lines as the note you received in Baghdad. We have merely acknowledged it.

Yours ever  
Graham

G S Burton  
Middle East Department

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(113)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

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Your reference
Our reference NBR 1/2
Date 21 November 1974

R G Giddens Esq  
BAGHDAD

Your reference  
Our reference  
Date 21 November 1974

Dear Dick

21/11  
19

PLEDGES TO THE KURDS

1. In paragraph 1 of FCO tel no 399 to Tehran, a copy of which was enclosed with my letter to you of 7 November, we made a brief reference to Mr Richard Hauser's involvement with the Kurdish problem. At the time we heard that during talks between Hauser and Sir Arthur Drew with senior Kurds in London the latter had stated, in the context of requesting permission for help in the education of Kurdish students in London, that there was particular responsibility on HMG in view of an alleged pledge to the Kurds at the time of the British Mandate in Iraq.

2. We asked Christopher Rundle in Research Department to look up past papers in an effort to discover if any pledges had in fact been given to the Kurds at that time. He has now produced some interesting notes - copy enclosed - based on the Annual Colonial Reports for Iraq, files in the Public Records Office, Kurds, Turks and Arabs by Edmonds, and the 1946 Research Department memorandum a copy of which I enclose. I think you will agree that this has been a very useful and interesting piece of research. From it we conclude that the essentials in refuting any idea that we owe the Kurds a debt are:

- a. that it was Turkish opposition to the creation of a separate Kurdish states, *which made it impossible*
- b. that ~~the~~ HMG and the Iraqi Government in their 1922 announcement recognised the right of the Iraqi Kurds to a measure of autonomy ~~and~~ Kurdish disunity and lawlessness and Turkish intrigues ~~have~~ made incorporation in Iraq the only realistic policy. The majority of ~~Kurds~~ agreed to this policy by taking part in elections to the Iraqi Constituent Assembly from 1923 onwards,
- c. that Kurdish rights were, in theory at least, safeguarded by the terms of the League of Nations award of 1925 and by the Iraqi Government's declaration

/Kurdish opinion

CONFIDENTIAL

/at



at the time of independence in 1932.

3. It is not difficult however to understand why the Kurds should believe that we owe them a moral debt in that our policies under the Mandate failed to create a lasting solution to their problem

yours  
for Peter Williams,  
G S Burton  
Middle East Department

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

114



BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

18 November 1974

G S Burton Esq  
Middle East Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
LONDON



4824/4  
185 17

*See Graham.*

KURDISTAN

1. Would you please refer to our tel No. 389 of 28 October<sup>78</sup> about the assessment of the situation in the North.
2. The weather continues fine and fighting is still going on. The Defence Attache has been invited to visit areas in the North with his colleagues from 22 to 24 November, and since much of his report will be relevant to the comments you require, we propose to delay again the submission of our views until after his return.

*Just as*

*but*

R G Giddens

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference

115

Mr Burton

cc Mr Eaton Legal Adviser  
25/11

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY N: 35 25 NOV 1974 NBR 1/2
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MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR KHRDS

1. As I told you, Mr Piggott of the British Red Cross telephoned me this morning to say that they have received a telex from the Iran Red Lion and Sun to say that one of the Iraqi Kurdish refugees for which the Red Lion and Sun are responsible is suffering from severe phosphorous burns and they would therefore like to send him, at their expense, to the UK for medical treatment. The Kurd concerned is called Zaher Said.
2. Mr Piggott said that he had referred this enquiry to the Red Cross Medical Adviser, Mr John Gray, who thought that he might be able to obtain admittance for this casualty to a British service hospital. In view of our earlier discussion however Mr Piggott wished to check whether we saw any political problems about this.
3. I told Mr Piggott that I saw no over-riding problems but thought that he should know that we had received, earlier this year, a request from the Iraqi Government for assistance in admitting their own casualties into British service hospitals. Although we had offered all possible assistance by way of facilitating medical treatment, we had not been able to make any special arrangements for British service facilities to be made available to them and there might be therefore a slight problem for us if the British service authorities were seen to be giving better treatment to Kurdish refugees than to Iraqi servicemen. I said that I did not wish to make too much of this point but hoped that he would agree to mention it to their Medical Adviser. If Mr Gray wished to contact us direct we would of course be happy to talk to him. Mr Piggott accepted this explanation sympathetically, and said that he would pass on my remarks to Mr Gray.
4. I think that there is in fact a good chance that any medical treatment accorded to a Kurdish refugee in response to an Iranian request would pass unnoticed, and do not think that we should go out of our way to frustrate the Red Cross in obtaining the necessary facilities for him. It would, however, clearly be preferable if any treatment could be arranged privately.



P R H Wright  
Middle East Department

25 November 1974

CONFIDENTIAL

Note for the file

## THE KURDS AND MR HAUSER

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 33

25 NOV 1974

NBR 1/2

1. Mr Kenneth Leigh, until recently the Secretary of the International Committee of the Society of Friends (Quakers) called on me on 21 November. He is the second person, General Sir Alexander Drummond being the first, who has broached the subject of the Kurds with us on behalf of Mr Richard Hauser, philanthropist and brother-in-law of Yehudi Menuhin.

2. Mr Leigh stressed that his and Mr Hauser's interest in the Kurds was purely humanitarian and that there was no question of their wanting to become involved in the political issues. I gave Mr Leigh a background draft on the dispute between the Kurds and the central Government and outlined HMG'S position on the lines of the explanation given in the Minister of State's letter to Russell Johnston MP of 20 September. I explained what the Iranian Red Lion and Sun Society were doing on behalf of the 100,000 or so refugees that had crossed into Iran and referred him to General Drummond's report which he had already seen. I added that I had been struck by the comparative ~~lack of~~ <sup>lack of</sup> ~~interest~~ <sup>interest</sup>, both in the ITV documentary film and in the numerous press reports from correspondents who had been allowed into Kurdistan, of any real indication of extreme suffering among the Kurdish people.



3. Mr Leigh said that as a result of General Drummond's report he and Mr Hauser had a good understanding of the situation on the Iranian side of the border and were impressed by what the Red Lion and Sun Society had been able to achieve. What they now had to find out was the real position in Iranian Kurdistan including the north-west where they understood there to be some 50,000 Kurdish refugees on the Turkish border; he was afraid that these latter people would be cut off by both the winter and the hostilities ~~from~~ <sup>from</sup> through crossing to the Iranian border and to the refugee camps. He was ~~pressing~~ <sup>pressing</sup> therefore to recommending that Mr Hauser send someone else via Iran to Iraq Kurdistan and on the basis of the report received (assuming that a case for the intervention of the international humanitarian societies was established) to lobby the International Red Cross, the UN HCR and possibly UNICEF in an attempt to achieve some concerted international action.

informed

4. He promised to keep me/ on whatever was decided; ~~and~~ in parting I repeated to him my earlier warning that he and Mr Hauser would be well advised to keep the Iranian Embassy here in the picture about any plans for sending a representative to Kurdistan.

25 November 1974

cc: Chancery Baghdad

  
G S Burton  
Middle East Department  


GRS 800

SECRET

117

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 260745Z

SECRET

DESKBY 261200Z



TOP COPY

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TEL OF 26 NOVEMBER 1974, INFO  
PRIORITY JISNE, SAVING KUWAIT, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, ANKARA  
AND TEHRAN.

26/4  
450  
12

DIG FOH.

WEEKLY SUMMARY. REF TO TOURIST AND 1:250000 MAPS.

ONE. KURDISTAN. VISIT TO NORTH 23-25 NOV. VISITED  
MOSUL, ARBIL, SALAHUDIN, KIRKUK AND KOISENJAQ. FLEW BY  
M18 TO 102 BDE POSNS AT KOISENJAQ. VISIT BY HELI TO  
38 BDE POSNS NORTH OF AQRA CANCELLED DUE TO WEATHER.  
TRAVEL BY COACH FROM MOSUL TO KIRKUK WITH NEVER LESS  
THAN PL. ESCORT INCLUDING APC FRONT AND REAR. LAVISH  
HOSPITALITY BUT TWICE DAILY PARTIES HAD HEAVY BAATH  
SECURITY PRESENCE. LARGE PROPORTION OF SENIOR OFFICERS  
BRITISH TRAINED. ONE OR TWO FORTHCOMING AFTER ADEQUATE AMOUNTS  
OF WHISKY AND OUT OF SECURITY EARSHOT. PHOTOGRAPHY  
DIFFICULT AND CAMERAS REMOVED FROM US AT KOISENTAQ.  
IRANIAN MA AND AMA WITH US THROUGHOUT. MET COMDS AND STAFF  
4 (BRIG TAHA SEKERJI VERY FORTHCOMING) AND 2 DIV STAFF 8  
WHO TOGETHER WITH PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS ARE SOURCES OF INFO  
AS FOLLOWS :

ALPHA. GOVT NOW HOLDING LINE WEST OF FROM INCLUSIVE ZAKHO  
AND SURROUNDING HILLS, ROAD AND HEIGHTS TO ALLUKA AND DOHUK  
BUT EXCLUSIVE ZAWITA. INCLUSIVE ATRUSH AND HIGH GROUND EAST  
(CHIYAKIRA AND AQRAH DAGHS) TO BUJIL EAST OF AQRA. INCLUSIVE  
ROAD AQRA TO AMDANIYA TO ABRIL. ROAD ARBIL TO APPROX AREA  
BARSARIN EAST OF RAWANDUZ INCLUDING DIYANA ZUZAK BUT ONLY  
PART OF HANDRAN. INCLUSIVE ROAD ARBIL KOISENJAQ TO RANIYA  
AND QALA DIZAH AND INCLUSIVE ROAD MIRGA TO SULAIMANIYA.  
INCLUSIVE ROAD SULAIMANIYA TO KHANAQIN TO IRANIAN BORDER.

BRAVO. GOVT INTENDS TO REMAIN IN THESE POSNS THROUGHOUT  
WINTER AND TO RENEW OFFENSIVE IN SPRING. NO FURTHER  
OFFENSIVES PLANNED NOW EXCEPT POSSIBLY TO ATTEMPT TO

SECRET

/PUSH

**SECRET**

PUSH BDE NORTH THROUGH AQRA TO BARZAN (WHICH IS NOW WITHIN RANGE OF GOVT ARTY) AND TAKE HANDRAN. GOVT POSNS WELL DUG IN WITH GOOD OVERHEAD COVER. THREE MONTH STOCKPILES OF FOOD, AMMO, POL, WOOD NOW ESTABLISHED IN ALL FWD POSNS.

CHARLIE. GOOD ALL WEATHER PAVED ROADS BUILT TO AIN SIFNI, AQRA, RAWANDUZ, KOISENJAR, RANIYA AND QALA DIZA.

DELTA. ALTHOUGH WEATHER HAS BROKEN AND THERE HAS BEEN HEAVY RAIN, SNOW ONLY IN EVIDENCE ABOVE 6000FT. GOING OFF ROAD VERY STICKY AND MUDDY. HEAVY SNOW NOT EXPECTED FOR ANOTHER THREE OR FOUR WEEKS. TEMPERATURES YESTERDAY KIRKUK MAX 15 MIN 8. ONLY AVAILABLE.

ECHO. COMDS AND TPS MORALE APPEARS HIGH. REGULAR TPS ON GROUND WELL EQUIPPED AND CLOTHED. FWD POSNS WELL SIGHTED IN DEPTH WITH GOOD ALL ROUND DEFENCE AND EXTENSIVE USE OF WIRE AND MINES. TPS HAVE PERSONAL ISSUE OF RADIOS AND TVS AND WEEK'S LEAVE EVERY 45 DAYS.

FOXTROT. POLICE AND RESERVE BDES USED EXTENSIVELY TO GUARD TOWNS AND L OF C, AND SURRENDERED AND LOYAL KURDS USED IN OPERATIONS. TOTAL OF ALL TYPES, REGULAR, RESERVE, AND IRREGULAR ESTIMATED AT WELL IN EXCESS OF 200,000 PERSONNEL.

GOLF. MAIN KURDISH SUPPLY ROUTE TO BARZAN AREA NOW CUT AND GOVT HOPES TO STARVE OUT OCCUPANTS. OFFICERS ADMIT KURDISH INFILTRATION FROM AMADIYA AREA AND BETWEEN AQRA AND BAKMA AND BETWEEN RAWANDUZ AND RANIYA PRESENTS THREAT IN WINTER MONTHS.

HOTEL. IRANIAN 175 MM, 155 MM AND 130 MM SHELLING OF RAWANDUZ, RANIYA AND QALAT DIZAH AREAS STILL GOING ON AND SPOKEN ABOUT BITTERLY AND OPENLY. OFFICERS WANT TO RETALIATE WITH AIR AND ARTY THEY WERE WELL AWARE OF DANGERS OF WIDENING THE CONFLICT.

INDIA. SENIOR OFFICERS ADMIT ONLY SOLUTION IS POLITICAL. TO FURTHER POLITICAL SOLUTION SURRENDERED KURDS ARE GIVEN IRAQI DINARS 100 FOR THEIR WEAPONS AND IRAQI DINARS 100 TO BUILD HOUSE. CLEAR EVIDENCE OF EXTENSIVE NEW KURDISH HOUSING BUILT BY GOVT AND BY KURDS IN ERBIL AND LESS IN QARAQOSH, MOSUL AND KIRKUK AREAS. LARGE SUMS OF MONEY NOW BEING SPENT ON OPENING UP NORTH AND ON INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS. TO WEST



**SECRET**

OF GOVT HELD LINES IN PARA ONE ALPHA ROADS OPEN BY DAY ECONOMIC  
BLOCKADE LIFTED, VILLAGES OCCUPIED AND FARMING IN FULL OPERATION.  
NO EVIDENCE OF ANY DESTRUCTION OF KURDISH VILLAGES OR OF  
CROPS IN GOVT HELD AREAS.

JULIET. KIRKUK, 1023 (NDB K1) NW AIRFIELD NOW HELICOPTER  
BASE. TEMPORARY LIGHTING, RUNWAYS NOT MAINTAINED. COUNTED  
12 X M18, 4 X M16 AND 4 X M14. ALOUETTES NOT SEEN BUT USED  
BY COMDS.

KILO. OIL COMPANY EXECUTIVE QUESTIONED ON VISIT TO  
KIRKUK OILFIELDS ADMITTED DAMAGE EARLIER IN YEAR BY KURDS TO  
ONE UNUSED PIPELINE, ONE GAS PIPE AND ONE OIL LINE JUNCTION  
BUT SINCE AUGUST NO SABOTAGE. SECURITY PRECAUTIONS ROUND  
OIL COMPLEXES WERE EXTENSIVE.

TWO. REPORT INCLUDING RECORDS OF CONVERSATIONS, PROGRAMME,  
PERSONALITIES, FULL ORBAT, ROAD AND EQUIPMENT REPORTS FOLLOWS  
HOPEFULLY IN NEXT BAG.

THREE. GENERAL COMMENTS ON JIC (A) 74 (NOV) 48 OF 5 SEPT  
REQUESTED IN YOUR DI4/IQ 703/4 OF 10 OCT CAN FOLLOW EITHER  
BY TEL OR BAG. PLEASE ADVISE AND ALSO SEE OUR TEL NO 446  
OF 26NOV TO FCO.


FOUR. PLEASE PASS SAVING KUWAIT, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT,  
ANKARA AND TEHRAN.

GRAHAM

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

FILES

MED  
DEFENCE DEPT  
PUSD  
MR CAMPBELL  
MR WEIR



Reference .....

18

Mr Williams  
Mr Burton

26/11

para 5 pnc.

Dry tel attached  
26/11  
pa


## SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND AND THE KURDS

1. Dr Noel Moynihan, the Chairman of the Overseas Relief Committee of Save the Children Fund telephoned me this morning to say that SCF were concerned at suggestions in the press that British relief organisations were not paying sufficient attention to the situation in Kurdistan and the letter which he and Lord Gore-Booth had written to "The Times" on 16 November had been designed to correct that impression so far as the SCF were concerned.
2. Dr Moynihan (who told me that he had already been in touch with General Sir Alexander Drummond) proposes to fly to Tehran on 2 December in order to discuss the situation with the Iranians. He said that he knew Mr Parsons well and had already written to him to let him know of his visit and that he would also be in touch with Lord Oxmantown who, I understand, is a member of the United Nations set-up in Tehran. Dr Moynihan asked whether I had any particular advice or points to make.
3. I said that there were two considerations of which I thought he should be aware. The first was that the Iran Red Lion and Sun Society regarded themselves as responsible for the Kurdish refugee camps in Iran and there was a risk that any offers of assistance might, unless very tactfully handled, be interpreted as implied criticism of the Iranian ability to cope. The second point was that it was important, in terms of our political relations with Iraq, that British relief organisations should not operate on Iraqi territory without the consent of the Iraq Government in Baghdad.
4. Dr Moynihan said that he fully took both points. In reply to my question, he said that it would be helpful if we could let Mr Parsons know about his arrival in Tehran, in spite of the letter which he has himself sent. I undertook to do this but warned him that the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster would be in Iran on 2 December and that Mr Parsons was therefore likely to be heavily preoccupied at that time.
5. Would you please draft a short telegram.

P R H Wright  
Middle East Department

26 November 1974

(119)



MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT

THE KURDISH SITUATION

I attach a copy of a letter which the Minister of State has received from Mr Lee of the Centre for Human Rights and Responsibilities. You will see that he wishes to "talk over the Kurdish situation".

2. The Minister of State would be grateful if the Department could explain that he (Mr Ennals) has a very busy programme at the moment and that officials would be glad to see him instead.

A. J. Coles.

A J COLES

25 November 1974

I spoke to Mr Lee today and passed on the explanation as requested by Mr Coles. He explained that the letter had been sent in error - he had already seen me on the 20<sup>th</sup>. I took the opportunity to emphasise the need for him (and me) to dissociate any visit to Iraqi Kurdistan from HMG. I have informed Mr Baxter in the private office.

26/11  
pa

## CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

---

Telephone No. 01 834 6326  
or 01 834 2457 (after office hours)

Registered Office:  
Nansen House  
64 Millbank  
London SW1

David Ennals : FAO  
Rt.Hon. David Ennals,  
Secretary of State,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
Whitehall, London SW1.

19th November 1974

Dear David Ennals,

For some years I have acted as consultant to Richard Hauser's Centre for Group Studies and have recently cooperated with him in a new venture - the Centre for Human Rights and Responsibilities. I retired recently as General Secretary of Friends Peace Committee, but my association with the Centre, (and with the British Council for Aid to Refugees, of which I am Vice Chairman) will keep me in touch, and in town for a couple of days a week.

I recently became aware of the difficult situation arising in Iraq and the fears of the Kurds that their relations with the Iraqi government were strained to breaking point.

Whatever the political rights and wrongs of the situation, fighting has now broken out as you know, and a difficult refugee relief problem has arisen. Iran has taken some 100,000 refugees, but 50,000, mainly women and children, are stranded high in the mountains, with severe winter coming on, in the North East bordering on Turkey. Turkey does not offer asylum and has closed the border. Technically, while they remain in Iraq, their status is that of displaced persons, but clearly the Iraq government cannot and would not help them. Some relief has been obtained here from Oxfam and Save the Children Fund.

Probably the most helpful action that could be taken would be to persuade the Turks to accept them as refugees. The second would be for the U.N. High Commissioner to adopt them as a special case as has been done before. In both cases decisions by governments are required. It would probably be more important that a number of governments should agree and persuade others in a position to act to do so. Here the influence of the U.K. Government might be very helpful - always stressing the humanitarian aspects.


It seems to me that minority problems are likely to be a continuing cause of strife and violence in the future, and I am sure this is an area where new guide lines of policy need to be worked out internationally. An overall look might take some of the sting out of particular situations, and again, the U.K. Government could help to encourage in other Governments a sophisticated and humane approach to the avoidance of such problems, and to their treatment when they do arise. It could also support the study in the U.N. of techniques and practices suitable to these special and difficult problems.

/over

Page Two

I should be very glad sometime to talk over the Kurdish situation if you could fit a half hour in your programme - or indeed, the whole subject over a lunch sometime. I should be happy to 'phone your secretary to arrange a convenient date if you can fit me in.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Kenneth A. Lee', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Kenneth A. Lee  
Director



Enty  
20/11  
NBR  
pa

REBELLION AND SELF RULE IN IRAQI KURDISTAN

RECEIVED  
REGISTER N  
27 NOV 1974  
NBR 1/2

A Report of the Fact Finding Committee  
Prepared by Charlotte Dennett and Dr. George Hajjar

736-6712  
may → 9.  
Aug 1.

Submitted to the Lebanese Section of the Women's International League  
For Peace and Freedom  
July, 1974

## **Contents**

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### **I Introduction**

### **II Rebellion and its Proponents**

### **III Self Rule and its Executors**

A. Barzani : First enemy of democracy.

B. Barzani : Guilty of bad faith

C. Barzani : international connections

D. Barzani and the DPK

### **IV Impressions and Reflections**

## INTRODUCTION

Last month a Kurdish woman living in Iraq wrote to the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (Lebanese section) and pleaded with the Chairman to send a delegation to Iraq in order to investigate the Kurdish problem. The woman expressed dismay over the Western media's heavily biased reporting in favor of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the so-called "Leader of the Kurdish nationalist forces" who for several months has been engaging his Pesh Merga Forces against the Iraqi army. She suggested that if a WILPF delegation visited Iraq and interviewed Kurds at random, it would learn that the majority of kurds living in Iraq are opposed to Mullah Mustafa and support the Government's Kurdish autonomy program.

Consequently, a fact-finding committee was formed on behalf of the WILPF (Lebanon) to investigate the Kurdish question in Iraq. The members of the committee were Charlotte Dennett, an American freelance journalist; Dr. George Hajjar, a Canadian professor of political theory; and a member of the WILPF (Lebanon) who is a professor at the Arab University, Beirut.

The committee visited Iraq between June 28th and July 3rd, 1974. and interviewed prominent Kurdish personalities and private citizens including 1) Obeidallah Barzani, son of Mullah Mustafa and Minister of State 2) Hashem Akrawi, member of the Politburo of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK) and Minister of Municipalities 3) Abdul Sattar Tahir Sheriff, Secretary General of the Revolutionary Kurdish Party and Minister of Public Works and Housing 4) Aziz Akrawi, member of the Politburo of the DPK and Minister of State 5) Sheikh Othman Ahmed Barzani, a spiritual leader of the Barzani tribe and nephew of Mullah Mustafa who rejoined the national government on June 4, 1974.

The committee was accompanied by Karsten Prager, Middle East Bureau Chief of Time Magazine and Eddie Adams, Pulitzer prize photographer of Time, on a two day visit to the governorates of Kirkuk and Suleimaniya. The group interviewed 1) Governor Khalid Abdul Hamid Tabra of Kirkuk- the only Arab interviewed during the committee's stay in Iraq 2) Subgovernor Burhan Shwani of Chamchamal - a former Pesh Merga commander 3) Governor Babakeral Pishdari of Suleimaniya and

4) many private citizens,

The group travelled throughout on its own, unimpeded and in civilian cars but on the way to Mt. Azmar from Suleimaniya it was accompanied by Governor Pishdari and his military escort. On the summit of Mt. Azmar, which is 7 kilometers from the Iranian border, the group talked to a number of soldiers, both Arab and Kurdish, to the regimental commander and a number of officers. The group was able to photograph the Iranian border and a sample of soldiers - not the armed forces and their equipment.

## Rebellion and its Proponents

The fact finding committee did not make a thorough investigation of the international press coverage of the Kurdish problem; however, it used a sample based on articles of three journalists as a means of obtaining information from those responsible. The sample consisted of David Hirst of the Guardian, Joseph Fitchett of the Observer and Georgie Geyer of the Chicago Daily News. The committee concentrated on questions raised by Mr. Hirst's articles (Guardian, May 6, 7, 9, 1974) which were based on interviews he obtained from Mullah Mustafa by way of Iran. Because Hirst's articles were provocative and tendentious, they were used as challenges to the ministers without identifying the source, with a view to unsettling the ministers and producing spontaneous remarks and observations.

One of the critical points raised in Mr. Hirst's articles was the alleged aim of Mullah Mustafa calling for "autonomy for the Kurds and democracy for all Iraq." Mr. Hirst regards the Mullah as the national leader of the Kurds whom he met in liberated Kurdistan. He writes, "Barzani appears to have the wholehearted support of every significant element of the Kurdish people. In the mountains, tribes which traditionally opposed the Barzanis have rallied to him... A hundred religious leaders have declared for Barzani. Students abroad are overwhelmingly with him. Above all, Kurdish 'emigres' in the Arab cities of Iraq, a largely apolitical silent majority, have voted with their feet. They have migrated in the tens of thousands to a hard and dangerous life in 'liberated Kurdistan.'"

Mr. Hirst conceives of the struggle in terms of personalities, not class analysis. . . . He writes, "it must be a nightmare for Sidam (Saddam Hussein is the Vice President of the Revolutionary Command Council). He cannot find a single respected Kurd to endorse his own autonomy plan. His newly appointed Vice President and Ministers, including Barzani's long disgraced eldest son, carry little weight. He cannot find 80 Kurds to appoint let alone elect, to his 80 man regional assembly."

According to Hirst, the Kurds are rebelling because the Iraqi government refuses to grant them the Kirkuk province which he considers to "have always been a predominantly Kurdish area though for many years now, successive Iraqi governments have been using devious and years now,



According to Hirst, the Kurds are rebelling because the Iraqi government refuses to grant them the Kirkuk province which he considers to " have always been a predominantly Kurdish area though for many years now, successive Iraqi governments have been using devious and coercive means to Arabize it." They also seek " autonomy for the Kurds underpinned by democracy in the country as a whole. Instead, as they see it , Arabs and Kurds ~~are~~ at present groaning under the most tight-knit, savage tyranny in the country's modern history. " Lastly, he says the Kurds dismiss the planned regional assembly as "a total farce."

As regards the Pesh Merga, he quotes the "officially estimated" number of 45,000 lightly armed militia whose support more or less comes from Iran. Hirst justifies Iranian support thus: "He (Mullah Mustafa) needs the support of the Shah, his only real backer in the outside world. He must therefore assure him that, in getting it, he will not eventually grow strong or ambitious enough to export his revolution to the Shah's Kurdish subjects." Furthermore, Hirst explains the Shah's unequivocal support as counteracting Soviet influence in the area: " It is this above all which has persuaded the Shah, for all his reservations to commit himself so firmly behind Barzani."

Hirst implies that the northern provinces of Iraq are under Barzani control defended by 130,000 people "who" have taken to the hills" and inflicted heavy losses on the Iraqi armed forces. He quotes Abdullah Pizhdari, who has been with Mullah since 1946, as saying, "Iraqi morale is not low. It is non-existent." Yet Hirst makes the following claim: " It is evidently Saddam Hussein Takriti's object to bomb all these people where they came from. For he has just extended the amnesty under which they can return without penalty. There are fears, too, that if bombing fails, he will try to gas them back. " Without providing any evidence, Mr. Hirst quotes Barzani accusing the government of "genocidal war waged by the wild beasts of Baghdad. " His source apparently is the Kurdish radio which reported that 281 air attacks took place between April 19th and May 4th in which 307 civilians died in the Qala Diza area. Hirst accepts the figures without casting doubt about them.

The general line of Hirst, which is the official line of Mullah Mustafa, has in varying degrees been propounded by the international press unquestioningly since the early 60's. Of late, Joseph Fitchett of the Observer (March 16) reiterated the same line regarding Mullah's international connections and added: "Once supported by the Soviet Union, Barzani believes the Russians have now switched totally to the Baath's idea of Kurdish autonomy and will back the Iraqi government in the renewed conflict. Searching desperately for a counter-balance to Soviet power, Barzani and his lieutenants have tried to interest Washington, but in vain." Furthermore, Fitchett pointed out that American officials have refused to meet Barzani because of a CENTO pact clause that inhibits subversion in an allied country, though Barzani says he "would be willing to sign an agreement renouncing Kurdish separatist claims in Iran and Turkey in exchange for help in Iraq" Why should these separatist claims be confined to Iraq only is not explained, although it is well known that over 5 million Kurds live in Iran without cultural or political rights and over four million live in Turkey as "mountain Turks."

Finally, Georgie Anne Geyer of the Chicago Daily News, (April 18 ) who adheres to the same thesis, concludes the following "Thus what is changing is not the political system - terror is gradually diminishing simply because the Baathists feel secure in power, and because most of their enemies are wiped out."

Self Rule and its Executors

A. Barzani: "First enemy of democracy"

The general consensus among the Kurds who were interviewed is that Mullah Mustafa Barzani stands for the very opposite of autonomy and democracy—that he is a dictator surrounded by feudal lords intent upon maintaining power over a traditionalist, tribal society. According to Obeidallah Barzani, who fled from his father in 1971, Mullah Mustafa uses divide and rule tactics and terrorism to maintain his position of preeminence. "Less than 25% of the Iraqi Kurds support my father," he says, "and most of them are spying against one another. Those who want to live demonstrate their support for him; if anyone betrays the slightest opposition, Mullah Mustafa is informed and the person will be killed or arrested." Of the reported 100,000 people still living under Mullah's domination, "90% stay there under coercion rather than voluntary participation in the affairs of the area he has occupied." If a tribal leader is perceived as a threat to Mullah Mustafa, he is dealt with harshly and excluded from the ranks of the elite. Indeed, in many instances, a hostage system is exercised in order to prevent a potential rival from challenging Mullah Mustafa. According to Obeidallah Barzani, this means that relatives and friends are transferred by the Pesh Merga into Iran and held there as a means of blackmailing the opposition.

Obeidallah Barzani does not find it easy to deprecate his father, but "what is forcing me to do this is his treachery against the Kurdish interests. My people are more important than my father. He is the first enemy of democracy, and cannot accept autonomy because he would be one among others. We will gladly accept a plebiscite

in the "liberated territory". If 1,000 civilian Kurds vote for my father, I and the other Kurdish ministers will resign we will say he represents us and we will follow him".

Minister of State Hashem Akrawi carries the argument further: "Let Mullah Mustafa open the roads and let an international committee question the people and ask who will go and who will stay." Akrawi contends that 20 to 30 family and tribal friends, who act as Mullah Mustafa's henchmen; exercise power in every department of the national movement and are only accountable to Mullah, not to the DPK and its responsible organs. In fact, Mullah regards himself as the embodiment of the party and the national movement and he periodically uses the party to serve his private interests. "The kind of democracy Barzani practices" adds Akrawi, "is not a democracy by the people and for the people, but a democracy for the tribal leaders". Akrawi accuses the foreign press of lionizing and idealizing a feudal autocracy that preys upon the Kurdish people, and he challenges newsmen to come and see for themselves how the new Iraqi Kurdistan is being built and how the representatives of the property are carrying out a social transformation which will, in effect, create a new Kurdistan citizen with full rights and secure socio-economic conditions.

Speaking in the same vein, Abdul Sheriff, the Secretary General of the Revolutionary Kurdish Party, contends that of the more than 2 million Kurds living in Iraq, most

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are living as peaceful citizens cooperating in the making of a new Kurdistan and disassociating themselves from the terrorism waged in their name by a defunct ruling clique that represents not the masses of peasants and workers but the feudal elements of Kurdish society. He believes that the workers and peasants are assuming their rightful position in a Kurdish Arab brotherhood and contends that he and his colleagues represent their hopes and aspirations, not Mullah Mustafa and his clique.

Sheikh Othman Ahmed Barzani, son and spiritual heir of the historic Kurdish leader of the Barzanis, Sheikh Ahmed, explained to the fact finding committee how Mullah maintains his terror apparatus and individualist rule and how neither relative of former friend is exempted from it. Sheikh Othman bluntly states, " We left my home town of Barzan under extreme hardships. It was not easy to escape. It took us over two weeks to travel from Barzan to Mosul through mountainous territory and there were occasional military encounters. Indeed, my followers and I had been under constant surveillance for several weeks before we managed to evade our watchers and run for our lives ". The fact finding committee asked him his reasons for leaving. He replied, " Although the protection of Barzan was uppermost in my mind, I left because the Iraqi national government seemed to be fairly genuine in its attempt to implement self rule for my people. Because of this feeling, I arranged for some of my followers

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to remain behind while I took with me over 500 of my men as a token of our support for the national government; we hope to place them at the disposal of the government to fight Mullah Mustafa and his Iranian supplied and supported Pesh Merga ".

B. Barzani guilty of bad faith

Although errors seem to have been committed on both sides because of a traditional legacy of mistrust and suspicion, it appears to the Kurdish ministers that Mullah Mustafa has been guilty of bad faith throughout, particularly since the proclamation of the March 11th

1970 Manifesto. For instance, on such profoundly critical issues as the disarmament of the pesh Merga, the sovereignty of the law, and the demographic character of Kirkuk, Mullah Mustafa violated accords reached after intensive negotiations and commitments to the results of the negotiations.

The pesh Merga, which consisted of about 20,000 troops at its apogee in 1970, was to be converted in part to border guards under the authority of the Iraqi armed forces while the rest were to be rehabilitated into public life. Instead of carrying out this agreement, Mullah Mustafa, rather than sever his relations with Iran, strengthened them and despatched forces to train at Iranian military colleges particularly in the use of heavy weapons. Moreover, the Pesh Merga was not dismantled but enlarged and was kept under his direct personal authority. What Mullah Mustafa apparently sought, according to Akrawi, was a respite in order to create dual authority and entrench himself in Northern region.

In addition, Barazani did not uphold the Sovereignty of the law, because he and his colleagues sabotaged the agrarian reform law which affected the class of feudalists that support him, and created chaos in the region by intimidating peasants whose claims he denied. According to all the Kurdish Ministers interviewed, Barazani wanted to preserve the northern backwardness and poverty which are the essential prerequisites of his continued dominance. Consequently central planning authorities could not carry out the building of proposed factories or the maintenance of social and health services in the area. Barazani's followers did not only make life difficult for those law-abiding citizens but also imposed taxes upon them and tarred them with a brush of treason for collaboration with the central authorities.

As regards Kirkuk, Mullah Mustafa insisted that it be treated as a Kurdish city when in fact it is a city populated by minorities none of which can claim sole authority (Kirkuk's Governor Tabra says that the Kurds make up 40% of 600,000 inhabitants in the entire province, and less than 30% of the 240,000 living in the town.) An agreement was reached between the government and Mullah Mustafa that the census of 1957 be applied in the estimation of population because of the relative tranquility which prevailed then. At the last minute, Barazani backed down on this agreement, presumably because he realized that even in 1957 the Kurds in Kirkuk were in the minority. The Government made an alternative suggestion to Barazani: areas in the province where Kurds are in a majority can go along with autonomy, while areas populated by minorities will be administered by the Arabs. Once again, Barazani refused. Finally, the Government offered to place Kirkuk under a joint Arab-Kurdish rule. Barazani rejected this last proposal.

" So what does he want?" queries Hashem Akrawi. " We doubted Mullah Mustafa before, but we thought he would change when he saw black and white in front of him. But when he rejected the three Kirkuk proposals, we were convinced that he was too tied to outside forces. The Government gave him everything just to prove he is a foreign agent. Even if we divided Iraq down the middle, he would never accept." ( or, as Obeidallah Barazani commented, " Give him Baghdad and he'll ask for Basra").

#### C. Barzani's international Connections .

One of the principal causes of the conflict between Barazani and the central authorities is that he refused to sever his relations with Iran and indirectly, with the CENTO powers and their sponsor, the United States. Indeed, the progressive Kurds believe that Barazani has acted as a tool of

Iranian power vis-a-vis Iraq, especially during periods of crises between Iraq and Iran. Since there are territorial disputes between Iraq and Iran over the Shatt el Arab River, and since Iran and the U. S., which claim supremacy in the Arab Gulf, view Iraq as a subversive and revolutionary regime which must be overthrown, it is in their best interests that the Baathist regime be toppled. Moreover, the timing of Barazani's military moves and activities invariably coincide with moves made in the areas by Iran and the U.S. Whenever there are military incidents on the Iraqi-Iranian border, Barazani intensifies his military operations. Put more clearly, Barazani launched all out war when it became evident that Iraq was leading the rejection front against an Arab-Israeli settlement favorable to American and Israeli interests. This situation, feel the Kurdish ministers, cannot but place in doubt the loyalty of Mullah Mustafa Barazani to Iraq and the well being of the Kurdish people. And since Barazani has firmly pledged not to raise the Kurdish question in either Iran or Turkey, it seems fairly logical to the interviewees that he is working in concert with the enemies of Iraq and in compliance with the wishes of imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction.

To illustrate this point further, Sub-Governor Shwani of Chamchamal was asked by Karsten Prager of Time to give evidence backing up his charges against Mullah Mustafa's imperialists connections. The Sub-Governor's answer: "Yours truly was the pesh Merga contact man with the Iranians but because of my proximity to the loci of power and knowledge of delegates who negotiated with the Israelis and Americans, I know for certain that Mullah Mustafa works in close collaboration with the Iranians, the Israelis and Americans. And, unfortunately, some right wing stated also support him." (The committee presumes he was referring to some Arab regimes).

To corroborate Shwani's position, Gbeidallah Barazani claims,

that prior to his break with his father in 1971, "at least 10 Israelis and eight or nine Iranians were acting as weapons experts for my father. I can give you no other proof except that I am Barazani's son and I was there."

Whenever these disclosures were made, the committee pointed out that in many circles Mullah Mustafa is known as the Red Mullah because of his alleged communist connections. The interviewees smiled readily and answered practically in chorus that such was the case in the 1960's but since the Iraqi government enacted the agrarian reform law, nationalized the oil monopolies, announced the March 11th Manifesto and formed the national and Nationalists progressive Front, the Soviet Union and the socialist camp decided that they must endorse Arab-Kurdish brotherhood and help the Government of Iraq to withstand the imperialists onslaught against it and the Gulf. The Ministers themselves said they were a little astounded that there are still progressive or liberal minded elements who believe Mullah Mustafa is still the champion of the national cause.

#### D. BARAZANI AND THE DPK

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6 The Democratic Party of Kurdistan, whose historic background can be traced back to the 20's, has been the champion of the Kurdish national cause.

The cause has always been frustrated, with the exception of a brief period in 1946 when the Mahabad Republic was established in Iran with the assistance of the Soviet Union. But the Shah crushed the infant Republic and ever since he has suppressed every Iranian Kurd who advocated nationalism.

Because of Mullah Mustafa's role in the Republic, and his active participation in the national cause, he became a "legendary



figure of the Kurdish people". For this and other reasons, the central committee of the DPK elected him chairman in 1959 without consulting him, as he was living in the soviet union. When Heneral Kassem of the July 14th, 1958 Revolution amenstied Mullah Mustafa and invited him to return to the national fold, Mullah did so, but within a period of time he instiga ted a rebellion against the Kassem regim e and surreptiously changed alliances. However, when the central committee discovered that he was collaborating with the Americans and the Ira nians and working for the implementation of CENTO plans in the region, the central committee expelled Mullah Mustafa in 1964 for his deviation a nd denounced him for his reactionary alliances. Thereupon, Mullah esta blished his own party and each wing maintaintained the same name: DPK

Mullah Musta fa, who is said to be a non-ideological man, an opportunist and an anti-party person, cultivated a perso-nality cult and formed a party that represented his interests and those of the feudal and capitalists classes.

According to Hashem Akrawi, Mullah Mustafa relied heavily on his parastins-"security forces" who infiltra ted every level of the DPK - to spy on members of the party and foment divisions. When the committee asked Akrawi why he and other members had not opposed such tactics he replied "No one could understand this set-up unless he had been a part of it. Members have dis-appeared in to thin air. Right now the search is on for Fakhari Mohamad , member of Politburo of DPK but as yet no one has found a trace of him."

A large number of the Kurdish progressives did not abandon Mullah Mustafa<sup>arguing</sup> "We must deal with the devil, to attain our national objective, the reco gnition of Kurdish legitimate rights." However, when the Iraqi government, on the ivitiative of the Baath party, not only recognized cultural rights but gra nted and recognized regional autonomy, the progressives urged Mullah

Mustafa to accept. A national Kurdish reconciliation was effectuated. But within two years, a number of radicals and liberal minded elements decided that Mullah Mustafa was not intent on peace but on war, consequently they proclaimed the Revolutionary Kurdish party in 1972 and called upon all progressive elements to rally behind it.

Besides the Kurdish Revolutionary party there also emerged the progressive party and the DPK, which repudiated anew the DPK of Barazani. In other words, in addition to the independent individuals, three political movements surfaced among Iraqi Kurds and all aimed at the opposition and exposure of Mullah Mustafa's "isolationist, chauvinist" forces of the DPK. In fact, attempts are being made now to form a unified Kurdish party consisting of communists and the aforementioned parties in order to replace and complete the liquidation of the DPK alla Barazani. Moreover, the interviewees assert that their parties are mushrooming everywhere in Kurdistan and the DPK of Barazani is disintegrating.

#### IMPRESSION AND REFLECTIONS

The most striking feature of those interviewed was their manifest self confidence and their conviction regarding the justice of their cause. Their smiles and calmness in the face of challenge show clearly that the problem has been thought out and they are committed to the execution of regional autonomy.

Another feature is their relative youth and obvious dedication to Arab Kurdish brotherhood and solidarity. They exude more than self confidence they are very optimistic about the future and certain that a new age is dawning for both Kurds and Arabs and that in the very near future Mullah Mustafa and his clique will wither away.

As the committee visited Kurkuk and Suleimaniya Governorates, it was evident that the Pesh Merga had adopted a scorched - earth policy as it retreated in the face of the advancing Iraqi army. The committee was informed by official and civilian interviewees that no prologned military engagement took place

near or in the cities. But the Pesh Merga, in addition to burning crops, took along with it hospital equipment, food stuffs and other needs and burned down public properties that it could not carry along. The Committee was shown a hospital in Chamchamal where nothing but burned-out empty rooms were left behind, and the doctor in charge, a Kurd, explained to Karsten Prager of Time how doctors and nurses were forced to go with the Pesh Merga along with their medical supplies. The doctor also apprized the committee that an earnest attempt was being made to rebuild the schools and hospital of Chamchamal, a town of 6,000 which has suddenly swollen to 11,000. More are expected to come as thousands of Kurds "vote with their feet" to return to their home towns and crops.

The Pesh Merga, which had consisted of approximately 15-26,000 troops, coerced many young men to join it. In some instances, social pressure and psychic blandishments were enough to persuade youth to join.

The case of Suleimaniya University is indicative of the social pressure applied. Of 500 Kurdish students there, 300 went to the mountains near Qala Diza where they were promised a university would be set up. A university student who just returned from there informed the committee that his going to the mountain was an act of faith in the national movement because he didn't want to be accused of being treasonous to his Kurdish people. But when he discovered that there was neither a university nor the prospects for one, and the cause as seen by Barazani was alien to the doctrines propounded by the DPK in the past, he and many others returned to Suleimaniya. Indeed the same university student told the committee that of the 300 who were "persuaded " to go to Qala Diza, only 50 or 60 remain " because they have families there and cannot come back". Consequently, it is estimated by the Governor of Suleimaniya<sup>and</sup> others that the swollen numbers of the Pesh Megga which followed the break up of negotiations in March have greatly deteriorated and it could not possibly exceed 10,000.

That the Governor of Suleimaniya was serious in what he said was displayed by his readiness not only to have the committee freely go around town as desired and elsewhere, but to accompany the committee to the summit of Mount Azmar where Kurdish and Arab troops were not only in high spirits but confident of their victory and the coming of peace in Iraq in the foreseeable future.

When the committee<sup>asked</sup>/the officers about indiscriminate bombing and killing of their fellow Kurdish citizens they were under strict orders not to engage in continuous and all out warfare because the Government wants to persuade the Kurdish rebels to put down their arms and return to lead a peaceful life in a united Iraq. The officers and their soldiers acknowledged the fact that in war many innocent people get killed and it hurts them to have to kill their fellow citizens. However, because the integrity of the Iraqi Republic is a stake, and because of foreign intervention in the area, they were prepared to fight to serve the flag and the country. They did express a sincere desire for peace and looked forward to Arab-Kurdish amity.

The Committee's overall impression is that both Arabs and Kurds have grown war-weary and plead for peace. Part of this war-weariness is seen as they discuss how the government has more or less boxed Barazani's forces in to the borders of Iran, whence his lifeline comes. Universal pain was expressed at the loss of civilian life, especially in the Qala Diza area where the Iraqi air force bombed what is said to be a very powerful area of espionage training and presence of foreign agents. The governor of Suleimaniya noted with sadness that about 20 civilians were injured and 7 or 8 killed, while the governor of Kirkuk<sup>o</sup> challenged the international press to authenticate its inflated claims and its allegations of barbarism on the part of the Iraqi armed forces. He assured the committee that Iraq is much

more concerned with the well being of its citizens than with journalists looking for scoops. Indeed, he asked for a photograph of Karsten Prager and then told Mr. Prager to see for himself what is going on in Iraq and warned Mr. Prager that "should you fail to report the truth objectively, I will sit down and curse your photograph".

Charlotte Dennett

Dr George Hajjar



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(NBR 1/2)

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TO ROUTINE TEHRAN TELEGRAM NO. 491 OF 26 NOVEMBER. 1974

SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND AND THE KURDS.

1. DR NOEL MOYNIHAN, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OVERSEAS RELIEF COMMITTEE OF THE SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND TELEPHONED WRIGHT ON 26 NOVEMBER TO SAY THAT HE WAS PROPOSING TO FLY TO TEHRAN ON 2 DECEMBER TO DISCUSS RELIEF FOR THE KURDS WITH THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES. MOYNIHAN HAS WRITTEN SEPARATELY TO YOU ABOUT THIS.

2. MOYNIHAN HAS ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH GENERAL SIR ALEXANDER DRUMMOND AND LORD OXMANTOWN. WRIGHT WARNED MOYNIHAN THAT YOU WERE LIKELY TO BE HEAVILY PRE-OCCUPIED WITH THE VISIT OF THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER AND ALSO ADVISED HIM

- A) THAT THE RED LION AND SUN SOCIETY REGARDED THEMSELVES AS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KURDISH REFUGEE CAMPS IN IRAN AND THAT ANY FURTHER OFFER OF ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE TACTFULLY PRESENTED AND
- B) THAT IN TERMS OF OUR POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH IRAQ IT IS IMPORTANT THAT BRITISH RELIEF ORGANISATIONS SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT OPERATE ON IRAQ TERRITORY WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT.

CALLAGHAN

FILES  
MED  
MR WEIR

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED  
27 NOV 1974  
Your reference  
Our reference NBR 1/2  
Date 26 November 1974

R G Giddens  
BAGHDAD

Your reference

Our reference

NBR 1/2

Date

26 November 1974

Dear Dick,

28/11  
AB pe

PLEDGES TO THE KURDS

1. My letter of 21 November, which was signed in my absence, contained the following errors and omissions:

Paragraph 2 line 5 - change "filed" to "files".

Paragraph 2a - add after "Kurdish state" "which ~~might have~~ made it impossible".

Paragraph 2b line 1 - delete the inserted word "while".

Paragraph 2b line 3 - delete "that" and insert "but".

Paragraph 2b line 4 - delete "really" and insert "eventually".

2. I apologise for these errors.

Yours age  
Graham

G S Burton  
Middle East Department

CONFIDENTIAL

~~Panel~~ 'B' Closed

Now See

~~Panel~~ 'C'.

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